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Abstract 
This thesis empirically examines the importance of competitive balance and how 
economic objectives and financial viability play a part in its impact on the demand 
for English football. Previous research in sports economics has been inconclusive 
in the desirability of competitive balance as well as how economic behaviour may 
affect its efficacy. 
Academic opinion is split in its assumptions about whether football clubs act 
as profit maximisers or utility (win) maximisers, which has a direct consequence 
on competitive balance and the policies used to promote it. An econometric test 
of a model of economic objectives in playing performance and revenue generation 
demonstrates that clubs heavily invest in playing talent to achieve those objectives. 
The results also show that the commercialisation of football in the 1990s did not 
appear to affect the achievement of a club's goals, nor did it appear to harm 
competitive balance. However, the failure to obtain the objectives relative to wage 
spending and pitch performance do impose a risk on the financial viability of a club 
and without the proper adjustment mechanisms in place can harm competitive 
balance. The results also show that clubs demonstrate some evidence of profit 
maximising behaviour which implies some policies used to promote competitive 
balance will be ineffective. 
The optimality of perfect competitive balance itself is questionable and econo-
metric tests on match attendance sensitivity to win percentage suggest that a more 
dispersed distribution of wins would maximise attendance and profits. The results 
indicate that polices used to promote more competitive balance above the nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium would harm attendance. 
Lastly competitive balance itself is shown to be complex. Using television au-
dience data, a test of the outcome uncertainty hypothesis indicates that it is not 
pure uncertainty that matters but rather a combination of excitement and potential 
outcomes which affects demand throughout the game. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Economics Within Sport 
The apphcation and examination of economic theory within the context of sport 
is not new. In fact it is a growing branch of economic hterature with its own 
specialised academic journals^, conferences and institutes^. The application and 
testing of economic theory within sport is both increasing and justified. Sports 
provide a bell jar to empirically test economic theories that are not easily testable 
in other industries, i.e., firm behaviour and economic objectives. One of the ad-
vantages of testing economic theory in sport is that it contains many observable 
factors. People can observe the production (the game or event). People watch 
sport because they want to be entertained by the competition between the teams 
(or athletes in individual sporting contests). Sport provides a way for economists 
to observe from start to finish the production line as well as the demand for the 
product (most commonly, the attendance for games and events). And, although 
the sporting event itself may be the primary good, additional markets exist for 
merchandise, sponsorship, television, and advertising. 
Sport provides a useful platform for testing economic theory. With respect to 
team sports, we can observe the behaviour of managers and their strategies; we 
can monitor the inputs (players) a team buys and sells and how much is spent or 
^e.g., Journal of Sports Economics. 
^Notably the Football Governance Research Centre at Birkbeck College-University of London; 
the Centre de Droit et d'Economie du Sport at Universite de Limoges, Prance; and the Centre 
International d'Etude du Sport at Universite de Neuchatel, Switzerland. 
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earned on them, and we can observe demand by knowing how many people attend 
matches and more recently how many watch an event on television. Given this 
information, organisers, participants and consumers can make decisions on how to 
increase profits and utility during the next season. This data rich environment is 
what makes sports so appealing to economists. The data allows us to test theories 
about firm objectives and behaviour (profit maximising or utility maximising), 
attitudes towards risk (e.g., response to injuries, relegation, etc.) and investment (a 
team may decide to forgo an investment if they feel there is no means to recuperate 
a portion of it if the gamble fails), theories of ownership and property rights (Berle-
Means, Coase) to name a few. 
Sport is also a subject for politics and governmental bodies. When the or-
ganisational structure of a league or competition for a popular game comes under 
scrutiny, economic opinion is often invited to support the arguments for both sides. 
During the 1994/95 U.S. Congressional session alone, approximately 28 pieces of 
legislation were introduced into the House of Representatives or Senate about base-
ball^. These Bills concerned the organisational structure of the league, anti-trust 
acts as well as labour laws. In the UK, the Parliamentary All Party Football Group 
and Independent Football Commission were set up to examine the corporate gov-
ernance, development and financial trends within football. At a broader European 
level, the Independent European Football Review "aims to evaluate various issues 
affecting modern-day European football including: the central role of the football 
authorities; the ownership, control and management of clubs; the level of expendi-
ture in respect of players; activities of agents; the system of player registration and 
movement; the distribution of revenues within European football; the provision 
of funding to generate opportunities for all people to participate in football; and 
investment in football stadiums with a focus on safety and security.'"^ 
Most of the political and legal issues concerning sport have had to do with 
competition, anti-trust legislation^and labour mobility® and these debates continue. 
Rottenberg (1956) wrote one of the first academic articles addressing sport within 
^E.g., see http://www.baseballl.com/bb-data/congress/i-hr45.html for a summary of the leg-
islation. 
www.independentfootballreview.com 
®In the U.S., several cases went to court: 1922 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. 
National Baseball Clubs, 1953 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 
®In 1972 Flood v. Kuhn challenged the reserve clause in U.S. baseball; in 1995 the Jean-Marc 
Bosman case went before the Eurpean Court of Justice to challenge football's transfer rules. 
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the context of economics. At the time there was debate about the justification 
of U.S. baseball's 'reserve clause,' which limited the free movement of a baseball 
player upon the expiration of his contract with a club. The club held the right 
to renew a player's contract or not thereby restricting the player from moving to 
another club. The justification for the reserve clause, according to the owners, was 
to maintain some equality amongst the professional teams so that the richer clubs 
(clubs in larger market areas such as New York and Chicago) would not be able to 
buy up all the good players, which could perpetually prevent the smaller clubs from 
being able to achieve success. Rottenberg argued that because sporting contests 
rely on sporting competition, profit maximising clubs would not have an incentive 
to buy up all the good competition. If some teams were too powerful and the games 
and league championships were too predictable then the competition would not be 
entertaining and demand would fall. There existed an economic motivation for big 
clubs to refrain from becoming too powerful, which implied that the competitive 
balance argument for the reserve clause was incorrect. 
The theory of competitive balance is one of the most commonly used arguments 
to justify various sports league policies as well as anti-trust exemption. Compet-
itive balance has been used to defend restrictions on player mobility (such as the 
reserve clause above), the collective selling of television broadcast rights and wage 
restrictions. This is appealing to economists because some practices and restric-
tions allowed in sport, would be deemed illegal in other industries. Sport has 
usually been treated more leniently because of the competitive balance argument. 
1.2 Football in England 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the theory of competitive balance within the 
context of English football. Statistical and financial data is widely available and 
more accessible for the English football leagues than in other European leagues. 
The structural nature of football in England is not unique^ but it is markedly 
different from the way sports leagues are organised within the U.S. Sports leagues 
in the U.S. are 'closed,' meaning new members are only allowed at the permission 
of the existing members and usually for a large fee. Thus, there is no risk of 
^Similar structures exist for other European and Latin American football leagues (e.g. Italy, 
Germany, Prance, Spain, Holland, Argentina, and Brazil), European basketball, rugby and cricket. 
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dropping out of the top tier if a team does badly. No matter what the success 
of a team in U.S. leagues, they are guaranteed participation in the competition 
next season. While teams may not drop out of the league, they can re-locate to 
other metropolitan areas (usually at taxpayers' expense®). In Europe, however, the 
leagues are 'open,' meaning that practically anyone can form a team, enter it into 
a competition within the lower divisions and by playing success work its way up 
into the top professional tiers. Ross &: Szymanski (2002) argue that because teams 
want to avoid relegation, they tend to have greater incentives to invest in playing 
talent compared to their North American counterparts. U.S. sports teams also act 
as local monopolies because league rules limit the number of clubs within a given 
metropolitan region. Such restrictions do not exist in England, and anyone could 
start a club in any city and compete within the lower leagues and move to higher 
leagues through playing success®. This development arose due to the exclusiveness 
granted to U.S. baseball owners in the National League of Professional Base Ball 
Clubs in 1876. Another difference is the exchange of players. In the U.S., leagues 
forbid cash transactions for players, whereas in the English leagues, clubs may 
purchase players with cash. The different incentives and structures of the two 
leagues, implies we should focus our empirical work only upon one. We choose 
English football mainly due to the availability of large amounts of statistical and 
financial data and information. Football is also the world's most popular sport, and 
it is hoped that our results would be as widely applicable as possible. According 
to Deloitte & Touche, "Over the past five to ten years the football industry has 
become increasingly globalised. This can be seen in the player transfer market, 
clubs marketing strategies, global brands investing in the game, TV rights sales 
and cross-border ownership." 
1.3 Contribution and Motivation of Thesis 
Each chapter addresses a different factor concerning competitive balance. Chapter 
3 asks if a change in economic objectives occurred within English football and if so 
did this affect competitive balance and incentives. Chapter 4 questions the impact 
®See Noll & Zimbalist (1997) for a review. 
®Within the M25 (the highway loop surrounding London) there are seven Premiership clubs: 
Arsenal, Charlton Athletic, Chelsea, Fulham, Tottenham Hotspur, West Ham United and Wat-
ford. 
^°Source: Deloitte & Touche Press Release 14 November 2005. See http://www.deloitte.com. 
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of financial constraints and whether the failure to obtain economic objectives affects 
economic behaviour and competitive balance. Chapter 5 addresses the optimal 
level of competitive balance and whether the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
is preferable in achieving the correct level of competitive balance as opposed to 
levels achieved by implementing restrictive policies. Chapter 6 examines demand 
and to what extent competitive balance influences demand for football. The tying 
theme is that since Rottenberg (1956), a central theme in sports economics has 
examined how competitive balance affects demand for sport and whether demand 
might fall when contests become too imbalanced. The methods in trying to achieve 
or enhance competitive balance have centred on implementing policies to improve 
it. However, policies can only be effective if the correct assumptions are made about 
the economic objectives of clubs. Each Chapter in this thesis contributes to this 
interrelationship between economic objectives, competitive balance and demand. 
One of the ambitions of this thesis is to address whether arguments for competi-
tive balance are valid and additionally if competitive balance is always ideal. There 
has been the notion that competitive balance is always preferred, but no one has 
really questioned how much should be desired or what is optimal. Additionally, we 
aim to contribute to the research literature about the validity of the competitive 
balance argument. While it may constitute one of the largest research areas of 
sports economics literature, there is no generally agreed consensus about competi-
tive balance, its influence on demand and the policies used to promote it (Zimbalist 
(2002), Szymanski (2003)). To understand the motivation for 'equality enhancing' 
and protective policies used in sport we also need to examine the underlying eco-
nomic objectives of sporting clubs. Many of the competitive rules governing the 
structure of leagues and the movement of labour within them crucially rely on 
given assumptions about firm behaviour, i.e., if they are profit-maximising or win-
maximising. The behaviour of a sporting club is not easy to test directly and it is a 
divisive issue amongst sports economists (conspicuously divided by the Atlantic). 
There exists two schools of thought: U.S. sports economists tend to beUeve that 
sports clubs are profit maximisers while their European counterparts believe clubs 
are win maximisers. The true objectives of club owners have direct consequences 
on the efficacy of competitive balance policies. Another motivation of this thesis 
is to provide a model to test and observe economic behaviour of sporting clubs. 
Competitive balance and economic behaviour of firms are inseparable theoretical 
features within sports economics: one is affected by the other. The aim of this 
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thesis is to present current behefs about these theories and test their vahdity and 
optimahty and how that might affect the pohcy and organisation of sports, eco-
nomically and generally. 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter 2 we shall review the background 
economic theory and the relevant literature concerning firms economic objectives 
and competitive balance within sport. Here we shall also point out the unresolved 
and existing issues in the research and where we hope to contribute. Chapter 3 
re-establishes and builds upon the existing models of objectives of English football 
clubs in addition to providing an empirical means of testing the economic behav-
iour. In Chapter 4 we introduce and test an adjustment mechanism when objectives 
are (or aren't) met and how that might affect rationality and risk taking. If the 
economic environment becomes riskier due to an imposed pohcy (for the sake of 
competitive balance), we should examine the potential effects. Chapter 5 further 
questions the 'optimal' level of competitive balance by considering the sensitiv-
ity of demand to varying hypothetical levels of inequality in the football league. 
Chapter 6 makes use of television audience data to determine how much compet-
itive balance (and within that outcome uncertainty relative to our expectations) 
matters or affects demand. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the conclusions and 
suggestions for future work. 
Chapter 2 
Established Theory and 
Literature 
Much of sports economics research has centred around competitive balance policies 
and their effectiveness. Due to the 'peculiar economics' of professional sports, the 
sporting industry has been treated differently than most other industries. In 1964, 
the economist Walter Neale explained: "The sporting firms produce an indivisible 
product from the separate processes of two or more firms (in law). But the prod-
uct itself is a peculiar mixture: it comes divisible into parts, each of which can be 
and is sold separately, but it is also a joint and multiple yet indivisible product."^ 
What Neale meant was that while sports clubs could sell individual seats in their 
stadiums, there were also joint products: the match itself and the utihty derived 
from being entertained by the match and the race for the championship. A team 
needed an adversary to play against in order to produce the match and champi-
onship race. Without a competitor there was no product, thus the peculiarity. 
Because of this sporting competition necessity, significant attention was given to 
the teams' competitiveness. Rottenberg (1956) first suggested that the attendance 
of baseball matches is amongst other things ".. . [a negative function] of the disper-
sion of percentages of games won by the teams in the league. That is to say, the 
'tighter' the competition, the larger the attendance."^ 
Since then, the bulk of theoretical and empirical literature has focused on this 
notion of competitive balance, its impact on demand and its justification for impos-
iNeale (1964) p. 2-3. 
^Rottenberg (1956) p. 246. 
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ing and defending restrictive trade practices. Theoretically, economists have hy-
pothesised about the real influence of policies such as anti-trust exemption, labour 
mobility restrictions (e.g., the reserve clause), and the collective selling of televi-
sion broadcast rights on competitive balance. Empirically, economists have played 
a role in deriving and testing competitive balance measures and their impact on 
demand as well as testing the hypotheses of the theoretical research.^ 
2.1 Competitive Imbalance 
2.1,1 Money and Success 
The premise that restrictive measures are needed to improve competitive balance 
is that there is an imbalance to begin with. Competitive imbalance implies a 
higher level of certainty about the outcome of a match or championship. The 
level of certainty surrounding a game or season is associated with the quality of the 
teams competing against each other. For example a team consisting of superstars is 
almost certain to win a match against a team of part-time amateurs. One source of 
inequality between the two sides is the quality level of playing talent which is funded 
by unequal resources. One hypothesis is that better resources (more money) buy 
better players. The concern and justification of many sports leagues for policies 
to restrict player movement and wages has been anchored in the argument that 
rich teams will buy all the good players and the weaker teams will be left with the 
poorer quality remnants. Rottenberg (1956) responded to this concern when he 
wrote his seminal article about the effect of the reserve clause on the distribution of 
playing talent in U.S. baseball. Rottenberg refuted the idea that the reserve clause 
lead to a more equal distribution of talent. Rottenberg stated "It seems indeed, to 
be true that a market in which freedom is limited by a reserve rule such as that now 
which governs the baseball labor market distributes players among teams about as 
a free market would." ^  The reason being that since attendance is partially driven 
by 'close' races, profit maximising teams would not want to dominate by too much, 
thus they would not want to buy all the good players. 
Higher team spending on better playing talent increases the likelihood of suc-
^For example testing the impact of free agency in U.S. baseball on competitive balance before 
and after its introduction. 
Rottenberg (1956) p. 225. 
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cess in a competition. Early studies indirectly modelled the relationship between 
players' wages and club success with mixed results. By attempting to model the 
level of monopsonistic exploitation of baseball players, Scully (1974) implicitly de-
rived a model of playing success and salary. Using salary data from Major League 
Baseball, Zimbalist (1992a) also found evidence of player exploitation since the cor-
relation between pay and performance was low. In contrast, Szymanski & Smith 
(1997) estimated the relationship between pay and performance in Enghsh football 
for forty-eight clubs between 1974 and 1989 and found a very strong correlation 
(R^ = 0.85). In a similar vein, Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) estimate the relation-
ship for forty clubs between 1978 and 1997 and also found a high correlation (R^ 
= 0.92). Comparing this to the era of restricted player mobility and a maximum 
wage limit^ indicates that the players market became much more efficient. 
Comparatively, studies analysing U.S. sports have found low correlations (e.g., 
Zimbalist (1992a)) or low correlation and statistical significance of wages on per-
formance, e.g.. Quirk & Fort (1999). Forrest & Simmons (20026) provide a com-
parative analysis and a re-examination of the pay-performance relationship within 
the four major U.S. sports and an extension of the Szymanski & Smith (1997) and 
Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) analysis. Unlike previous U.S. analysis, they do find 
that wages are a statistically significant factor in determining league success. They 
attribute the lack of similar results for U.S. sports to more regulations® and the 
existence of playoffs^ this may explain the low coefficients of correlation. Over-
all they found that wages are a significant predictor of team success®. Empirical 
studies in the U.S. literature show that wages are statistically significant in the per-
formance on wages relationship, but that the explanatory power (R^) is low. The 
pay-performance relationship in studies using European leagues data have higher 
R^ which implies that the differences in wages accounts for more of the variation 
^They also estimated the relationship of performance on pay for twenty-eight clubs between 
1950 and 1960 during which the 'retain and transfer' rule and the maximum wage were still in 
effect. During this period the correlation between salary and league position was only 50%. 
^These include mechanisms to improve competitive balance such as the rookie draft where the 
worst performing team has the first pick of new talent in the following season. 
^In all U.S. sports the playing season is divided into the regular season where teams compete 
for position and the play-offs where qualifying teams play a series of games to reach the next 
round. Theoretically, this means a poor performing club during the regular season could go on to 
become champions if it performed well in the playoffs. A European equivalent would be similar 
to the World Cup finals or the Championship playoffs in the English Football League. 
®Additionally, both Forrest & Simmons (20026) and Szymanski (2003) present comparative 
study tables of pay-performance correlations and significance. 
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in performance (Szymanski (2003)). 
Berri, Schmidt & Brook (2006) offer an alternative explanation for the low 
correlation of payroll and wins in U.S. sports. Wages and wins are poorly correlated 
due to the inconsistency of players performances and the lack of predictive power 
for player performance. In other words, past performance may erroneously lead 
clubs to pay higher salaries for players in hopes that their performance will be 
consistent or even increase in future seasons. Therefore if player performance is 
inconsistent, then predicting future performance will also be inconsistent and wages 
will not correlate very well with actual performance. 
Crucial to this relationship is that the direction of causality runs from pay to 
performance and not from performance to pay. Hall, Szymanski & Zimbalist (2002) 
implement Granger causality tests to ascertain the direction of the relationship in 
both baseball and football. While they cannot reject the hypothesis that perfor-
mance Granger causes wages in baseball they can reject it for football. Again this 
could be attributed to the more restrictive nature of baseball compared to Eng-
lish football®. This provides further evidence that wages increase the likelihood of 
high performance and that the market for players operates efficiently for English 
football. 
The relationship between performance and wages is crucial to understanding 
competitive balance, the inequity of teams and the distribution of playing talent. 
Many measures devised to ' improvecompeti t ive balance focus on shaping the 
distribution of playing talent: the rookie d ra f t in t roduces top new talent to the 
worst performing teams, and former transfer and trade limitations such as the 
reserve clause which limited player movements. Implicitly revenue sharing measures 
also affect talent distribution by allocating revenues from stronger teams to weaker 
teams, which should enable the weaker clubs to purchase more talent^^. 
Critics of the Granger causality test argue that the test has restrictive assumptions about 
the model and is based more on predictability rather than cause and effect. Judge, Hill, Griffiths, 
Liitkepohl & Lee (1988) 
^°Much research in sports economics contests the claim that certain mechanisms improve com-
petitive balance. This is discussed in Section 2.3. 
^^The rookie draft is a procedure in U.S. sports where teams select (draft) first-year or amateur 
players (usually out of university or high-school) to play at the club during the following season. 
The worst performing team of the previous season gets the first pick, the second-worst performing 
team the second pick and so on. 
^^An example is the revenue sharing scheme in the National Football League in the U.S. Under 
the current sharing system, at the start of each season, all the owners receive approximately $100 
million from the national television and radio contracts, national sponsorship deals and one-third 
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2.2 Influence on Demand 
Because the inequahties exist in the abihty to generate the resources to purchase 
playing talent, clubs often cite the need for measures to maintain or improve com-
petitive balance or interest and attendance will fall.^^ Sports league organisers 
and club owners who want to maximise attendance fear that imbalanced contests 
will make the game (or league championship) too predictable and as a result lower 
attendance. Outlined below are the three different types of uncertainty, match, 
seasonal and long-run. Most of the empirical literature has focused on either match 
or seasonal uncertainty. 
2.2.1 Match Uncertainty 
Match outcome uncertainty by definition is the inability to predict the likely win-
ner of an individual match. Although the results are hardly conclusive, there is 
some empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that match outcome uncer-
tainty increases demand. The studies of Peel & Thomas (1988), Peel & Thomas 
(1997), Welki & Zlatoper (1999), Falter & Perignon (2000), Forrest, Simmons & 
Buraimo (2005)^^ all find that demand increases with higher outcome uncertainty. 
However much of the match uncertainty literature comprises mixed results. A few 
studies point to a positive relationship between the probability of the home team 
winning and attendance, although the relationship is negative beyond a home win 
probability of around 0.60 (Whitney (1999), Knowles, Sherony & Haupert (1992), 
Peel & Thomas (1996) and Rascher (1999)). Others have found that match uncer-
tainty yielded no significant impact (Hynds & Smith (1994), Baimbridge, Cameron 
& Dawson (1996), Price & Sen (2003)) and some have found a negative influence 
on match attendance (Peel & Thomas (1992), Forrest & Simmons (2002a), Garcia 
of the gate revenues from each game which is pooled and redistributed to all the teams. Source: 
"NFL's Economic Model Shows Signs of Strain," The Washington Post, 8 January 2005 
large factor in resource generation is the market area of the club, i.e., clubs located in large 
metropolitan areas have a greater market to which to sell their product subject to the stadium 
capacity. This is especially the case in the U.S. where clubs are local monopolies. While television 
broadcasting contracts make up a large portion of revenue in sports leagues, gate attendance is 
also crucial and accounted for 30% of revenue in the English Premiership in the 2003/04 season 
Deloitte & Touche Annual Review of Football Finance (Various Issues). 
^^Borland & McDonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003) provide comprehensive hsts of the main 
findings in outcome uncertainty research. The lists re-produced here cite these two reviews as 
the sources. 
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& Rodriguez (2002)). 
2.2.2 Seasonal Uncertainty 
Seasonal uncertainty pertains to uncertainty about which team will be the cham-
pion. Research in seasonal outcome uncertainty has been more consistent in its 
results with most demonstrating a positive and significant relationship between 
outcome uncertainty and attendance (Noll (1974), Hunt & Lewis (1976), Jennett 
(1984), Borland & Lye (1992), Knowles et al. (1992), Carmichael, Millington &: 
Simmons (1998), Szymanski (2001) and Garcia & Rodriguez (2002), Depken &: 
Wilson (2006)). A handful of papers have shown that seasonal outcome uncer-
tainty was not significant (Rascher (1999), McDonald & Rascher (2000)). 
However, as Szymanski (2003) points out, there are times when fans continue 
to attend matches even though the championship has already been decided. A 
notable example is when Arsenal continued to sell out matches during the 2003/04 
season when they went unbeaten in the league. 
2.2.3 Long-Run Uncertainty 
Lastly, long-run uncertainty consists of uncertainty about who wins the league over 
a longer period of time, i.e. a 'churn' of champions season after season. The research 
in this area is sparse. Schmidt & Berri (2001) and Humphreys (2002) provide some 
support for a positive effect of outcome uncertainty on annual attendance. 
The issue about outcome uncertainty and demand is far from decided. Ac-
cording to Szymanski (2003), ".. .the empirical evidence in this area is far from 
unambiguous." 
Part of the reason for conflicting results can be attributed to the different mea-
sures used for outcome uncertainty and competitive balance. 
Borland & McDonald (2003) suggest a more subtle interpretation. Noting that 
while there is little convincing evidence that higher match-uncertainty increases 
attendance, this does not rule out the effect of uncertainty of outcome on atten-
dance. They say, "This is because the evidence also suggests that there is quite 
iSp. 1156. 
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strong support in existing studies for the existence of a relation between attendance 
and season-level competitive balance-both within a season, and across seasons." 
Berri et al. (2006) cite a " disconnect between the theoretical and empirical 
treatment of competitive balance." According to them, "the problem with em-
pirical studies of competitive balance is that we are not looking at a world where 
the uncertainty of outcome doesn't exist. Even when a team dominates a sport for 
a period of time,.. . , there is still uncertainty of outcome."^® They conclude that 
even if competitive balance is statistically significant in determining attendance, 
the economic significance is small and thus it is not clear how important the level 
of competitive balance is to demand. 
2.2.4 Measuring Outcome Uncertainty and Competitive Bal-
ance 
2.2.4.1 Outcome Uncertainty Measures 
Most studies have utilised match betting odds to capture the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding a match, e.g., Peel. & Thomas (1988), Knowles et al. (1992), and Peel 
& Thomas (1997). However, Forrest & Simmons (2002a) show that betting odds 
are prone to bias and home win odds may be understated while away win odds 
are overstated. Therefore match betting odds are likely to be inaccurate measures 
of outcome uncertainty. Other studies have used the difference in team positions 
(e.g., Borland & Lye (1992) and Baimbridge et al. (1996)), or a factor derived from 
team points (e.g., Wilson & Sim (1995), Garcia & Rodriguez (2002) and Forrest 
et al. (2005)). Forrest & Simmons (2002a) and Forrest et al. (2005) also state the 
need to factor in the 'home advantage' effect into their measure to account for the 
higher likelihood of a home win^®. 
487. 
i7p. 82. 
iSp. 83. 
English football, home teams are twice as hkely to win than the away team, all else being 
equal. 
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2.2.4.2 Competitive Balance Measures 
Various measures of competitive balance have also been used in the literature. The 
most common measure is the standard deviation of win percentages^^ (see Scully 
(1989), Quirk & Fort (1997)). The larger the standard deviation, the greater the 
imbalance. One of the criticisms of this measure has been its inability to contrast 
competitive balance across seasons, i.e., it cannot capture the movement of different 
teams over different seasons. One solution proposed by Eckard (1998) is to break 
the variance into a time element and a cross-sectional element^^. Other proposed 
measures have been entropy^^ (Horowitz (1997)), concentration measures such as 
the Herffndahl-Hirschman Indexes^^ (Depken (1999)) which measures the concen-
tration of championships over time, and distribution type measures such as the 
Gini coefficient^'' (Schmidt (2001), Schmidt & Berri (2001)). Buzzacchi, Szyman-
ski & Valletti (2003) derive a dynamic measure of competitive balance to assess the 
probability of clubs entering into the top k ranks of both open and closed leagues^^. 
Humphreys (2002) offers a review of these measures of competitive balance as well 
as presenting an alternative measure; the competitive balance ratio^®. 
2.2.5 Measuring Demand 
Another contestable measure has been how to accurately measure demand. Almost 
all studies use gate attendance (aggregate or average) as a measure of demand^^. 
However there are several problems with using gate attendance: (1) capacity con-
straints which limits the estimation of the 'true' demand since it is censored (Sim-
mons (1996), Dobson & Goddard (2001)) (2) the make-up of the home attendance 
mostly consists of home fans who want to see their team win^ ® and (3) much of the 
attendance consists of season-ticket holders who, according to Feehan, Forrest & 
= \/[EtiiWPCTu - 0.500)2]/iv 
+ (T'cuM' Eckard (1998), Eckard (2001a), Eckard (20016). 
= —T,iPilog2Pi, where pi is the probabihty of the event, Horowitz (1997) p. 375. 
Depken (1999), p. 208. 
= (1 + i ) - * (Zjv,i -t- 2 * XN-i,i + 3 * XN^2,i + .•• + N* Xi^i), Schmidt (2001), p. 24. 
^®'Open' leagues are where different teams may enter and exit league through promotion and 
relegation whereas 'closed' leagues are those which consist of the same teams each season. 
Humphreys (2002) p. 137. 
^^See Borland & McDonald (2003) for a comprehensive review. 
^^Knowles et al. (1992), Peel & Thomas (1996) and Rascher (1999) found that attendance is 
maximised when the home team has a much higher probability of winning (approximately 0.60). 
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Simmons (2002), attend nearly all the home matches. The last two points imply 
a level of consumer loyalty which may be more robust to factors such as competi-
tive balance that influence demand. More recent literature (Forrest et al. (2005)) 
utihses TV audience flgures which circumvent the aforementioned problems. 
2.3 Policy Issues and the Invariance Principle 
Integral to the influence of competitive balance and outcome uncertainty on de-
mand are the policies used to enhance or preserve competitive balance. A large 
portion of the sports economics literature is dedicated to the notion of the invari-
ance principle first articulated by Rottenberg (1956) which states that given certain 
assumptions, mechanisms meant to enhance competitive balance would not achieve 
a level of competitive balance any different than would occur in a free market. For 
example, practices such as the reserve clause or revenue sharing would not affect 
the distribution of playing talent any differently than would be determined by the 
free market. El-Hodiri & Quirk (1971) suggested that under profit maximising be-
haviour, as long as clubs are located in areas of differing revenue potential, neither 
the reserve clause nor the draft system would equalise clubs' playing strengths. A 
crucial factor in determining whether the invariance principle holds true, is the 
assumption about the clubs' owners true objectives. 
2.3.1 Profit Maximising Assumption 
Under the assumption that club owners are profit maximisers, several empirical 
papers have sought to test the invariance principle. Looking at the introduction of 
free agency in baseball and American football, Scully (1989) and Balfour & Porter 
(1991) found that free agency actually improved competitive balance where Quirk 
& Fort (1997) found no change in competitive balance had occurred. Others claim 
that the reserve clause had enhanced competition and that the introduction of free 
agency harmed competitive balance (Daly & Moore (1981) and Cymrot (1983)). 
Evidence for and against the invariance principle is far from conclusive^®. Stud-
ies have also focused on revenue sharing and its effect on competitive balance. 
Here also the the analysis has shown inconsistent conclusions about the invariance 
29 See Szymanski (2003) for a table of studies examining the invariance principle and free agency. 
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principle. Quirk & El-Hodiri (1974) first hypothesised that revenue sharing would 
have no impact on competitive balance. Fort & Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) 
empirically tested the effect of revenue sharing and found their results to be con-
sistent with the invariance principle. However, Atkinson, Stanley Sz Tschirhart 
(1988) and Marburger (1997) concluded otherwise. Kesenne (1996) tested the in-
variance principle under the assumption that clubs were win-maximising subject 
to a breakeven constraint and found that revenue sharing can improve competitive 
balance. Rascher (1997) noted the contradictory evidence and explained that both 
results could be consistent given the initial assumptions about the owners' objec-
tives. Szymanski (2003) takes a difference approach and notes that assumptions 
about the supply of talent has implications for revenue sharing and competitive 
balance. By assuming Nash conjectures instead of a fixed supply of playing talent 
(fixed supply conjectures), the invariance principle is violated but in the direction 
that revenue sharing decreases competitive balance. Szymanski & Kesenne (2004) 
reach a similar conclusion. 
2.3.2 Utility Maximising Assumption 
Most sports in the U.S. are thought to be profit maximising whereas European 
sports are regarded as utility-maximising. Much of the difference can be consid-
ered cultural and due to how sports originated and were organised as they de-
veloped^°. Sloane (1971) first suggested using a utility maximisation assumption 
when analysing sports leagues within an economic framework. Under his hypoth-
esis, clubs could have many different objectives that are part of a utility function 
with profit only one aspect of it. Other elements in the utility function could be 
playing success, club survival in the league, attendance, and league health. All of 
these characteristics will have various weights of importance in the utility func-
tion. If the weight of performance is greater than that of profit, incentives to 
curb spending because of diminishing returns would no longer be valid and clubs 
would continue to spend in order to win. Under this scenario, richer clubs could 
spend more than their rivals and increase competitive imbalance unless financial 
constraints or regulations prevented them from doing so. Kesenne (1996) exam-
ined revenue sharing under a simpler utility maximising framework: that of win 
^°See Szymanski & Zimbalist (2005) for a comparison between sports business in the U.S. and 
Europe. 
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maximisation. Under a win-maximising assumption, the utility function simplifies 
to maximising wins subject to a financial constraint. Within the win-maximisation 
framework, Kesenne (1996) and Kesenne (2000) find that revenue sharing improves 
competitive balance. While there is no consensus on which set of assumptions are 
correct, during the 1990s several football clubs decided to go public and float on 
the stock exchange. This movement towards a more public and commercial form 
of financing could have imposed more profit oriented goals on the clubs as they 
sought to look like attractive investments to investors. Chapter 3 will examine this 
possibility. 
Much work is still to be done in the area of competitive balance. With access 
to new data and with the implementation of new techniques and tests this thesis 
aims to fill in some of the gaps surrounding the theory of competitive balance with 
respect to owner objectives, financial inequality, the optimal dispersion of wins 
and outcome uncertainty. Recent conferences and publications have focused on 
the financial crises in European footbalP^. Lago, Simmons & Szymanski (2006) 
summarise the difi'erent financial crises and severity within some of the European 
football leagues and suggest that while no general or systematic financial crisis is 
imminent, there are some leagues where the financial situation has become severe. 
There is a general problem however of unprofitability. This is especially true for 
smaller European leagues where larger clubs (e.g. Sparta Prague, Fenerbahge) 
who vie to compete in Europe, don't have the revenue security that is available 
in the larger European TV markets. This leads to increased financial volatility 
and instability. Possible remedies could be tighter regulation or alternatively to 
make competition in Europe more tenable for smaller clubs by focusing on the rules 
involving promotion and relegation. In Chapter 4 we will touch on some of these 
issues and the financial instability within the English football leagues. 
^^The Rimini Conference held at the University of Bologna-Rimini brought together a group of 
European economists to discuss the financial crisis (or lack thereof) in their respective country's 
football leagues. An edition of the Journal of Sports Economics (2006 Volume 7, No. 1) brings 
together their individual work. 
^^In 2002, the Italian club Fiorentina went bankrupt and were refused permission to play in 
Serie B after they had been relegated from Serie A. In the same year, financial caretakers took 
control of Lazio until 2004. Other clubs prevented from promotion or relegated due to financial 
difficulties have been Torino and Perugia in 2005. 
Chapter 3 
Making Money Out of Football 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to examine the imphcations of club ownership and 
club objectives on competitive balance. Traditionally, there have been two main 
schools of thought concerning the objectives of sports clubs: (1) the 'American 
school' which supposes sports clubs are profit maximising and (2) the 'European 
school' which supposes clubs are utility-maximising. Research emanating from 
these two hypotheses has argued, but never reached any firm conclusion or sub-
stantiating evidence to firmly support one side over the other. The difficulty lies 
in not being able to observe the true objectives of the firm. One can only observe 
the outcomes such as number of wins, position, financial figures, etc.^. The reason 
this research and debate is important is that it not only adds to the more general 
economic literature about firm's objectives, but also it has policy implications for 
the regulation of sport and club ownership. The aim of this Chapter is not to 
solve the issue once and for all, but rather to add to the debate through empirical 
testing. Most previous research has relied on theoretical arguments for or against, 
with very little in the realm of actual empirical work. 
In this Chapter we shall consider football clubs that changed ownership status 
from private to publicly owned via floatation on the stock market. By examining 
the club before and after its floatation we can try and discern if any change in firm 
behaviour has taken place. This examination can also be extended as a way of 
^Even these are clouded if tax-avoiding club owners want to hide their true profits through 
creative accounting. 
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testing the theory put forth by Berle and Means in 1932 (Berle & Means (1932)), 
that diverse ownership will increase agency problems between the manager^ and 
the owner-shareholders. If these agency problems exist we might see a divergence in 
firm objectives, whether they be profit-maximising or utility-maximising. What-
ever the objectives of the football clubs really are, does floatation on the stock 
market and the increased dispersion of ownership appear to have altered the be-
haviour of the firm? 
The main objectives of this Chapter are the following: firstly, to see if we can 
move a step closer in resolving the debate over whether football clubs as firms are 
utility-maximising or profit-maximising by examining clubs that changed ownership 
structure; secondly, to determine the impact on competitive balance and financial 
viability and more generally to determine if dispersed ownership in this industry 
has altered the behaviour of the firm. The overall objective is to discern whether 
any change in behaviour is identifiable through empirical testing. One argument 
could be that clubs who were utility-maximising shifted towards profit-maximising 
behaviour once they became public entities, with the rationale being that firms need 
to be (or at least appear trying to be) profitable in order to attract shareholders. 
If behaviour did change, what would be the likely impact on competitive balance 
and financial viability for the clubs and the league? One possible efi'ect of a shift 
towards profit oriented objectives would be a curb in wage spending and less success 
in the league relative to that of a utility maximiser. In order to be profitable, 
clubs also needs to be successful on the pitch. Clubs spend on playing talent 
in order to achieve success. While spending increases performance and therefore 
profits, eventually spending will reach a threshold where increasing levels of success 
become more expensive and hurt profits. Another effect could be that clubs would 
try to seek out better commercial opportunities such as increased sponsorship and 
exploring wider markets^in order to increase revenues. 
Another argument could be that clubs were always profit maximising and that 
by becoming public companies this would only confirm their profit-minded goals 
and not lend to significant observable changes in financial or playing performance. 
However, once a firm disperses ownership to many, there is the potential that 
^In this instance we refer to the Manager as the administrator running the firm, not the 
football manager on the pitch. 
^Many Premiership clubs have tried to expand their appeal in Asian markets by going on 
summer tours in Asia and making their websites available in Mandarin. 
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agency problems and costs exist which could prevent the owner from monitoring 
the manager who may have different objectives than the owner. Managers may 
place the owner's profits secondary to his own self interest which may be utility-
maximising. 
According to Demsetz (1983), the move of a private company to go pubUc is 
an endogenous decision where the shareholders realise the consequences of going 
public. In agreeing to go public they balance the costs and benefits relating to the 
performance of the firm beforehand and it must be the case that they continue with 
a change in ownership structure because the benefits at least outweigh the costs in-
volved. Therefore there should be no correlation between ownership concentration 
and the profit rate. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) empirically tested this hypothesis and 
found no support for the Berle-Means argument^. They also found not statistically 
significant evidence that profits were affected by ownership structure (diffused or 
concentrated). Demsetz & Lehn (1985) examined why various ownership structures 
existed given the advantages and disadvantages of diffuse ownership. One signifi-
cant factor was if a firm was in the mass media or sports industry. They found that 
if a firm was in the sports industry, ownership was much more concentrated which 
they not only attributed to the relatively smaller size of firms and profit instability, 
but also to the amenity potential of firm output. That is, the owners get some 
nonpecuniary benefit associated with firm ownership and control thus owners need 
to be in a position where they can wield that control. However, if there were strong 
benefits to private or concentrated ownership, one would not expect private clubs 
to go public. Owners would expose themselves to a takeover if the club performed 
poorly financially. Thus one would not expect a club to go public if the owner ini-
tially received high nonpecuniary benefit from ownership. One shortcoming of the 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) study is that although they briefly looked at ownership 
concentration in the U.S. sports leagues they did not apply their 'separation of 
ownership control' analysis to their dataset. Our analysis of English football clubs 
that went public can directly contribute to the Demsetz hypothesis that ownership 
structure bears no influence on proflts. 
Another fundamental objective of this Chapter is to try and move closer to-
wards identifying the clubs' economic objectives and behaviour. A mixture of win 
maximisers and proflt maximisers within a league may lead to greater competitive 
^Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) also lists other studies that reached similar conclusions. 
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imbalance as profit minded clubs only invest up to the point where the marginal 
revenue from a win is equal to marginal costs, but utility maximisers invest be-
yond that (Zimbalist (2003)). If one assumes that football clubs are constrained 
win-maximisers, they might exude the same behaviour as profit maximisers; how-
ever unconstrained win-maximisers would continue to spend on talent. Secondly, 
theory suggests that policies in favour of increasing competitive balance will only 
work if the assumptions about the objectives of clubs are correct®. In many sports 
leagues, particularly in North America, clubs engage in restrictive practices for the 
sake of increasing competitive balance. Regulations such as revenue sharing in the 
National Football League (NFL), salary caps in the National Basketball League 
(NBA), and draft systems (in most U.S. sports) are all cited as necessary in order 
to maintain a balance of power and talent amongst sports clubs. In Europe, gov-
erning bodies such as UEFA are considering (and in some cases implementing) new 
rules which will restrict player movements (transfer windows), limit squad sizes 
(roster limits) and require a certain number of 'home-grown' players to be fielded. 
If clubs are profit-maximisers, then these practices will have almost no effect ex-
cept increasing the profits of the clubs, which according to Fort & Quirk (1995) 
and Vrooman (2000) are the true reasons owners of clubs want these regulations 
in place. Kesenne (1996) demonstrates that the profit-maximisation assumption is 
crucial for these conclusions. 
An example is the collective selling of broadcast rights in North American 
sports where money generated from the sale of rights is distributed amongst all 
the teams in the league. If clubs could individually negotiate their own television 
contracts, large metropolitan clubs would receive more revenues from broadcasting 
than small-market clubs. However, if clubs are profit-maximising, then the smaller 
clubs will most likely receive more money than they would under individual selling 
but they are not obligated to spend that money on improving the team. As a 
profit-maximiser they would spend until the marginal revenue of a win equals the 
marginal cost. A collective selling arrangement would not change anything® except 
increase the profits of the small-market team who receive more money under this 
®For example Kesenne (1996) and Cairns, Jennett & Sloane (1986) show that under the as-
sumption of win-maximisation, revenue sharing increases competitive balance. Conversely, Fort 
& Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) demonstrate that under profit maximisation revenue sharing 
does not improve competitive balance but rather leads to lower salaries. 
®In fact, according to Szymanski & Kesenne (2004) there exists the possibility that collective 
selling could actually hurt competitive balance. 
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scenario, but are not required to spend that on improving their share of playing tal-
ent in order to improve competitive balance within the league. Conversely, if clubs 
are utility-maximisers, then collective selling would increase competitive balance 
assuming that clubs spend what they earn on improving the club's chances for suc-
cess in the league. Under collective selling small-market clubs would receive more 
revenue and large-market clubs relatively less than would occur under individual 
negotiations. 
The simple point is that choices depend on the overall objectives of the clubs. 
Polices designed to affect the incentives of clubs should be devised with the correct 
knowledge about the true objectives. Therefore it is crucial to try and understand 
the objectives of football clubs. One method we propose here is to examine the 
behaviour of football clubs that have changed ownership structure. During the mid-
1990s, sixteen English football clubs floated on the London Stock Exchange or the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Mostly this occurred through share placings 
and offers for sale up to 100%. Empirically we can test whether any significant 
relative changes in wage spending, revenue generation and on-field performance 
occurred in the years following a club going public. One might expect that if clubs 
were utility-maximising prior to floatation, then after floatation they may shift 
towards more profit-maximising behaviour in order to appeal to investors, assuming 
that the investors purchase shares primarily in hopes of achieving a return on their 
investment. While this may be somewhat difficult to ascertain, we can however 
simplify things by simply asking, given whatever the true objectives of football 
clubs are, upon floatation was there any noticeable change. Prom that standpoint 
we can encompass the Berle-Means hypothesis that dispersed ownership will alter 
the behaviour and performance of firms with the objectives of the owner being at 
odds with those of the manager. To place the analysis in context, we must first 
provide a historical overview of how ownership in football has evolved over time. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: first we shall discuss the traditional 
and new ownership structure of football clubs, second we discuss the relevant lit-
erature, third the theoretical aspects, fourth the data, fifth the methodology, and 
last we present the results and conclusions. 
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3.2 Ownership in English Football 
3.2.1 Traditional Ownership 
At the end of the 19th century, when the professionalism of football began to take 
shape, many clubs established themselves as limited liability companies to protect 
proprietors from personal liability^. An advantage to this arrangement facilitates 
borrowing that is easier than would be under the initial arrangements of club com-
mittees where members would be personally liable for debts. In a typical company, 
one would assume that as owners of the limited company, shareholders are mo-
tivated by profit. However this may not have always been the case for English 
football clubs. Examination of initial shareholders lists (see references in the Foot-
note below) suggests that the original financiers were local businessmen who were 
probably also fans who wanted their team to survive and succeed. For example 
when Newton Heath (a departmental team in the Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail-
way Company) experienced financial difficulties after going private, a local brewing 
company magnate, John Henry Davies stepped in with cash and a consortium of 
business associates to save the club and re-launch it as what is known as Manchester 
United today. Even purely commercially motivated shareholders, most likely had 
invested money in the club in hopes that the team would succeed and thereby 
generate money for their local core businesses rather than receive a return on the 
investment in the club itself (see Morrow (1999) for a detailed description of the 
motivations of directors with dominant shareholdings). According to Inglis (1988), 
football clubs were in many ways viewed as public utilities, which provided a ser-
vice to society much as a library or museum would. A will to provide a public good 
was most likely spurred by philanthropy rather than profits (King (1998)). 
Another reason to doubt a profit motivation on the part of shareholders is 
that initially the Football Association tried to restrain commercialism by imposing 
Rule 34 in the Articles of Association which capped dividend payouts and pro-
hibited payments to club directors. Additionally, as clubs experienced periods of 
financial distress over the years, shares became increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few shareholders, many of whom were wealthy supporters of the clubs 
and unlikely to take on a sole profit motive. 
^For a thorough history of Enghsh football clubs see Mason (1980), Tischler (1981), Vamplev 
(1988) and Inglis (1988). 
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According to King (1998) this 'traditional' style of ownership lasted until the 
late 1970s and early 1980s when a new style of director started to emerge. 
3.2.2 New Ownership and Market Floatation 
3.2.2.1 First Movers 
During the 1980s more business minded entrepreneurs were appearing on the man-
aging boards of football clubs (See King (1998) for a review). In 1983, one such 
businessman was Irving Scholar'who masterminded the first floatation of an English 
football club: Tottenham Hotspur. The public offering of shares was in Tottenham 
Football Club PLC a holding company formed to bypass Rule 34 and was part of 
a three-pronged strategy by Scholar to improve the financial situation at the club. 
Unfortunately, the financial markets did not view football shares as an attractive 
investment given the game's poor cultural and violence-associated status during 
this period. According to King (1998), Tottenham were ahead of their time. In 
1989, Millwall Football Club became the second English club to list on the stock 
exchange. Millwall's strategy was to create a new leisure group which would pro-
vide additional services (bars, restaurants and other leisure facilities) in order to 
buttress poor turnover due to low gate receipts and "to develop into a major force, 
a club which can be compared favourably with the likes of Spurs and Arsenal." 
According to then Chairman Reg Burr, "There were two steps we could take. We 
could have stayed as we were and ended up in the Third Division after having to 
sell our best players. Or we could raise additional capital that would help us get 
new players and help the move to a new, purpose-built stadium. This scheme is 
the only way that we feel we can maintain our progress as a major football club by 
increasing revenues."® Burr must have anticipated criticism from fans over a seem-
ing profit motivation for his actions, "I suppose we will get some stick but really 
this is the only way for the club to go. The criticism will come from ill-informed 
people. Personally, I am very excited about the whole project. It will strengthen 
our financial hand." 
The third and most famous successful English football club to float on the 
exchange was Manchester United in 1991. Martin Edwards became chief executive 
and majority shareholder through inheriting his father Louis' shares. Edwards was 
®E.g., see http://www.millwall-history.co.uk/the.den4a.htm 
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twice approached to sell his stake in the club. The first was by Robert Maxwell 
in 1984 who offered £10 million. Then in 1989 it seemed almost certain Michael 
Knighton would become the new owner only for the deal to fall through due to 
his questionable funding methods. Eventually on 31 May 1991 Manchester Untied 
offered over 2.5 million shares to the public via the London Stock Exchange. 
3.2.2.2 Mid-1990s Boom 
The breakaway of the Premier League in 1991/92 would set the stage for future 
club listings. The huge increase in broadcasting income associated with the advent 
of the Premier League and the rapid appreciation of Manchester United share 
prices created conditions in the mid 1990s where the stock market was receptive 
to new issues. Between October 1995 and October 1997 a further sixteen English 
clubs obtained a listing (see Table 3.1 on page 64). During the 1995/96 season 
rumours as well as actions involving the takeover of clubs by media conglomerates 
were circulating. Caspian Group PLC initiated a takeover of Leeds United in 1996 
and Manchester United was rumoured to be a potential takeover target by BSkyB, 
Granada and VCL The alignment of football clubs with media groups was appealing 
to City investors especially given the anticipated revenue from future pay-per-view 
broadcasts. Increased revenue streams and financial regeneration of the clubs were 
not the only motivating factors for share offerings. Clubs also utilised the market as 
a means of financing stadium developments (Football Task Force (1999)). Due to 
requirements in the Taylor Report that teams have all-seater stadiums, Manchester 
United also used some of its proceeds to fund the restructuring of its Stretford End 
at Old Trafford. Preston North End also issued placings and an open offer in 2000 to 
generate funds for ground redevelopment®. Aston Villa claimed that issuing shares 
would generate funds for the improvement of facilities at Villa Park, providing a 
hostel for the team schoolboys as well as creating funds for the transfer market. 
With respect to raising funds for use in the transfer market, recently (January 
2004) Tottenham Hotspur chairman David Levy won a vote to issue new shares 
worth £15 million earmarked for buying new players. Ever ton has also sounded 
out the idea of market floatation for reviving the club's fortunes. 
What we want to empirically test in this Chapter is whether the switch from 
a private limited company to a publicly listed entity induced any change in firm 
®West Bromwich Albion has made similar overtures to future issues for stadium development. 
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behaviour. If we observe changes in behaviour, we could infer changes in objectives. 
While we have argued that it is possible for the initial investors and directors of 
professional football clubs may have had non-profit and philanthropic motives, 
this does not mean that they did not care about profits. A level of sustainability 
and solvency was required for clubs to remain successful. However, we expect 
that as a club shifts from private ownership to a PLC that the motive towards 
profits will become stronger. The stock market is a medium for which investors 
to place their money in hopes of receiving a return, and clubs that floated did 
want their shares to be appealing to investors. In order to attract investors, clubs 
would have to become or at least aim to be a worthy investment and for most 
public companies this means achieving healthy earnings, a good balance sheet and 
a stable business plan for the future which would in turn cause the share price to 
appreciate and potentially produce dividends. Though it is not a requirement of 
the stock exchange for the firm or club to be profitable, it makes more sense for it 
to be from an investor's standpoint. However, the exchange does have regulations 
regarding the dissemination of all appropriate financial information (via annual and 
half yearly reports) for investors to make decisions. Additionally, requirements by 
the London Stock Exchange state that at least 25% of shares must be in public 
hands. 
A risk for directors of financially poor performing clubs could be a severe decline 
in share price and a potential hostile takeover. Therefore we expect that if clubs 
were utility-maximisers (as many assume), then there should also be a shift towards 
more profit-motivated behaviour for these publicly traded clubs. The view that 
stock market flotation will introduce commercial objectives has been advanced in 
the North American context. Most of the Major leagues in fact ban stock market 
flotation on the grounds that this will lead to excessive commercialisation^®. Thus 
while we cannot state with certainty that the directors of any single company will 
be more profit oriented following a stock market flotation, we can reasonably argue 
that on average directors of companies with a listing will be more profit oriented 
than directors of companies that do not have a listing. 
^°This is perhaps odd given the prevailing view that team owners in North America are dyed-
in-the-wool profit maximisers. See Cheffins (1998) for a critical discussion of this issue. 
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3.3 Profit Maximisation Versus Utility Maximi-
sation 
3.3.1 Profit-Maximisers 
The effectiveness of certain policies in sport relies on the assumptions made about 
the true objectives of football clubs. Sports clubs frequently cite the need for certain 
policies to restrict labour movement and wages in order to maintain competitive 
balance, i.e., prevent the wealthy teams from buying up all the good players. Re-
sponding to the argument that the reserve clause in baseball ensures the equal 
distribution of playing talent, Rottenberg responded that the distribution of play-
ing talent under the reserve clause would be the same as in the free market. He 
notes that there are diminishing returns so it does not pay to have a team full 
of the best players. Wealthy teams also need their competitors to succeed and 
winning by close margins increases attendance and therefore profits. Therefore 
playing talent will be distributed to teams where they are most needed. This is an 
effect of rational profit maxismising behaviour, thus the reserve clause only serves 
to depress salaries of the players. El-Hodiri & Quirk (1971) stated that even the 
equalisation of playing strengths was not consistent with profit maximisation and 
that it was the market size of the team which led to unequal distribution of playing 
talent. Scully (1989), Scully (1974) and Fort & Quirk (1995) surmise that under 
the profit maximisation assumption, restrictive policies such as the reserve clause 
are really used to lower costs (players wages) and to increase the profits of the 
league and the teams and make no difference with respect to competitive balance. 
Vrooman (1995) examines three different policies designed to affect competitive 
balance: free agency, revenue sharing and salary caps and finds that while free 
agency has not harmed competitive balance, revenue sharing and salary caps also 
do not help it and actually lead to more exploitation of players by affecting team 
winning incentives and by cost sharing collusion. 
If the assumption about teams being profit maximisers is true then measures 
such as revenue sharing and salary caps may not improve competitive balance, but 
rather lead to depressed player salaries and increased profits for the clubs. However, 
not all research relies on the profit maximising assumption. 
3.3.2 Win Maximisers 
Sloane (1971) outlined a model where achieving success subject to a budget con-
straint was the motivation for club owners, rather than profit maximisation. Ac-
cording to Sloane, the real benefit for utility-maximising owners was not profit, 
but the prestige and power that came along with owning a successful team. Dab-
schek (1975) outlined some evidence in support of the utility maximisation model: 
spending on wages beyond what was required in Australian football, the unequal 
balance of sporting competitions and the retention by big clubs of the most talented 
players. Theoretically, revenue sharing would impact the distribution of playing 
talent if clubs were win maximisers. By assumption, weaker teams would benefit 
from increased revenue and spend it on increasing the talent pool, while rich teams 
will have less money (Kesenne (1996), Kesenne (2000)). 
Empirical work has also been inconclusive. Noll (1974) looks at ticket pricing 
and shows that prices are set where the elasticity of demand is equal to one. By 
examining the marginal revenue products of baseball players Scully (1974), Scully 
(1989) and Zimbalist (19926) also cannot reject the profit maximising behaviour 
hypothesis since players are paid near their marginal revenue products. Most of 
the empirical work has looked at sport in the U.S. with none performed within the 
context of European sport^^. 
3.4 Theoretical Aspect 
3.4.1 Impact of Floatation 
We now introduce a simple model to illustrate the expected impact of a change 
of owner's objectives. We suppose that the objectives of a football club's owners 
can be expressed as a weighted average of profit and the success of the team. To 
simplify matters we consider a league consisting of only two teams, where teams 
invest in talent t to produce wins w}^ We adopt a simple 'contest success function' 
^^See Kesenne (2002) for a response to Scully (1989) and Zinibalist (1992a). 
There is a growing body of statistical evidence to support this hypothesis. Szymanski & 
Smith (1997), Szymanski & Kuypers (1999), Hall et al. (2002) all provide evidence that the wage 
bill is the biggest single factor explain league performance, and some evidence in support of this 
direction of causality. Forrest & Simmons (20026) utilised a larger data set for English soccer and 
found that wage bills are reliable predictors for team success. They also tested the reliability of 
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which translates expenditure on talent into wins, i.e., 
which is the logit function commonly used in the analysis of contests and tourna-
ments (see Nti (1997) for an analysis of different functional forms). We further 
suppose that revenue is concave, increasing with wins up to some critical value 
and then decreasing (reflecting the possibility that fans will get bored by excessive 
predictability). We also allow that one team might generate more income from 
success, i.e. asymmetry, so that the profit functions for each team are: 
TTi =(cr — wi)wi — cti 
(3 2) 
TTg =(1 - W2)W2 - Ct2 
Since the owners are assumed to value both profits and success on the pitch, we 
can write the objective function of the owners as a weighted average of profit and 
wins. Thus for team 1: 
= ttiTTi + (1 — ai)wi = [cKi(cr — Wi) + 1 — ai\wi — aicti. (3.3) 
As the weight on wins increases, profits must eventually decrease, since wins cost 
money (via increased talent expenditure) and eventually reduce income (as league 
becomes excessively unbalanced). This may ultimately lead to losses. Sloane as-
sumed that zero profit constraint applied to the clubs, but this not clear given that 
a "sugar daddy" might choose to fund a club's losses in order to achieve success. 
Examples of this type of conduct abound, not only in football but in all major 
sports—Szymanski and Kuypers discuss some of the examples in football. 
Given these objectives the first order conditions for the clubs' owners are 
^ = [ai((T - 2wi) -t-1 - a i ] , ^ _ - " ic = 0 
sn t (3.4) 
Prom which we can derive the Nash equilibrium win percentage for team 1; 
(%i(%2(cr - 1) 4- #2 /g 
wx = 7 -T . (3.5) 
aia2[o-- 1) + ai + a2 
wages as predictors for success in North American sports as well as continental European soccer 
and found significant correlations. Deloitte & Touche in their Annual Review of Football Finance 
consistently use wages expenditure to explain on the pitch success. An alternative approach using 
estimated transfer values is advocated by Dawson, Dobson & Gerrard (2000), but they also find 
that wage expenditure is closely correlated with playing success. 
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Note that when there is no asymmetry in revenue generating potential (cr = 1) 
the win percentages depends simply on the ratio of the weights placed on profit 
OLijoLx. Prom this is it straightforward to show that the win percentage of team 1 
will decrease when the weight on profits (cti) increases, i.e., 
_ -0^2 /g g\ 
5ai (cKi 0:2(0' — 1) + CKi + 0:2)^  
Similarly, it is trivial to show that the win percentage for team 2 is also decreasing 
in the weight placed by its owners on profit. 
An owner that becomes more interested in profit must invest less in playing 
talent in order to produce this outcome. Less investment in talent must increase 
profits (otherwise the owners could have both increased profit and success by in-
vesting more in talent prior to change in objectives). This is the predicted effect 
of stock market flotation. 
However, we can also consider the effect of a change in one team's objective on 
the performance of the other team. Consider first the ratio of winning percentages, 
which in this model equals the ratio of playing talent. At equilibrium the expression 
for this is 
^ ^ ^ ^ Q;iQ:2(cT - 1) +Qi2 
W2 #1 
Prom this it is apparent that a fall in investment in talent for team 1 will lead to 
a fall in investment in talent at team 2. Since the team 2 spends less on talent 
and has an increased win percentage, its profits must increase, and therefore the 
change in objectives of team 1 should raise the profitability of its rival clubs. 
3.4.2 Changes in Objectives 
These effects follow directly from the supposed change in objectives. Indirect con-
sequences may follow as well if the increased scrutiny imposed by the listing re-
quirements cause directors to be more circumspect in their policies. Pirst this 
may involve the avoidance of excessive risks, thus creating a more stable earnings 
stream. Secondly, it may imply a shift in distribution policy toward higher and 
more regular dividend payments, which are sometimes considered an important 
indicator of company performance by market investors. Thirdly, it may be that 
company efficiency is improved, so that resources are more productive and oppor-
tunities are exploited more fully (something here which may be associated with a 
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higher degree of commercialism— e.g., raising ticket prices if it is profitable to do 
so). 
3.4.3 What Can We Measure Empirically 
While it is difficult to test actual firm objectives, we can try and examine whether, 
no matter what the firm's objectives are, dispersed ownership and floatation ap-
peared to have changed these objectives or altered performance of the firm. Per-
formance can be measured in terms of utility (winning) or as profit (revenues). 
Suggested by the theoretical outline above, we expect that after floatation firms 
become more profit-oriented thereby reducing relative wages and subsequently on-
field performance while increasing revenues (and profits). This does not mean clubs 
forget about pitch performance but simply that it will experience a decline rela-
tively while the firm becomes more cost effective. First place does not necessarily 
correspond to the profit-maximising position for the club. 
However prior research (Jensen & Meckling (1976)) has suggested that dispersed 
ownership exacerbates agency problems, though some compensating advantages 
can offset these. Thus floatation increases the number of owners but lowers their 
proximity or power in making decisions which could affect wage spending and 
subsequently position and prqflts. A moral hazard problem could exist where 
directors and squad managers who feel susceptible to fan's emotions make decisions 
that are not in the best interest of profit-minded shareholders, e.g., paying too much 
to secure a star player to boost position. Thus we could have a move towards profit-
maximising behaviour but also an increased risk of agency problems between the 
managers and shareholders. 
Our strategy is to search for any changes in the performance of these recently 
floated companies relative to their peers in the professional leagues using the FAME 
(Financial Analysis Made Easy) database of UK company accounting information 
which provides online records for the previous ten years. Thus in most cases we 
are able to track performance for about five years before and seven years after 
fiotation. We examine four main indicators: operating profits^^, league ranking, 
^^Operating profit indicates the day-to-day operations of a football club capturing how well 
a club performs in its ordinary business. Operating profit takes into account revenues via gate 
receipts, marketing and merchandising, broadcasting and other commercial activities as well as 
wages, salaries, cost of goods sold and various other operating costs such as amortisation of player 
costs. It does not include financing costs and exceptional items. (Deloitte & Touche, 2003). 
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wage expenditure and revenues relative to the league average for teams in that 
season. The first two variables shed light directly on any possible change in ob-
jectives associated with flotation. The last two relate to variables that might be 
related causally with changes in these variables; for instance, increased wage ex-
penditure is likely to lead to better divisional (and overall league) performance. 
We also consider wage expenditure and revenues relative to divisional averages in 
order to partially control for financial impacts due to promotion and relegation. 
Wage spending and revenues are expressed in terms of orthogonal deviations serves 
two purposes. Firstly, given the rapid escalation of ticket prices, broadcast rights 
values and player salaries a relative measure provides a consistent basis for compar-
ison across years. Secondly, in the context of a sports league an absolute indicator 
of financial performance such as profits is likely to depend on the use of inputs 
measured in relative terms rather than absolute terms (the absolute quality of a 
team will not determine its success on the pitch, rather its quality relative to its 
competitors). 
3.5 Data 
3.5.1 Club Data 
Club financial data was downloaded from the FAME database, which consists of 
accounts information^'^ for 2.8 million public and private UK companies. For our 
sample, in most cases FAME provides us with more than a full ten year record 
for each company. Supplementary financial information was obtained from yearly 
publications of the Deloitte & Touche Annual Review of Football Finance. The 
financial variables we use are annual total wages, revenues, and operating profits 
denoted as such by the resources. Club attributes (i.e., position, division, etc) 
are obtained from the Rothmans Football Yearbooks. We choose to examine the 
period from 1990/91 until 2003/04 inclusive. Initially we estimated a panel over 
the period from 1990/91 until 2001/02 because many clubs had been dehsted''"' 
^"^FAME accounts data includes profit and loss accounts, balance sheet items, cash flow and 
ratios, as well as security and price information. 
^^During the late 1990s there were, approximately 20 football clubs listed on either the London 
Stock Exchange or AIM. Since then, Nottingham Forest and QPR (Loftus Road) were delisted in 
the latter half of 2001, Leicester in 2002, Bolton (Burnden Leisure) and Chelsea in 2003, Leeds 
United and Sunderland in 2004 and Manchester United in 2005. 
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from the stock exchange by 2004, but there were no significant differences in the 
estimation results. A few clubs are traded on the OFEX, but this exchange is not 
stringently regulated and shares are very illiquid (e.g.. Shares in Arsenal Holdings 
were issued at £70,000), so we eliminate these teams from our dataset. We choose 
to exclude Manchester United, Tottenham and Millwall since they were already 
listed during the period of examination. We also exclude the two Scottish Premier 
League clubs^®, Celtic and Heart of Midlothian since they do not play in the Enghsh 
leagues; however we have no reason to expect that their effects of floatation would 
be dissimilar to those of English clubs. 
3.5.2 Summary Statistics for Clubs that Floated 
3.5.2.1 Variable Definitions 
Wages and revenues are then transformed into orthogonal deviations: 
( I f ) • ' • ' • ' " ' " ( x ) (3.8) 
Earlier in the chapter we discussed that relative measures of wages and revenues 
are used to maintain a consistent measure across years and to allow for relative 
comparisons. 
The variable for position is converted into log odds: 
" ' " ( 9 3 ^ ) ( 3 . 9 ) 
Operating profit is measured in levels. 
We denote quoted clubs with a dummy variable, Q, which first takes on the value 
of one the year the club floats on the stock exchange. One reason for indicating 
the floatation the season it occurs is that clubs anticipate the issue and perhaps 
'window dress' the financials in order to look appealing for the offering. Thus some 
clubs may make financial improvements before the actual date of floatation. 
3.5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we describe summary statistics for five main variables that could 
have changed once a club started to trade on the stock market; position, wages, 
^®Glasgow Rangers are listed on the OFEX, while Hearts and Celtic are listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
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wages as a percent of revenues, revenue and operating profits. We want to note if 
there are any marked differences before and after floatation. The first two variables 
shed light directly on any possible change in objectives associated with flotation. 
The last two relate to variables that might be related causally with changes in these 
variables; for instance, increased wage expenditure is likely to lead to better league 
performance. Wage spending and revenues are expressed in terms of orthogonal 
deviations which serves for two purposes. Firstly, given the rapid escalation of 
ticket prices, broadcast rights values and player salaries a relative measure provides 
a consistent basis for comparison across years. Secondly, in the context of a sports 
league an absolute indicator of financial performance such as profits is likely to 
depend on the use of inputs measured in relative terms rather than absolute terms 
(the absolute quality of a team will not determine its success on the pitch, rather its 
quality relative to its competitors). This could also shed light on the possibility that 
if nothing changed, then floatation did not appear to have the heightened agency 
problems previous research has suggested and that club behaviour has remained 
relatively the same. 
Position Team performance could be measured in several ways. Clubs compete in 
a number of sporting competitions—the domestic league, the FA Cup, The 
League Cup, and at the highest level the UEFA Cup and Champions' League. 
Domestic league performance is the indicator used here, firstly because it is 
the competition within which teams play most of their matches, and secondly 
because club performance over time is comparable on this basis. 
One possibility is that after floatation, clubs focused more on profit margins 
and less on team performance. The implication here is that if a club is more 
profit minded, it will seek to control its wage bill and as well as other types of 
spending and that relatively lower wage bills could also lower the performance 
of the team (i.e., teams have less talented players). However, it is also possible 
that teams could try to become more productively efficient and although these 
clubs may have a lower wage bill, they could refine 'technology' areas such as 
training techniques or coaching methods. Then one might expect no change 
or possibly an increase in position. Another scenario is that agency problems 
are worsened because shareholders, which are more far removed from the day 
to day operations, would have less control on club managers and directors 
who may spend more by increasing the club's share of talent. 
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Out of the 16 clubs examined in this analysis, nine clubs significantly (at least 
at the 10% level) increased position, four had significantly lower positions and 
three experienced no significant change. Four of the significant movers were 
Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Charlton Athletic and West Bromwich 
Albion, but almost all these clubs were improving performance even before the 
became publicly traded firms. Another reason for the increases is that clubs 
used the funds generated from floatation to buy new players, thus increasing 
their likelihood of obtaining significantly better positions than was previously 
possible. In that respect we should also inspect how relative wages have 
changed. Details for all 16 clubs are located in Table 3.2 on page 65. 
Profits There are significant problems associated with the use of accounting prof-
its to measure the financial performance of sports businesses, as is well docu-
mented in the American literature on the subject (see e.g. Scully (1989) and 
Quirk & Fort (1997))^^. When profit and loss statements form the basis of tax 
assessments firms have a significant incentive to understate profits. Particu-
lar government policies, for example in relation to depreciation, may create 
tax loopholes which enable firms to reduce profits and so legally hmit their 
tax liability. Owners may charge expenses to the company which bear little 
relation to any economic services rendered, and so transfer taxable income 
away from the company (e.g., because personal incomes are more favourably 
treated)—this is legal tax avoidance (for example, it would not be illegal to 
pay a director £1 million for 10 minutes work), or may be able to illegally 
evade tax by exaggerating expenses. 
Table 3.5 reports operating profits for the sixteen clubs listed in Table 3.1. 
An unsurprising detail is that practically all clubs have experienced declin-
ing profits since fioatation with only Birmingham City and West Bromwich 
Albion reporting a positive average operating profit. Aston Villa reported a 
cumulative loss of £22 milhon after floatation while Leeds United reported a 
cumulative loss of £80 milhon. In general a business that runs perpetually 
at an economic loss will be closed by its owners if they are proflt-maximisers. 
Several of the clubs did in fact have to undergo a significant restructuring, 
Leeds United being one of the most prominent. The shares of Nottingham 
^^Both of these drew heavily on the work of Roger Noll from Stanford University who dissected 
the profits statements of Major League Baseball teams on behalf of the players' union in the 
1980s and found that reported accounting profits significantly understated economic profits. 
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Forest, Queens Park Rangers (Loftus Road PLC) and Leicester City have 
all been suspended from the market while the latter two clubs have entered 
administration (in 2001 and 2002 respectively). Nottingham Forest had their 
shares delisted in 2002 following their failure to publish their accounts and in 
anticipation of a restructuring involving a cash injection of £5 million from a 
wealthy supporter. Swansea City, which was taken over by a listed company 
in 1997 was sold to its Managing Director for £1 during the 2000/01 season. 
Sunderland delisted its shares in late 2004 while Bolton also ceased trading. 
Chelsea too was suffering profit losses (approximately a total of £35 million 
since floatation) before going private again under Roman Abramovich. Thus 
it may be that the losses indicated reflect a genuine failure to produce an 
economic return. On the other hand, Aston Villa has reported an operating 
loss in each of the last five seasons without filing for bankruptcy while New-
castle has paid out dividends in each of the past five seasons (totaUing £14 
miUion) despite the size of its reported losses. 
The ability to pay dividends is generally viewed as an indicator of financial 
health, although there may be many good reasons for not paying dividends. 
It makes little sense for a company with profitable investment opportunities 
to return internally generated funds to shareholders. Of the quoted football 
clubs six have paid dividends: Aston Villa, Bolton, Newcastle, Southampton, 
Sunderland and West Bromwich Albion. The total payout across those years 
which were available was in the region of £0.9 million per club per season. 
Table 3.5 illustrates that in general operating profitability has deteriorated 
since fiotation. In the five or so years prior to flotation the fisted clubs in total 
reported losses of £32.8 million in aggregate, an average of £2.1 million per 
club. In the time since flotation aggregate losses have been £513.5 million, an 
average of £32.1 million per club—i.e., over fifteen times larger than before 
flotation. Surprisingly, only West Bromwich Albion reported positive profits 
on average post floatation^®. 
The decline in profitability also seems to be reflected in the changing market 
valuations of the clubs. What is clear is that market values of clubs analysed 
here declined steadily. Furthermore, this performance contrasted sharply 
Leicester City also reported positive profits on average, but this club was also undergoing 
restructuring and administration after 2001. 
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with that of Manchester United and the market in general until the stock 
market started to decline in 2000. This is consistent with a rational valuation 
of football club shares based on expected profitability. 
Wages Clubs improve their league performance by hiring or otherwise acquiring 
better players. Since there is a well functioning market for player talent any 
improvement in player quality can only be achieved through higher wage 
spending^®. Wage spending is here defined as the ratio of the team's wage 
spending relative to the average wage spending of all teams in the league. 
If clubs started to shift towards profit-maximising behaviour we would ex-
pect that wages would be curbed. We also look at the ratio of total wages 
to turnover, an important financial performance indicator according to De-
loitte & Touche. Six clubs had significant increases in their relative wage 
bills though not all of these are the same clubs that experienced better per-
formance on the pitch. Five clubs had significantly lower wages. Seven clubs 
also had increases in their wages to revenue ratio. No clubs significantly de-
creased the wages to revenue ratio. A note of caution must be mentioned 
here. During the time of most club floatations, the satellite television broad-
caster Sky, had negotiated its second television agreement with the Premier 
League. This contract was worth 3.5 times (£670 million) more than the 
previous contract (£191 million). This tripling of broadcast revenues could 
have enticed clubs to spend more on talent since they anticipated increased 
future revenue streams from television. Full results for relative wages can be 
found in Table 3.3 on page 66. 
Revenues One expectation that one might hold about clubs that floated on the 
market is that they would exploit their commercial opportunities more ef-
fectively, e.g., through merchandising and sponsorship. This would manifest 
itself in the ability the extract higher revenues from a given level of perfor-
mance. Since on average relative performance improved post flotation, one 
might reasonably expect that revenues relative to the league average would 
improve at most if not all clubs. In fact, revenues significantly improved at 
only five clubs out of the sixteen relative to the league average. Four clubs 
^®This is unless the club possesses some distinctive capability that enables them to extract a 
better level of performance from a given player than any other club. See chapter 6 in Szymanski 
& Kuypers (1999) for a discussion of this possibility. 
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had significantly lower revenues—the same four with lower league rankings. 
Table 3.4 contains revenue figures for the sixteen clubs. 
Given the averages listed here, there are no obvious trends that are a direct 
result of floatation and the mix of results suggest that actually floatation had no 
effect. 
3.6 Methodology 
3.6.1 Regression Analysis 
The analysis thus far has been discussed in terms of averages. These shed hght on 
the proposition that flotation may have shifted football club owners away from util-
ity maximisation toward profit maximisation given that such a change in objectives 
is likely to lead to an increase in profits and a relative decline in performance on the 
field. It also facihtates analysis concerning principal-agent problems. Given that 
it appears profits have severely declined while wages have increased this is a possi-
bility. However, another approach is to look at the underlying causal relationships 
and to see whether fiotation led to any change in those causal links. 
The first causal mechanism that underlies the analysis in this Chapter is that 
league performance is determined by the quality of players hired in a competitive 
market so that in general higher player expenditure leads to better league perfor-
mance. The correlation between position achieved and wages spent can be seen 
in Figure 3.1. The second link is that better performance will generate increased 
revenue as teams attract fans, sponsorship and other income as a result of increased 
success. The correlation between revenues and position is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
This is essentially the model proposed and estimated in Szymanski & Smith (1997). 
Each team chooses a level of investment in playing talent to meet its target level 
of performance and profit given their underlying objectives and capabilities. We 
can write; 
Pi,t = ai + hwi^t (3.10) 
= Ci + dpi^t 
Where p is league rank, w is wage expenditure relative to the average and r 
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Figure 3.1: Graphical Correlation of Position and Wages in English Football 1991-
2004 
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Figure 3.2: Graphical Correlation of Revenue and Position in Enghsh Football 
1991-2004 
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is revenue relative to the average. The a and c parameters represent intrinsic 
differences in terms of productivity (the efficiency of turning player spending into 
performance) and revenue generating capacity (from a given level of support). 
Each team then has an objective function that is a weighted average of profits and 
performance: 
+ (1 ~ ^)Pi,t (3.11) 
so that if, for example, A = 1, the club cares only about profit. Here we ask whether 
flotation might change the underlying causal relationship as well as the weighting 
on profit. In effect we test to see whether a and c are affected by flotation. This 
might be because a stock market listing is a more effective discipline on company 
managers and hence they become more productive, either in their ability to generate 
playing performance from a given investment (a) or to generate income from success 
(c). Conversely, if agency problems deepen due to lower proximity of owners to 
managerial decisions, we may see an opposite effect. 
3.6.2 Panel Data 
Since we are looking for any changes in the relationship between wages and per-
formance and performance and revenues upon floatation, we can take advantage 
of the use of panel data. By obtaining a pooled estimator we are able to get an 
overall effect of floatation in general instead of team by team. Looking at teams 
individually would only tell us how floatation specifically affected that team and 
may only be unique for that team and not extrapolative to the population in gen-
eral. Team specific intricacies such as inate abilities as well as market size, however 
can be captured in a fixed-effects panel estimation. 
3.6.3 Error Correction Model 
The data available here is a panel, which is characterised by a relatively small 
time dimension (T) but a large number of clubs (N). In economics there are 
many relationships that are dynamic in nature and a major advantage of panel 
data is that we are better equipped to examine the dynamics of a relationship. 
A simple panel estimation with fixed effects could have been specified. However 
we want to estimate the dynamic relationship between position, wages, revenues, 
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promotion, relegation and floatation. Given the movement up and down divisions 
and the adjustments clubs make with respect to wage spending and revenues, a 
dynamic model is well suited to take into account their short-run and long-term 
effects. Hence, the question we are interested in is essentially a dynamic one of the 
adjustment, which takes place in a club over time to flotation. However, due to 
the effect of a small T and a large N, we therefore have a very well known problem 
in panel data estimation, which was first outlined by Nickell (1981) that under 
these circumstances ordinary least squares (OLS) dynamic panel data estimation 
is subject to considerable bias. We therefore employ the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation technique proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) and 
Arellano & Bover (1995) to estimate dynamic panel data models. Essentially these 
techniques build up a recursive varying set of instruments which provide good 
small sample performance even in the face of relatively short time periods (T). 
A good survey of these techniques may be found in Baltagi (2005). Given that 
actual outcomes in football will often deviate substantially from planned results, the 
most natural approach to estimating these relationships is using an error correction 
model. The parameters from the error correction specification allow us to make 
inferences about the long-term equilibrium and short run adjustments towards this 
equilibrium. The long run structure is indicated by the coefficients on the level 
terms whereas the short term adjustments are captured in the differenced terms of 
the error correction model. Our two estimating equations are; 
^Pi,t + SGAQi^t + 
+ SjPRi t-i + Ss^PRi t''f ^QRELH-I + SioARELi t + 6ixDli t-i+ 
(3.12) 
+ Si2A.Dlit + 5isD2i^t-i + 5i4AD2i^t + 5i5D3i^t-i+ 
+ SieADSi^t + Vt, 
Avi^t =7i + + P2Ari^t~i + + PiApi^t + + P&AQi^t+ 
+ p7PRi,t-i + PsAPRi^t + P^RELi^t-i + PioARELi^t + Ai-Dli,(-i+ 
+ /^i2^-Dli,t 4- (3\zD2i^t-\ + PuAD2i^t + 
+ PieADSi^t + 
(&13) 
where revenues (r) and wage expenditure (w) (both in orthogonal deviations), and 
league performance (p) are expressed in logs. Q is a dummy variable that indicates 
periods when clubs are listed on the stock market. Dl, D2, and D3 are dummy 
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variables that indicate the relative league division in which the team plays (with the 
Premier League being the reference variable); PR is a dummy variable which takes 
the value of one if a team gains promotion, and RE is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if a team is relegated. The division variable will account for 
the level of competition in the league on performance and also the market size of the 
club with respect to revenue generation. Promotion and relegation dummies will 
also account for the movement between the divisions with respect to performance 
and also the generation (or loss) of income when a team is promoted (or relegated). 
The Q dummy will take a value of one the season a club has floated on the stock 
market. For example, Birmingham City floated in March 1997; hence Q would 
have a one for the 1996/97 season and a one for the subsequent seasons. 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Error Correction Estimates 
Parameter estimates are reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 at the end of this Chapter. 
The first table reports estimates for the performance equation, the last table reports 
estimates for the revenue equation. Here we present estimates from the one-step 
Arellano-Bond estimator. Arellano-Bond suggest using the one-step estimators for 
inference and the two-step estimator for the Sargan test since the two-step estima-
tors' standard errors are prone to downward bias. To correct for heteroskedasticity, 
we use White's standard errors. 
We are interested primarily in the sign and significance of the quoted variables. 
In an error correction model the terms specified in difi'erences specify the way in 
which a given variable infiuences the adjustment toward equilibrium and the levels 
terms define the underlying long term equilibrium relationship. 
Results from the estimation of Equation 3.12, afiirm that wages are one of 
the most important factors in determining a club's position at the end of the 
championship race. The significance and magnitude of the dummy variables for 
division, promotion and relegation also take into account the limited positions 
clubs can achieve while in a given division. Promotion strongly helps in the long-
run, while relegation similarly reduces position in the longer term. The long-
run floatation variable is insignificant from zero indicating that floatation had no 
3. JkfOAffCir Ot/jT OJ? 27C)0:rfi/lZ,I, 58 
significant long-term impact on performance. In other words, quoted teams are 
not expected to generate a better league position from a given wage expenditure 
relative to the average. In the short-term there was a small but significant negative 
impact. Thus in the short-run clubs' performance suffered, but in the longer-term, 
public clubs did not change in their ability to achieve a certain position given the 
wages spent. In other words, floatation did not cause performance to worsen. 
In Equation 3.13 the signs and significance of the variables are in accordance 
with expectations. Promotion and relegation are very significant in determining 
revenue in both the short-run and long-run. In the long-run, both promotion and 
relegation have strong positive and negative effects on revenue respectively, much 
more so than the other variables. Division is also a strong determinant of revenue, 
but this is most likely due to the size of clubs in the respective divisions, with 
Division Three containing many smaller market clubs. The long-term fioatation 
variable in the revenue on position relationship is significant in both the time-effects 
and fixed effects regression indicating that over the longer term fioated clubs were 
able to generate higher revenues given a position relative to the average, but this 
is not an overwhelming effect when compared with promotion and relegation. We 
also ran identical error correction models adjusting for divisional averages. The 
results are similar and are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. 
The fit of the equations is strong with the Wald tests showing high joint sig-
nificance of the variables. There is no second-order serial correlation, indicating 
that the GMM instruments are not correlated with the errors. As an additional 
check an indicator variable FLOAT was added, which took the value of 1 if the 
club was a club that eventually went public. This was to take into account for the 
possibility of selection bias in that clubs that did fioat were always different from 
the average with respect to revenue floatation. This variable was not significant. 
We also tested for slope effects. using interaction dummy variables. In the short 
run those clubs that had higher relative wages had a steeper relation between wage 
spending and position while those clubs already obtaining higher positions in the 
league were able to generate more revenues after fioatation. 
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3.8 Discussion 
3.8.1 Has Anything Changed 
The analysis here has indicated that although there was a surge of club floatation 
in the mid and late 1990s, it appears there are no notable changes as a result 
of going public. There have been large dechnes in operating profit, but football 
clubs have always suffered poor profits and there appears to be no causal link 
with floatation. In fact four clubs (Aston Villa^°, Preston North End, Sheffield 
United and Swansea) suffered significantly lower losses than prior to floatation but 
they have always reported losses. What is notable is the significance of fioatation 
on revenues yet this has not translated into profits. Most likely this is due to 
the revenues that are coming in are going straight back into players' wages and 
transfer fees, not to mention stadium construction (e.g. Sunderland's Stadium of 
Light) though one could potentially view these as assets and investments. Also 
notable is that performance does not seem to have suffered nor has it particularly 
improved. Floatations were widely criticised at the time with the fear being that 
commercialism would dominate and clubs would only care about money and not 
about winning (see Conn (1997)). 
Given the comparison of simple averages in revenues, profits, wages, wages as 
a percent of revenues along with the more robust results from the error correc-
tion regression, floatation did not affect the behaviour of clubs. There are a few 
interpretations of these results: 
• A possibility exists that once becoming public, the day to day running of 
the club was too far removed from the new owners (shareholders). Dispersed 
ownership dilutes some of the decision making on behalf of the owners so 
managers and directors of the clubs are able to take riskier management de-
cisions without being heavily challenged. They are also susceptible to trying 
to help the performance of the team while neglecting the costs associated 
with that, so the objectives of the managers and directors could be at odds 
with shareholders who would want a more profltable company and this is the 
classic principal-agent problem. 
^°The reason Aston Villa appears to have suffered significantly lower losses is due to an outlier 
in 2003. 
• Directors may have gambled on improving performance with a view to exploit-
ing the very rapid growth in media income during the period. The escalation 
of player salaries in general during this period was a reflection of this growth, 
and it may have appeared to be an individually rational strategy to invest 
relatively heavily in the late 1990s with a view to obtaining a larger share of 
a larger pot in the new millennium. An example of this approach appears 
to be the performance of Leeds United, which invested heavily and gambled 
on achieving success not only in the Premier League but also in the UEFA 
Champions League. They did in fact succeed in reaching the semi-final of 
the latter competition in 2001, only to fail to qualify for the following season 
and found themselves unable to fund their collection of star players. Since 
that time they have been more or less forced sellers of large amounts of player 
talent. So even if the club could have become more profit-oriented, pressures 
on the managers to provide a successful team on the pitch could be at odds 
with that, thus giving the appearance that no change occurred or even the 
opposite of what was expected, making it difficult to tell if any changes in 
objectives occurred. 
• There is also the case that mostly fans bought the shares, though there is 
evidence that there was institutional buying. Morrow (1999) reports that "at 
its 1997 accounting year end 124 institutional shareholders owned almost 60 
per cent of the ordinary shares in Manchester United." However, it may be 
that the institutions quickly deserted the newly floated clubs once they re-
alised that they were unlikely to see a reasonable return on their investment. 
So if fans bought most of the shares, they would be less likely to exert pres-
sure for profits and more likely to support spending for purchasing players. 
However if clubs only wanted money from supporters, there may have been 
easier ways to generate fan revenue (i.e., raising ticket prices). A possibility 
is that control of shares was not very dispersed, and that controlling block 
shareholders were part of management (e.g., Freddy Shepherd of Newcastle 
and Doug Ellis of Aston Villa). 
• Another argument is public clubs face a prisoner's type of dilemma. If 
the league actually consists of a mixture of profit-maximising and utility-
maximising teams, rational investors may want to avoid being the minor-
ity profit-maximisers given that win-maximisers would over-spend on talent 
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which potentially could result in diminished profits and wins for the profit-
maximiser. This might cause some clubs to act as win-maximisers if some 
do, but there is no substantial evidence to this effect. The risk of relegation 
and its long term effects on revenues and position outweigh any benefit from 
profit-maximisation. 
• Another possibility is that clubs spent the money on transfers. Additionally, 
clubs may have used the money to finance stadium refurbishment as some 
clubs indicated they would. There does not appear to be any adverse effects 
on either pitch performance or revenue generation. If anything public clubs 
did better in the long-run which could indicate increased efficiency. However, 
playing performance did not significantly improve even though clubs raised 
money through floatation. 
• A possibility is that all football clubs were profit maximisers before fiotation-
so that entry onto the stock market did not lead to any appreciable change 
in behaviour. 
It seems unlikely that any one explanation will furnish a conclusive explanation 
of the relative performance of, the football clubs that floated in the mid 1990s. 
However, the data does at least provide a serious challenge to the received view that 
football clubs in England were utility maximisers rather than proflt maximisers. If 
a utility maximising club floats stock on the market the most natural implication 
is a shift upward in profit and downward in on the pitch performance, almost 
exactly the opposite of what seems to have occurred. Not only did profits fall 
and performance improve on the pitch, but the econometric evidence suggests that 
the reason for this change was that the floating clubs simply spent the flotation 
proceeds on players. While it is not impossible to construct alternative stories to 
explain the data while maintaining the conventional view that football clubs are 
utility maximisers, at the very least the explanations seem somewhat strained. 
What is noticeable is that regardless of the true objectives of the clubs, the 
potential for promotion and relegation forced all the clubs to behave similarly. 
Given the concerns about competitive balance and flnancial viability, the act of 
floatation did not appear to adversely affect either the competitiveness of teams 
nor their flnances. If clubs did move towards more profit minded objectives, they 
did not do so at the expense of playing performance. Thus, policies formed to 
promote competitive balance should take into account the impact of promotion 
and relegation on incentives and club behaviour. 
Some caution should be given since some clubs were delisted due to financial 
difficulty (e.g., Nottingham Forest, Leeds United, Queens Park Rangers) though 
this difficulty could not be attributable to floatation itself. Other clubs became 
private again (e.g., Chelsea and Manchester United) and there exists the possibility 
that ownership benefits were larger under private ownership rather than public 
ownership. 
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3.9 Additional Tables for Chapter 3 
Club Float Date Method % Offered/Placed 
Preston North End October 1995 Placing/offer 86 
Chelsea March 1996 Introduction ga 
Leeds August 1996 Takeover and placing/offer 60 
Queens Park Rangers (Loftus Road) October 1996 Placing/offer 44 
Sunderland December 1996 Placing/offer 26 
Sheffield United January 1997 Takeover and placing/offer 42 
Southampton January 1997 Reverse Takeover 100 
West Bromwich Albion January 1997 Placing 100 
Birmingham City March 1997 Placing 30 
Charlton Athletic March 1997 Placing/offer 35 
Bolton Wanderers (Burden Leisure) April 1997 Reverse Takeover 100 
Newcastle United April 1997 Offer 28 
Aston Villa May 1997 Placing/offer 16 
Swansea City August 1997 Takeover 0'' 
Leicester City October 1997 Introduction 0^= 
Nottingham Forest October 1997 Offer 11 
a. Chelsea FC is owned by Chelsea Village PLC in which the directors and three other interests 
jointly held 83.5% of the equity at the company's introduction. 
b. Swansea City FC was purchased by Silver Shield PLC, a car windscreen replacement company. 
Although located in Wales, Swansea plays in English Football League and hence is treated as an 'English' club. 
c. Leicester City FC was acquired by Soccer Investments PLC. 
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Table 3.1: Clubs that Floated in Mid-19908 
O) 
Year 
Aston 
Villa 
Birm 
City Bolton 
Charlton 
Ath Chelsea 
Leeds 
UU 
Leicester 
City 
Newcastle 
Utd 
Nott 
Forest 
Preston 
N.E. QPA 
Sheffield 
' Utd 
South-
ampton 
Sund-
erland Swansea WBA 
1991 1.498 -0.414 -0.065 0.460 2.009 3.102 0.194 0.693 2.363 -0.645 1.910 1.817 1.730 1.360 -0.792 0.151 
1992 2.508 -0.065 -0 .551 0.792 1.730 4.522 0.947 0.194 2.363 -0.742 2.009 2.234 1.571 0.281 -0.842 -0 .281 
1993 3.818 0.238 -0.065 0.551 2.009 1.498 0.842 1.113 1.172 -0.947 2.868 1.730 1.427 0.151 -0 .194 -0 .151 
1994 2.116 0.108 0.460 0.598 1.730 2.868 0.947 3.401 1.056 -1.427 2.234 1.295 1.427 0.551 -0 .551 0.151 
1995 1.427 -0.022 1.001 0.414 2.009 2.868 1.232 2.674 3.401 -1.427 2.363 0.742 2.116 0.194 -0 .414 0.238 
1996 3.102 0.505 1.295 0.947 2.009 1.817 1.001 3.818 2.234 -1.056 1.360 0.792 1,498 1.232 -0.894 0.693 
1997 2.868 0.742 1.232 0.505 2.674 2.009 2.234 3.818 1.295 -0 .551 0.792 1.001 1.571 1.427 -1.295 0.460 
1998 2.508 0.894 1.427 1.056 3.102 2^88 2.116 1.817 1.232 -0.551 0.238 0.947 1.910 1.113 -2 .868 0.742 
1999 2.674 1.056 0.947 1.427 3.401 3.102 2.116 1.817 1.295 -0.108 0.281 0.842 1.498 1.232 -1 .427 0.645 
2000 2.674 1.001 0.947 1.232 2.868 3.401 2.363 2.009 0.551 0.065 0.742 0.460 1.649 2.508 -1.056 0.238 
2001 2.363 1.001 1.113 2.234 2.674 3.102 1.817 2.009 0.693 1.056 0.151 0.742 2.116 2.508 -0 .947 0.947 
2002 2.363 1.001 1.571 1.730 2.674 2U#8 1.295 3.102 0.460 0.842 -0.238 0.598 2.009 1.498 -2.868 1.172 
2003 1.571 1.817 1.498 1.910 3.102 1.649 1.172 3.401 0.947 0.645 -0.065 1.113 2.363 1.295 -3 .102 1.360 
2004 •2.674 2.116 . 2.363 2.508 3.818 1.360 1.427 2.868 0.551 0.505 0.022 0.842 1.910 1.113 -1.649 1.172 
Avg Pre-float 2.412 0.058 0.346 0.627 1.897 2.972 0.861 1.982 2.098 -0.940 2.277 1.435 1.628 0.507 -0 .615 0.134 
Avg Post-float 2.462 1.204* 1.387t 1.575* 2.925* 2.464 1.818t 2.605 0.878* -0.058* 0.365* 0.818t 1.878* 1.547* -1.902* 0.842* 
i 
I 
Oo 
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1 
"Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and significance at the 90% level 
Table 3.2: Position 
C5 Cn 
Year 
Aston 
Villa 
Birm 
City Bolton 
Charlton 
Ath Chelsea 
Leeds 
Utd 
Leicester 
City 
Newcastle 
Utd 
Nott 
Forest 
Preston 
N.E. 
Sheffield 
Utd 
South-
ampton 
Sund-
erland Swansea WBA 
1991 0.353 -0.417 -0.684 0.811 -0 .052 0.467 0.701 -0.750 0.296 0.073 0.250 -0 .030 -0.270 
1992 0.763 -0.260 -0.656 0.763 -0 .018 0.581 0.450 -0.848 0.423 0.229 0.336 0.065 -0.834 -0.216 
1993 0.648 -0.316 -0.629 -0 .258 0.803 0.025 0.684 0.655 -1.129 0.459 0.234 0.356 0.040 -1.038 -0.354 
1994 0.844 -0.007 -0 .383 -0 .388 0.602 0.868 0.154 0.895 1.085 -0.886 0.408 0.158 0.383 0.179 -1 .055 -0.334 
1995 0.860 0.183 -0.132 -0.289 0.670 0.920 0.380 0.855 0.637 -0.936 0.375 0.040 0.459 0.109 -1 .068 -0.348 
1996 0.796 0.320 -0.049 -0.320 0.974 1.063 0.448 1.414 0.895 -0.919 0.364 0.116 0.170 0.246 -1.265 -0.245 
1997 0.847 0.127 0.356 -0.376 1.246 1.048 0.725 1.399 0.622 -0.699 0.517 -0.192 0.102 0.279 -1 .363 -0.332 
1998 0.718 -0.176 0.466 -0 .288 1.497 0.965 0.524 1.307 0.615 -0 .773 0.486 0.318 0.182 0.301 -1.529 -0.387 
1999 0.863 -0.161 0.316 0.117 1.469 0.930 0.781 1.208 0.479 -0.925 0.179 0.035 0.400 0.313 -1.425 -0.471 
2000 0.909 -0.111 0.062 0.236 1.726 1.164 0.856 1.201 0.230 -0 .717 -0 .113 -0.349 0.467 0.936 -1.406 -0.326 
2001 0.885 -0.103 0.094 0.508 1.617 1.440 0.768 0.963 0.037 -0 .743 -0.019 -0.406 0.468 0.816 -1.456 -0.600 
2002 0.901 0.052 0.386 0.538 1.519 1.453 0.939 -0.352 -0.743 -0.745 -0.563 0.590 0.721 -1.908 -0.492 
2003 0.837 0.344 0.557 0.522 1.384 1.397 -0 .455 1.172 -0.474 -0.865 -1.336 -0 .533 0.645 0.888 -0.200 
2004 0.694 0.317 0.331 0.573 1.925 0.357 0.979 -0 .697 -1.032 -0.727 0.444 0.000 -0.334 
Avg Pre-float 0.711 -0 .083 -0.422 -0 .314 0.636 0.833 0.156 0.816 0.737 -0 .903 0.392 0.142 0.326 0.073 -1.052 -0.295 
Avg Post-float 0.832 0.036 0.321* 0.229* 1.484* 1.183* 0.508 1.146 0.058* -0.835 -0.083* -0.302t 0.412+ 0.500* -1.515* -0.393* 
"Indicates significance at the 99% level; tsignificance at the 95% level and significance at the 90% level 
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Table 3.3: Relative Wages 
o 
05 
Year 
Aston 
Villa 
Birm 
City Bolton 
Charlton 
Ath Chelsea 
Leeds 
Utd 
Leicester 
City 
Newcastle 
Utd 
Nott 
Forest 
Preston 
N.E. 
Sheffield 
Utd 
South-
ampton 
Sund-
erland Swansea WBA 
1991 0.791 -0 .735 -0 .661 0.814 -0.235 0.301 0.539 -1 .193 -0.129 0.076 0.558 0.242 -0.386 
1992 0.793 -0 .474 -0.579 -0 .811 0.931 0.628 0.449 1.210 -0 .855 0.179 0.233 0.494 0.750 -0.918 -0 .481 
1993 0.880 -0.302 -1.082 -0.789 0.626 1.149 0.171 0.728 1.029 -1.115 0.422 0.362 0.810 0.069 -1.120 -0.289 
1994 0.940 -0 .301 -0 .034 -0.556 0.698 1.003 0.203 1.207 1.125 -1 .223 0.197 0.066 0.353 -0.036 -1.238 -0 .304 
1995 0.812 0.185 0.041 -0.752 0.827 0.939 0.519 1.455 0.579 -1.132 0.282 -0.288 0.556 -0 .047 -1 .587 -0 .228 
1996 1.173 0.228 0.144 -0.459 1.005 1.167 0.462 1.602 1.013 -0.708 0.206 -0 .251 0.270 0.205 -1.941 -0 .073 
1997 1.067 0.004 0.008 -0.562 1.151 1.054 0.824 1.689 0.642 -0 .680 -0.013 -0.547 0.196 0.569 -1.908 -0.224 
1998 1.118 -0.219 0.414 -0.587 2.137 1.001 0.615 1.555 0.078 -0.939 -0.316 -0 .217 0.187 0.595 -2.204 -0 .331 
1999 1.117 -0 .303 0.099 0.354 2.082 1.175 0.735 1.365 0.398 -0.799 -0.801 -0.576 0.164 0.746 -1 .721 -0.524 
2000 1.039 -0 .225 0.058 -0.077 2.130 1.504 0.719 1.268 -0 .291 -0 .801 -0.781 -0.788 0.297 1.079 -1.800 -0.619 
2001 0.961 -0.126 -0.039 0.631 1.827 1.745 0.666 1.293 -0.279 -0.739 -0.529 -0.839 0.481 1.116 -1.810 -0 .571 
2002 0.846 -0.279 0.605 0.424 1.749 1.402 1.262 -0 .607 -0 .707 -1 .071 -0.692 0.653 0.782 -2.284 -0 .340 
2003 0.756 0.536 0.575 0.498 1.627 1.098 -1.275 1.508 -0.849 -1.315 -1.585 -0.496 0.828 0.688 -2.324 0.287 
2004 0.768 0.559 0.632 0.497 1.770 0.425 1.247 -0 .895 -1 .371 -0.784 0.654 0.096 -2.138 -0 .231 
Avg Pre-float 0.898 -0 .233 -0.362 -0.673 0.717 0.967 0.291 0.957 0.916 -1 .097 0.190 0.033 0.507 0.196 -1 .361 -0 .294 
Avg Post-float 0.959 -0 .007 0.294* 0.147* 1.720* 1.268+ 0.387 1.398 -0.225* -0.919 -0.611* -0.617* 0.433 0.653* -2.024+ -0.319 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
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Table 3.4: Relative Revenues 
O) 
-a 
Year 
Aston 
Villa 
Birm 
City Bolton 
Charlton 
Ath Chelsea 
Leeds Leicester Newcastle 
Utd City Utd 
Nott 
Forest 
Preston 
N.E. QPR 
Sheffield 
Utd 
South-
ampton 
Sund-
erland Swansea WBA 
1992 3,542 - 7 1 7 - 2 7 0 
1993 - 3 2 3 - 7 2 6 -1 ,632 3,449 - 7 1 5 - 6 7 1 201 - 3 2 3 1,413 1,555 - 8 9 7 - 2 2 3 -3 ,342 
1994 - 2 , 3 6 7 - 4 8 8 - 7 6 1,255 - 1 , 3 8 7 311 -2 ,498 4,019 - 1 5 6 - 2 , 7 1 3 - 5 , 253 -1 ,130 -1 ,499 - 1 4 7 - 4 , 1 4 1 
1995 2,899 245 - 5 4 7 - 1 , 0 8 0 3,011 - 9 9 3 1,038 - 5 0 7 96 - 2 9 1 64 402 - 4 6 4 - 4 3 6 233 
1996 5,775 803 - 8 8 3 - 6 3 3 -1 ,984 - 9 7 4 - 5 6 8 -26 ,784 1,161 - 2 9 5 - 3 2 3 - 9 7 40 - 4 5 0 44 310 
1997 5,363 671 -1 ,906 - 4 9 5 2,171 - 9 , 763 1,827 8,105 -1 ,479 - 7 6 9 - 3 , 2 3 4 -950 269 2,863 - 4 5 7 781 
1998 ^ 8 % 1,102 - 1 , 3 9 1 - 1 , 1 7 5 1,000 3,164 617 -10 ,494 - 8 , 4 % - 1 , 6 1 8 - 1 , 6 8 0 -6 ,409 3,401 885 - 7 6 3 880 
1999 - 3 , 780 -9 ,324 1,394 - 7 8 3 5,790 -660 1,372 - 2 , 9 3 7 - 1 , 2 1 4 - 1 , 2 9 7 -6 ,446 - 1 1 3 1,951 - 1 , 1 2 3 - 5 0 7 
2000 - 5 , 1 9 7 - 1 , 0 8 1 -8 ,640 - 6 , 6 1 0 2,071 -2 ,881 - 2 , 6 2 3 -19 ,108 -10 , 286 - 2 , 3 8 2 2,399 -5 ,035 -3 ,979 -6 ,046 - 1 , 3 3 7 892 
2001 - 6 , 6 5 1 -96,000 -12 ,847 - 8 5 - 6 , 8 2 6 -5 ,685 - 1 3 4 - 5 , 1 2 6 -9 ,742 - % 8 % 62 - 3 , 5 5 3 -2 ,350 2,336 - 1 , 0 4 9 -134 
2002 - 9 , 779 - 2 , 7 8 0 766 -12 ,702 -13 ,508 -28 ,498 48 - 7 , 2 2 7 108 - 1 , 0 7 8 -2 ,804 -5 ,099 - 7 , 1 7 3 - 1 , 3 3 2 -1 ,834 
2003 -13 ,550 3,421 - 5 , 1 2 3 - 9 0 0 -17 ,739 -41 ,827 -4 ,454 11,621 -7 , 119 - 4 , 038 - 1 4 - 6 9 1 1,989 -23 ,581 - 4 2 8 9,869 
2004 - 5 , 1 4 3 5/M8 2,529 - 3 9 -75 , 444 6,217 7,532 - 4 , 0 5 8 - 2 , 964 - 1 , 8 0 3 -730 - 3 , 2 2 1 124 -994 
Avg Pre-float 1,905 - 1 7 7 - 7 8 5 - 1 5 3 812 922 - 6 8 6 - 5 , 9 8 6 629 23 - 1 , 5 1 8 - 9 6 8 217 - 9 5 3 - 2 0 6 -1 ,735 
Avg Post-float -2,841* • -11,589 -4 ,492 - 2 , 5 7 7 -12 ,338 -10 ,084 113 - 7 5 6 - 6 , 4 1 0 -1 ,630* - 6 4 6 -3,461* - 8 2 7 - 3 , 6 0 4 -796+ 1,119 
"Indicates significance at the 99% level; 1'significance at the 95% level and ^-significance at the 90% level 
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Table 3.5; Operating Profits 
O) 
00 
Aston Birm Charlton Leeds Leicester Newcastle Nott Preston Sheffield South- Sunder-
Year Villa City Bolton Ath Chelsea Utd City Utd Forest N.E. Utd ampton land Swansea WBA 
1991 0.341 0.726 0.516 0.526 0.634 0.623 0.620 0.822 0.807 0.526 0.388 0.402 0.592 
1992 0.543 0.694 0.518 0.473 0.293 0.639 0.262 0.564 0.714 0.557 0.478 0.282 0.609 0.729 
1993 0.442 0.550 0.877 0.948 0.394 0.482 0.533 0.383 0.550 0.579 0.491 0.354 0.541 0.605 0.522 
1994 0.480 0.708 0.373 0.625 0.480 0.462 0.503 0.387 0.508 0.740 0.652 0.579 0.544 0.655 0.634 0.513 
1995 0.549 0.522 0.440 0.832 0.447 0.514 0.456 0.287 0.555 0.637 0.575 0.727 0.475 0.612 0.881 0.465 
1996 0.409 0.653 0.491 0.685 0.578 0.537 0.588 0.494 0.530 0.483 0.698 0.860 0.539 0.621 1.172 0.502 
1997 0.456 0.643 0.805 0.684 0.625 0.565 0.515 0.425 0.557 0.558 0.965 0.810 0.517 0.425 0.980 0.510 
1998 0.390 0.608 0.613 0.785 0.307 0.561 0.531 0.454 0.995 0.688 1.298 0.994 0.579 0.434 1.143 0.550 
1999 0.497 0.739 0.796 0.505 0.347 0.502 0.671 0.548 0.694 0.565 1.707 1.180 0.811 0.416 0.861 0.676 
2000 0.601 0.767 0.688 0.936 0.457 0.487 0.784 0.640 1.152 0.745 1.334 1.061 0.811 0.594 1.015 0.918 
2001 0.631 0.697 0.778 0.603 0.552 0.502 0.754 0.490 0.935 0.679 1.135 1.050 0.672 0.505 0.970 0.662 
2002 0.661 0.870 0.502 0.701 0.496 0.658 0.452 0.807 0.603 0.866 0.711 0.587 0.588 0.910 0.537 
2003 0.711 0.541 0.644 0.671 0.514 0.884 0.469 0.953 1.028 0.841 0.632 0.546 0.801 0.403 
2004 0.605 0.511 0.482 0.702 0.760 0.498 0.794 0.913 0.689 0.528 ,0.591 0.587 
Avg Pre-float 0.461 0.642 0.536 0.773 0.464 0.474 0.493 0.494 0.476 0.669 0.665 0.623 0.463 0.498 0.780 0.554 
Avg Post-float 0.569+ 0.672 0.664 0.698 0.515 0.587% 0.651+ 0.497 0.861* 0.690 1.106* 0.891+ 0.631* 0.553 0.980 0.605 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
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Table 3.6: Wages as Percent of Revenue 
to 
A;^,t APi,t APi,, 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
^Wi,t 0.269* 0.085 3.15 0.311* 0.090 3.45 0.268' 0.091 2.95 
APi , t - i -0.087+ 0.040 - 2 . 1 4 -0.083t 0.041 -2 .04 0.082* 0.028 2.93 
APRi^t 0.476* 0.046 10.30 0.466* 0.045 10.30 0.511* 0.054 9.53 
AREi^t -0.575* 0.051 -11 .40 -0.572* 0.050 -11 .30 -0.554* 0.047 -11 .90 
ADli^t -0.244* 0.043 - 5 . 6 2 -0.237* 0.043 -5 .46 -0.267* 0.045 - 6 . 0 1 
AD2<, -0.196* 0.033 - 6 . 0 1 -0.186* 0.033 - 5 . 7 1 -0.223* 0.040 - 5 . 6 1 
-0.694* 0.048 -14 .60 -0.691* 0.047 -14 .80 -0.778* 0.050 -15 .50 
AQi.t -0 .193t 0.091 - 2 . 1 1 -0 .227t 0.089 - 2 . 5 5 -0 .178 0.110 -1 .62 
Constant 1.082* 0.203 5.33 1.046* 0.206 5.08 3.281* 0.324 10.10 
1 0.167* 0.035 4.74 0.192* 0.043 4.45 0.170t 0.101 1.69 
Pi,t-1 -0.517* 0.097 -5 .30 -0.526* 0.100 - 5 . 2 7 -1.012* 0.077 -13.20 
PRi,t-i 1.259* 0.088 14.20 1.235* 0.088 14.10 1.472* 0.096 15.30 
REi^t-1 -1.457* 0.091 -16 .00 -1.448* 0.089 -16 .40 -1.574* 0.091 -17 .40 
-0.674* 0.147 - 4 . 5 8 -0.662* 0.145 - 4 . 5 7 -1.237* 0.146 - 8 . 4 8 
D2i,t-i -1.105* 0.248 - 4 . 4 5 -1.082* 0.244 -4 .44 -2.163* &228 - 9 . 4 7 
-1.863* 0.410 - 4 . 5 4 -1.846* 0.406 - 4 . 5 4 -3.627* 0.353 -10.30 
Qi,t 0.095 0.074 1.29 0.074 0.088 0.84 0.009 0.099 0.09 
Observations 894 894 894 
Time Effects No Yes Yes 
Group Effects No No Yea 
Wald (Joint) 1273 1371 1767 
AR{1) -0 .739 -0 .695 -0 .488 
AA(2) -1 .014 -0 .871 -1 .532 
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'Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 3.7: Error Correction Mechanism: Performance on Wage 
-J 
o 
ARi^t ^Ri,t 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
-0.100* 0.028 -3 .61 -0.104* 0.028 -3 .67 -0.052 0IW8 -1 .34 
0.083* 0.020 4.18 0.089* 0.019 4.80 0.088' 0.022 4.01 
0.039 0.125* 0.038 3.25 0.110* 0.042 2.63 
AREi^t -0.069t 0.030 -2 .33 - 0 . 0 7 l t 0.028 -2 .53 -0.053* 0.031 -1 .70 
ADli^t -0.250* 0.031 -8 .09 -0.248* 0.031 -8 .03 -0.234* 0.031 -7 .45 
AD2^, -0.210* 0.031 -6 .76 -0 .218' 0.031 -7 .04 -0.195* 0.035 -5 .61 
-0.036 0.032 -1 .10 -0 .030 0.031 -0 .94 -0.036 0.035 -1 .04 
AQi^t • 0.056 0.037 1.49 .0.103? 0.046 2J23 0.105t 0.051 2.05 
Constant -0.015 0.037 -0 .40 0.028 0.048 0.59 0.425* 0.123 3.47 
-0.163* 0.018 -8 .84 -0.199* 0.022 -9 .20 -0.509* 0.041 -12.40 
Pi,t-i 0.076* 0.017 4.52 0.095* 0.017 5.61 0.127* 0.030 4.30 
0.447* 0.045 9.90 0.451* 0.045 10.00 0.452* 0.060 7.59 
-0.330* 0.054 -6 .08 -0.323* 0.053 -6 .15 -0.282* 0.063 -4 .48 
-0.206* 0.034 -6 .03 -0.218* 0.038 -5 .74 -0.380* 0.061 -6 .24 
-0.292* 0.049 -6 .02 -0.318* 0.052 -6 .15 -0.545* 0.098 -5 .59 
-0.243* 0.074 -3 .28 -0.251* 0.078 -3 .20 -0.536* 0.149 - 3 . 6 1 
Qi,t 0.022 0.016 1.42 0.063* 0.020 3.13 0.113t 0.045 2.51 
Observations 903 903 903 
Time Effects No Yes Yes 
Group Effects No No Yes 
Wald (Joint) 635.6 (M&7 633.0 
AR{1) -1 .80 -1 .39 -1 .71 
AR{2) -0 .896 0.310 -1 .97 
i 
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O 
Ri,t = \Og{Ri,t/Rt), Pi,t = -10g(g^^) 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and * significance at the 90% level 
Table 3.8: Error Correction Mechanism; Revenues on Position 
Af^,« Af^,( 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
AtUi.t 0.322* 0.088 3.67 0.331* 0.087 3.78 0.275* 0.081 3.40 
-0.082* 0.041 -1 .99 -0.082* 0.041 -1 .99 0.079* 0.031 2.58 
0.461* 0.046 9.97 0.460* 0.046 9.96 0.507* 0.054 9.45 
AREi^t -0.565* 0.051 -11.10 -0.566* 0.050 -11.20 -0.549* 0.045 -12.10 
ADli.t -0.332* 0.050 -6 .66 -0.333* 0.050 -6 .65 -0.349* 0.045 -7 .71 
AD2i, -0.306* 0.043 -7 .10 -0.310* 0.042 -7 .30 -0.325* 0.043 -7 .62 
AD3(,t -0.739* 0.045 -16.40 -0.740* 0.045 -16.50 -0.819* 0.049 -16.70 
AQi,t -0.177* 0.091 -1 .95 -0 .22 l t 0.089 -2 .48 -0.170 . , 0.108 -1 .57 
Constant 1.274* 0.210 6.08 1.245* 0.214 5.82 3.430* " 0.295 11.60 
0.222* 0.044 5.02 0.223* 0.045 4.90 0.210* 0.082 2.54 
Pi,t-i -0.534* 0.100 -5 .35 -0.534* 0.100 -5 .33 -1.011* 0.082 -12.30 
PRi,t-i 1.475* 0.085 17.30 1.481* 0.085 17.40 1.677* 0.079 21.10 
-1.685* 0.097 -17.30 -1.693* 0.098 -17.30 -1.780* 0.096 -18.50 
-0.887* 0.148 -5 .98 -0.887* 0.150 -5 .91 -1.450* 0.136 -10.70 
-1.484* 0.248 -5 .97 -1.488* 0.251 -5 .93 -2.541* 0.217 -11.70 
D\t-i -2.372* 0.414 -5 .73 -2.375* 0.417 -5 .69 -4.114* 0.348 -11.80 
Qi,t 0.090 0.074 1.23 0.092 0.083 1.10 0.036 0.091 0.40 
Observations 894 894 894 
Time Effects No Yes 
Group Effects No No Yes 
Wald (Joint) 1263 1345 1814 
AR{1) -0.787 -0 .834 -0 .559 
AR(2) -0.847 -0.836 - 1 . 5 7 
Wi,t = l o g ( W i , t / W t ) , Pi^t = - l o g ( 9 3 - P i , f ) 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 3.9; Error Correction Mechanism; Performance on Wage (Divisional Averages) 
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t-H 
-a to 
ARi^t Ai?i,t 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
-0.081* 0.022 - & 7 2 -0.079* 0.021 -3 .75 0.024 0.020 1.24 
0.103* 0.018 5.62 0.104* 0.018 5.86 0.097* 0.020 4.82 
^PRi,t 0.119* 0.039 3.01 0.119* 0.039 3.03 0.121* 0.040 3.06 
-0.072* 0.024 -2 .94 -0.073* 0.025 -2 .94 - 0 . 0 6 l t 0.028 -2 .18 
0.265* 0.031 8.49 0.266' 0.031 8.50 0.295* 0.029 10.10 
AD2(. 0.276* 0IW2 8.69 0.277* 0.032 8.66 0.290* 0.037 7.83 
0.105* 0.033 3.16 0.105* 0.033 3.17 0.087t 0.036 2.41 
AQi.t, 0.073* 0.040 1.84 0.082* 0.043 1.91 0.045 0.043 1.05 
Constant -0.306* 0.045 -6 .81 -0.296* 0.054 -5 .53 -0.223t 0.103 -2 .16 
Ri,t-1 -0.219* 0.025 -8 .70 -0.221* 0.026 -8 .62 -0 .652 ' 0.040 -16.30 
Pi,t-i 0.110* 0.018 6.31 0.112* 0.018 6.39 0.145* 0.027 5.39 
PRi,t-l -0.517* 0.044 -11.70 -0.518* 0.044 -11.90 -0.479* 0.057 -8 .37 
0.615* 0.054 11.40 0.617* 0.053 11.60 0.655* 0.060 10.90 
0.172* 0.038 4.48 0.176* 0.039 4.55 0.523* 0.062 8.44 
0.300* 0.056 5.32 0.307* 0.057 5.37 0.900* 0.092 9.78 
0.516* 0.085 6.08 0.525* 0.085 6.15 1.262* 0.129 9.75 
Qi,t 0.054* 0.017 3.16 0.058' 0.019 3.05 0.064 0.041 1.54 
Observations 903 903 903 
Time Effects No Yes Yes 
Group Effects No No Yes 
Wald (Joint) 3003 2797 2382 
AR{\) -3 .315 -3 .24 -2 .64 
AR(2) 0.271 0.301 -0.842 
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* Indicates significance at the 99% level; significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 3.10: Error Correction Mechanism: Revenues on Position (Divisional Averages) 
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Chapter 4 
Economic Objectives, Adjustment 
and Financial Viability: An 
Empirical View 
4.1 Introduction 
The last Chapter provided insight into the ownership and economic objectives of 
football clubs and the role they play in achieving competitive balance. The decision 
to float on the stock market produced mixed results. While the results show that 
floatation did lead to increased revenues, they did not appear to lead to better or 
worse performance on the pitch. There is a decrease in performance in the short-
term but the long-run indicator, although insignificant, predicts an increase in 
performance. If clubs were strict profit maximisers we should have seen a decrease 
in playing performance. Conversely, if the increased revenues were spent on wages, 
we would have expected better performance from teams that floated. Many of the 
clubs that floated are no longer listed on the stock exchanges and most club share 
prices declined as the stock market bubble burst, while the subsequent downturn 
in the financial markets in 2000 did little to help shares. Even financially successful 
clubs such as Manchester United have become private companies again. 
An extension of this model is to examine what happens when clubs miss their 
objectives. If clubs have position and revenue objectives what are the imphcations 
financially and competitively if those goals are not obtained? Additionally, what 
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happens when clubs overperform? If Rottenberg (1956) was correct in assuming 
that clubs would not want to get too powerful, then over per forming clubs should 
also scale back relative to their competitors and even the playing field. More 
critically, what happens when clubs underperform? How might underperformance 
affect competitive balance and financial viability of leagues and the clubs and what 
are the imphcations of policy issues. A more specific objective of this Chapter is 
to determine the implications of these new regulations on clubs, especially those 
in financial crisis. Previous research has not empirically explored this aspect of 
the game. Prior transfer market research has been more or less focused on the 
determinants of transfer fees not the act or results of transfers themselves^. 
4.1.1 Success and Failure 
Failure and success on the pitch have financial consequences. European compe-
titions such as the UEFA Cup and Champions League are extremely lucrative. 
Competing in the Champions League could generate a £20 to 30 million (or more 
depending on how far a team progresses in the competition) boost in extra revenue 
per club^. A UEFA Cup spot implies an increase in revenue of £5 to 10 million. 
Moving up and down divisions- are also financially important. Promotion to the 
Premiership for the 2006/07 season could generate an extra £40 miUion in income.^ 
Comparatively, relegation means much lower revenue during the following season.^ 
The difference of one position in the Premier League itself implies a significant gain 
or loss because of the way prize payments are allotted according to position and 
because of the potential for European qualification^. 
The analysis in this chapter will extend the Szymanski & Smith (1997) model 
and build from the equilibriurn model presented in Chapter 3. We advance and 
build up this model to allow for adjustments when clubs experience deviations from 
the performance and revenue objectives. More specifically, we would like to examine 
^See Carmichael & Thomas (1993), Speight & Thomas (1997), Carmichael, Forrest & Simmons 
(1999) and Dobson, Gerrard & Howe (2000). 
^Source; p. 29, Deloitte & Touche Annual Review of Football Finance, July 2006. 
^Portsmouth who won promotion to the Premiership in 2003 earned approximately £12.6 
million in 2003 while playing in the Championship. Its revenue for 2004 (when it played in the 
Premiership) was £39.8 million. 
^Wolverhampton, who earned £37.9 million while playing in the Premiership in 2004, earned 
£23.9 the following season after getting relegated. 
^Access to European competitions such as the UEFA Cup and Champions League are limited 
to the top seven spots of the Premier League. 
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the potential knock-on effects of nnderperformance. Does underperformance imply 
an increased probability of financial difficulty? We propose that it is the transfer 
market that allows clubs to re-adjust their inputs when objectives are not met. How 
clubs might utilise the transfer market in the equilibrium adjustment as well as the 
reaction to financial distress is crucial to realising potential policy implications 
relating to the transfer market. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: the next Section describes the 
history and evolution of the English football labour market. A summary of the 
league history and reforms will assist in understanding the policy implications and 
why governing bodies have intervened historically. Section 4.3 provides a discussion 
and definition concerning financial distress. 
Initially, there will need to be a general description of financial distress and the 
academic literature behind it. Financial distress in the sporting industry is pecuhar 
as sporting competition requires that clubs rely on their competitors for the legiti-
macy of the industry. For example, if during the season a team goes into financial 
distress and is ultimately liquidated (i.e., Aldershot Town, Newport County), this 
has a knock on effect for every other team in the league. The remaining teams 
will lose out on match-day income if fixtures are unable to be fulfilled due to a 
team going bankrupt. This also implies increased uncertainty and instability in 
the league. However not only will teams lose income due to unfulfilled fixtures, 
but the FA could also expunge points earned against the folded team. This means 
that teams who have played the now defunct team to lose points they may have 
won, thereby causing these remaining teams to fall further down the league table. 
However a team going bust outside of the season may not have such drastic con-
sequences; it may mean less matches played next season and affect other teams 
objective strategies. In other industries, a firm may not suffer such consequences 
when its competitor goes bankrupt. An automobile manufacturer may want less 
competition so it can capture more of the market share and charge higher prices. 
Sporting competition relies on two teams playing each other to create the good 
that people pay to watch. Without an opposing team, there is no product. Our 
model and economic proposition follows with a description about how clubs adjust 
towards equilibrium. 
A focus of this chapter is the financial aspect of the team. The transfer market 
provides a means of equilibrium adjustment. The underlying economic model is 
4. fcoofvojwrrc; vii]LrLrs:rA/rE%\ri; i/jL4J3ijLZTir "77 
that clubs invest in players in hope of achieving a certain league position and level 
of revenue. However, there may be random internal shocks that affect the team 
causing over or underperformance relative to the expectations based on the level 
of talent. Whether a club over or under performs with respect to its objectives, 
it may utilise the transfer market for adjustment towards the long run objectives 
by adjusting the wages spent. We state that the level of wages paid out by clubs 
captures talent and quality of the players and this relationship is justified below. 
The transfer market provides a method of adjustment because it is a medium 
in which clubs can alter the wages spent by buying and selling players of different 
quality and characteristics. Clubs can sell a player who receives high wages and thus 
reduce the wage bill for the club. One thing to note is that after the collapse of ITV 
Digital in 2002, clubs started to put more performance based clauses in contracts, 
so if a club performed badly they could directly change the player's salary without 
having to sell him. However the most utilised mean of changing the wage bill is by 
altering the mix of players in the squad through the transfer market. According to 
Deloitte & Touche, "Of comfort to those who rely on football's financial well-being 
should be the low financial failure rate and the new money coming into the game, 
which does find its way round via the transfer market. And, if it comes down to it, 
there are also those 'off-balance sheet assets', the players, one of which always can 
be sold. This may be unpalatable to directors and supporters but, at the end of the 
day, it is financially acceptable."® We then present the methodology and results. 
The last section concludes with a discussion about the implications for financial 
viability and competitive balance in English football. 
4.2 Labour Market in English Football 
Football clubs require a stock of players in order to form a team, 'compete' in the 
league and to participate in matches. To acquire this stock of playing talent, clubs 
not only provide training and schooling for young apprentices, but also engage 
in the transfer market to buy and sell players. However, there are also several 
other underlying reasons and motivations for a club to participate in the transfer 
market. Teams purchase or sell players relative to their respective goals, i.e., a 
Third Division club will purchase or sell players suitable for competing in the 
®p. 21, Deloitte & Touche Annual Review of Football Finance, 1992. 
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Third Division. Firstly, clubs have an overall set of objectives: performance and 
revenue generation. For example. Premiership clubs that compete for a lucrative 
Champions League position will want to acquire higher quality talent in order 
to reach Champions League qualification as well as performing well within that 
competition. Investing in better talent will improve productivity and probability 
of achieving that objective. Furthermore, a more productive and efficient team 
will win more matches, and hence increase revenue as well as gain higher utility 
from possibly becoming champions. Conversely, a struggling team facing relegation 
may select one of two opposing options. A risk averse team may offload expensive 
players since relegation effectively means less revenue, and the inability to pay high 
wages. Alternately, a team going for an all or nothing strategy may restructure 
its line-up by purchasing players in order to stave off relegation. In either case, 
the objective is a certain performance and revenue level. Another motivation for 
clubs to enter the transfer market is the depreciation of assets. Beyond a certain 
age, they become more injury prone and less productive. Therefore, clubs will 
buy new assets to replace the depreciating ones. Again this rehes on the objective 
of the team. A club cannot achieve its optimal performance objective with an 
aging and unproductive squad. Also, contingent on divisional quality, managerial 
effectiveness and team chemistry, players can also appreciate. As clubs improve in 
productivity via training and competition, player valuations appreciate in efficiency 
and quality. With respect to quality, players may also appreciate monetarily in 
that competing clubs may be willing to offer higher prices to obtain that quality 
or talent^. 
4.2.1 History of the Labour Market 
Until the early 1960s the football labour market functioned under a 'retain-and-
transfer' system with a maximum wage. Since 1885, professional football clubs had 
to register their players with the Football Association. The clubs could buy and sell 
player registrations, but the player had no power to initiate a move to another club 
by his own accord. The maximum wage was abolished in 1961 after considerable 
lobbying by the Professional Footballers Association. Then in 1963, the High 
Court ruled that the 'retain and transfer' unfairly restricted trade. This ruhng 
implied that clubs had to offer new contracts with at least the same conditions 
^An example is Manchester United's purchase of Rio Ferdinand from Leeds United in 2002. 
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as the previous contract or the player acquired the freedom to move to another 
club. Not until 1978 were players themselves given the right to decide on whether 
to move upon expiry of their contracts. However, if the employing club offered a 
player a new contract at least as good as the previous one, the club could demand 
a fee from any club that wanted to buy the player. In order to switch clubs 
the player had to rely on his prospective future club to be willing to pay the fee 
required by his current club. This 'freedom-of-contract' structure lasted until the 
landmark Bosman case in 1995. The ruling by the European Court of Justice stated 
that requiring compensation for out-of-contract players restricted the freedom of 
movement of labour and was counter to the law as stated in Article 48 in the Treaty 
of Rome. The Bosman ruling paved the way for players that were out-of-contract 
to have the complete freedom to move. Only if a player is still under contract (or 
under 24 years of age), can the club demand compensation. 
Simmons (1997) researched five possible implications of the Bosman ruling on 
the transfer markets. He discounted the likelihood of the then touted notion that 
the transfer markets would collapse since the market is efficient in matching play-
ers with squads. Concerning the redistribution of funds between divisions in the 
league, Simmons notes the exchange of players during the 1994/95 season demon-
strates only a modest flow from the lower divisions into the Premier League. He 
does note that although some clubs do find playing 'gems' and sell them on to Pre-
miership clubs, the increase in foreign spending may actually shift resources abroad 
as opposed to lower division teams. Simmons also notes that that out-of-contract 
players may even garner larger salaries since a free transfer will allow the funds that 
could have been used for a transfer fee to now be part of the salary package. This 
could increase the distribution of players' salaries. With respect to the magnitude 
of fees themselves, fees could increase if the characteristics of players moving clubs 
change, i.e., fees increase because player quality increases, or fees could decrease as 
quota restrictions are eliminated for international players. Lastly, Simmons notes 
that the Bosman Ruling may affect contract length since contract length involves 
some risk sharing between the club and the player. 
Szymanski (1999) contends that since the inception of free agency in 1978, the 
transfer market has become efficient due to the easing of regulations. Szymanski 
states that the labour market in English football is efficient because the wage bill 
captures playing talent and is therefore more influential on performance than the 
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transfer fee itself. According to Szymanski, larger (bigger revenue generating) clubs 
will bid just above the second-highest bidding club for the contract of a player on 
offer. Hence, the Bosnian verdict should only affect inefficient contracts. 
Forrest & Simmons (2000) look at the proposals put forth by regulators and 
argue that the case against reform by football authorities is weak. Using data 
from the 1999/00 season, Forrest and Simmons cite the argument that the transfer 
system helps lower division clubs is not empirically sound. They note that most 
of the player flow is from upper divisions to lower divisions and relatively few (10 
clubs out of 48) of the lower league clubs benefited from transfer fee income. 
Feess & Muehlheusser (2003) compared three diflFerent transfer systems: pre-
Bosman, post-Bosman and what they termed the "Monti" system. They found that 
the three systems only differed in contract length. This is because contract lengths 
are chosen such that the trade-off between the marginal gain from higher player 
effort and the marginal loss from contract renegotiation are equal.Tervio (2006) 
argues that the transfer market acts as an allocation system for scarce playing 
time of players of different levels and not so much a system of covering the costs of 
player training. Tervio (2006) suggests less use of EU regulatory restrictions and 
more freedom for the clubs and players to negotiate "early termination penalties." 
4.2.2 Transfer Windows 
In 2001 FIFA started implementing new rules restricting when transfers could take 
place. This was in response to a threat by the European Commission to allow 
players to move clubs whenever they pleased. At the same time FIFA realised 
clubs themselves should not trade unilaterally at any time thus the introduction of 
transfer windows. FIFA successfully argued that in order to maintain contractual 
stability players should not be allowed to break their contracts at any time®. The 
trading of players is limited to two window periods. As defined by FIFA (2001): 
Each national association will decide upon the establishment of two 
registration periods per year, according to the following principles: 
(a) The first registration period will start, at the earhest, when the na-
tional championship has ended and finish, at the latest, before the 
subsequent national championship begins. This period, in princi-
ple, should last for no longer than six weeks. 
®www.premierleague.com 
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(b) The second registration period will occur approximately in the 
middle of the season. This period should, in principle, last for 
no longer than four weeks and should be limited to registrations 
for strictly sport related reasons, such as technical adjustments 
to a team or the replacement of injured players, or in exceptional 
circumstances. 
As has been noted by Szymanski & Kuypers (1999), clubs may utilise the 
transfer market as a "kind of insurance policy." They give the example that clubs 
may find it easier to obtain credit lines and loans from lenders, if the lending party 
believes that the club can rely on the selling of players to raise cash and the club to 
remain financially viable. Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) suggest that without such 
insurance from the transfer market, clubs may face tighter financial controls. If 
the clubs cannot sell players, the contracts may become liabilities, which may lead 
to clubs offering shorter contracts, therefore creating less security for the players. 
Carmichael et al. (1999), did try to model a player's propensity of being sold, but 
this did not take into account a club's finances nor the club's objectives, but merely 
the players' attributes that may affect his potential of being transferred. 
Many smaller clubs, however, hover just above financial distress and occasion-
ally experience a financial crisis®. If clubs are limited to selling only twice a year, 
there is an increased risk for clubs to hit financially hard times outside of these 
windows. A detrimental effect due to the increase in risk is that clubs also may 
experience an increased probability of hquidation which in effect could result in 
the inability to fulfill fixtures. This does not just affect the distressed club, but 
every other club in the league. In turn this will lead to a systematic loss of income 
across the league and may affect the finances of other clubs as well. However to 
understand the potential consequences of such a situation, a general overview and 
definition of financial distress must be presented. 
4.3 Classifying and Defining Financial Distress 
Determining which football clubs are in financial distress is not only important to 
investors and shareholders but also to commercial sponsors, broadcasters, other 
clubs and the consumers (the fans) themselves. These groups depend on the event. 
®E.g., see www.clubsincrisis.com for a list. 
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that a match or competition will actually take place. However, how do concerned 
parties ascertain that a firm or industry is in financial distress? Below we present 
general research about financial distress in standard industries and how it could 
provide a useful perspective for applying the definitions in the football industry. 
4.3.1 Predicting Distress 
Altman (1968) suggested using rigorous statistical techniques along with ratio 
analysis to predict which firms are likely to declare bankruptcy. Altman found 
results of previous studies employing profitability, solvency and liquidity ratios 
questionable in their technique since a firm could have a poor profitability or sol-
vency profile but in actuality have very good liquidity making the interpretation of 
imminent bankruptcy doubtful. Altman suggests that analysis should be built on 
determining which ratios are useful in detecting the potential for bankruptcy and 
attaching weights to these ratios using multiple discriminant analysis. 
A problem with Altman's and earlier research is that he relies on a matched 
sample in his analysis. Zmijewski (1984) argued that employing nothing less than 
the entire population of healthy firms in the chosen industry would result in biased 
estimates in multiple discriminant analysis models. Data for most of the 92 clubs in 
England is easily obtained; consequently, this research incorporates practically the 
entire population in the dataset. However future analysis may want to incorporate 
a broader comparison by including other entertainment industries. 
Zavgren (1985) opts for the use of conditional probability models. The proba-
bility estimates from a logit model are able to generate an index where one could 
determine the firm's propensity to fail, not whether it actually fails or not, which 
is useful for looking at clubs on the brink of financial failure. Zavgren notes that 
not only financial data will have an effect on a firm's vulnerability to failure. Un-
observable or immeasurable characteristics such as quality of management, quality 
of assets, random factors and laws of the courts can have a significant effect on 
strength of a company. As Zavgren notes, random shocks can influence distress 
and in the football industry certain shocks (managerial turnover, injuries) may 
affect whether a club achieves its objective performance level. However limited de-
pendent variable analysis appears ideal as we can use this technique to examine the 
probability of financial distress given the football clubs' objectives most notably 
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the probabihty of distress when a club has failed to achieve its objectives. 
The work by Gilbert, Menon & Schwarz (1990) notes that financial-ratio-based-
bankruptcy models based on financially distressed firms perform poorly in their 
prediction rates. Pinches, Mingo & Caruthers (1973) noted that financial ratios 
experience fiuctuations over time; hence, data instability could be problematic for 
prediction models. Hence, the model in our research will not incorporate financial 
ratios, since other factors may be more telling of the situation. However it is worth 
considering and may be utilised in future research. 
Piatt & Piatt (2002) designed an automobile supplier industry study not to 
predict bankruptcy, but rather to predict financial distress. They cite the difficulty 
in defining what actually determines financial distress as the reason for the lack of 
work in financial distress forecasting. Previous studies have used layoffs, restruc-
turings, missed dividend payments, interest coverage ratios, and cash flow relative 
to long term debt as defining corporate distress. Piatt and Piatt use a logit model 
with the categorical dependent variable defined as status of the firm: healthy or 
distressed. This seems an appropriate method to use in the model developed here 
since once we determine a club's financial state of health we would like to deter-
mine how clubs react and if clubs engage in the selling of assets once they are in 
financial distress. 
4.3.2 Reaction to Financial Distress 
The ability to forecast which firms may be in financial distress is vital, but for those 
firms experiencing a financial crisis, how do they go about rectifying the situation. 
Understanding the average industry's reaction will help determine how the football 
industry reacts to these types of problems. Schleifer & Vishny (1992) state that 
firms that in financial distress may find it difficult to sell assets because industry 
peers may also be facing financial hardships. This causes assets to sell for less than 
optimal prices. This subsequently may cause firms to decide not to sell assets at all 
as a method of recovering from financial distress. They find that this adds to the 
costs of financial distress. However in football, the buying and selling of playing 
assets is an integral part of the economic functioning of the club. 
The transfer market is a means by which clubs can change the make-up of their 
squad. The transfer market facilitates the replacement of aging or retiring players, 
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brings in fresh talent and bolsters areas in the squad that are weak. The transfer 
market also acts as an allocation mechanism as described by Tervio (2006). 
However, players are on contracts and once the contract expires, a player may 
leave his team for free to join another club (known as a Bosman transfer). Clubs 
realise players could move for free and many times choose to sell the player before 
his contract expires rather than let him leave for free. In desperate situations clubs 
may even offload a player at a cut-rate fee rather than see him go for free. Before 
Lee Bowyer went to West Ham for a nominal fee in 2003, Leeds had agreed a fee of 
£9 million, far below the £15 million they had hoped for. However the issue here 
is not just the fee. In fact, more importantly is the case of reducing and adjusting 
the wage bill by selling off the players with the expensive contracts. So the selling 
of assets here is not simply getting a return for the asset, but also as a means of 
adjusting the wage bill and in the case of financial distress, adjusting it downwards. 
Another reaction to distress is stated by Opler & Titman (1994). They proclaim 
that financial distress may make managers desperate. Out of desperation a firm 
manager may feel it better to gamble on a risky project with a small chance of a 
large payoff. In football, desperate clubs may invest in players in hopes of winning 
their way out of financial trouble whilst piling on more debt. 
Asquith, Gertner & Scharfstein (1994) also examine methods that financially 
distressed firms use to avoid bankruptcy, i.e., public and private debt restructurings, 
asset sales, mergers and capital expenditure reductions. According to the authors, 
financial distress is a result of high interest expense, poor operating performance 
relative to other firms in the industry or an industry downturn. They found that 
poor firm-specific operations being the major cause for the firm's troubles, with 
industry downturn as the second major factor. It is not uncommon these days for 
significant shareholders, board members and chairmen with no knowledge of the 
football industry to be involved in the running of the club, i.e., Roman Abramovich 
of Chelsea. They also note that asset sales may stave off bankruptcy in some 
situations, but can prove difficult if the entire industry is facing a financial crisis. 
Poor operating and managerial performance may be influenced by factors such as 
club position and managerial decisions. A manager fearing relegation may resort 
to desperation spending and plunge the club into financial difficulty by not taking 
into account the budget constraint. Clubs competing for a Champions League or 
UEFA Cup qualifying position may invest too heavily to try and secure it. As 
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quoted in the Evening Standard on 8 March 2002: 
"With gate revenue and television income tumbling because of the 
team's failure to qualify for this season's Champions League—having 
made the semi-finals last term—chairman Peter Ridsdale said the ex-
tent of the clearout will depend on whether they secure a spot in the 
UEFA Cup or the more lucrative Champions League for next season." 
4.4 The Economic Model 
The economic model formulated in this Chapter is presented below. One assumes 
that football clubs have target objectives, position and revenues as outlined in 
the previous Chapter, subject to budget constraints. Teams have expectations 
for position and revenues given the level of wages spent and position achieved. 
Overperformance is where clubs achieve a better position given the wages spent, 
whereas underperformance is when clubs reach a lower position given the wage 
bill. Similarly, overperformance with respect to revenues is when a club generates 
more revenue given its position and underperformance implies a lower level of 
revenues given position. As noted by Manchester City's managing director Alastair 
Mackintosh: 
"Things haven't gone as well as we would have liked on the pitch but I 
think our target is achievable. Through a combination of reviewing the 
season, making adjustments and learning from what we did this year, 
I am very confident we will finish above ninth." 
In order to achieve the desired level of performance, clubs must invest in playing 
talent. The quality (productivity) of playing talent can be captured in the wages 
paid by individual clubs. Previous empirical work in football and other sports 
has demonstrated that wages are a good indicator of playing talent. Hence, the 
more a club spends on talent, the more likely a club will achieve a high league 
position. While free agents switching clubs may garner higher wages due to the 
lack of a transfer fee, the general employment of wages as a proxy for playing talent 
has been demonstrated by previous empirical studies with a strong correlation. 
^ B B C Sport, 18 May 2004. 
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Szymanski & Smith (1997) empirically presented the strength and correlation of 
these relationships. The work by Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) supported that 
result. Hall et al. (2002) further confirm the relationship and also test for Granger 
causality. In English soccer there was no evidence that performance Granger causes 
wages. Forrest & Simmons (20026) utihsed a larger data set for English soccer and 
found that wage bills are reliable predictors for team success. They also tested for 
the statisitical significance of wages as predictors for success in North American 
sports as well as continental European soccer and found significant correlations. 
The work by accounting and consulting firm Deloitte & Touche further supports 
these mo dels 
As a club is more successful on the pitch, it should follow that the club has 
an increased ability to generate more revenue by given its position. By increasing 
its fan base, broadcasting leverage, sponsorship and commercial opportunities, we 
expect successful clubs to receive higher revenues when it is successful. 
4.4.1 The Data 
A key assumption is that clubs' wage expenditure will capture the measurement of 
player quality. Hence expected performance of a club can be formulated on its wage 
bill. This relationship has been demonstrated in previous research mentioned in the 
subsequent literature review and is also replicated in the results generated in this 
paper. The data obtained for the empirical analysis in this chapter consists of club 
statistical and financial data over an eleven-year period: from the 1990/91 season to 
the 2003/04 season inclusive. Club statistical data has been obtained using Roth-
man's Football Yearbooks, The Daily Telegraph and SoccerBase^^. Financial data 
has been obtained from the Annual Review of Football Finance Reports published 
by Deloitte and Touche from 1992 to 2004, as well as actual company accounts and 
accounts information obtained from Companies House and the FAME (Financial 
Accounts Made Easy) database. 
Although the total wage bill includes all club employees, not just the players, the largest 
portion of the wage bill is for the players and the variation between wages of different clubs will 
mainly be the difference in players' wages. 
football database whose underlying database (the Stamps Soccer Database) has provided 
statistics to established newspapers and betting firms. 
Gfl/IPTIEIR -4. ECC%\rC)A4JC ylI)jrL%S:rA%NSjV'r, T/I/LElflJTir 87 
4.4.2 Dynamic Equilibrium and the Error Correction Mech-
anism 
We will construct two error correction models similar to the models in Chapter 3: 
one will take into account the clubs' performance objectives based on relative wages 
spent and another will take into account for the clubs' revenue objectives based on 
performance achieved. This type of model helps us to represent a club's long-term 
objectives while allowing for short-term deviations and adjustments. The variables 
on the right-hand side are chosen by the general-to-specific modelling methodology 
as suggested by Hendry (1995) and Cuthbertson, Hall & Taylor (1992)^^. The 
general models are presented below using the following two recursive equations: 
^Pi,t —Oti + SlPi^t-l + + 5^PRi^t-l + 
+ + SgAREi^t + -|- dioADli^t + ^nD2i^t-i+ 
+ 5i2AD2it + 5izD2)i^t-x + + rjt 
(4.1) 
+ /52Ari_j_i -|- (3zPi,t-i + P^Api^t + PbPRi,t-i + 
+ PrREi^t-i + PsAREi^t + + PioADli^t + 
+ Pi2AD2i^t + PuD^t-i + PuAD^t + £t 
(4.2) 
Abbreviation Definition 
Pi,t Relative Position 
Relative Wages 
ri,t Relative Revenues 
Dli,t Division One 
Division Two 
D\t Division Three 
PRi,t Dummy variable for Promotion 
REi^t Dummy variable for Relegation 
Pi,t = - l o g ( g g # ^ ) , Wi^t = l o g ( W i , t / W t ) , = \og{Ri^t/Rt) 
Table 4.1; Error Correction Model Equation Definitions 
^^Note: The error correction model here does not impose symmetry between over and under-
performance. 
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Upon running these regressions, we derive clubs' expected performance given 
its wages spent as well as their expected revenue given the position achieved. Once 
we estimate the two equations and derive the coefficients, we may calculate the 
residuals from the level terms (the non-differenced terms) of Equations (4.1) and 
(4.2). The residuals from the levels are representative of the disequilibrium and 
hence the over or underachievement of a club with respect to its performance 
objective. In the long run equilibrium the differenced terms will be zero and we 
are left with the following; 
0 + <^20 + + <5^40 + S^PRi^t'^ 
+ JgO + S^REi^t + ^sO + SgDli^t^ 
+ l^oO +,3iiD2i^t + 612O + 5i3-D3i,t+ 
+ 
Then solving for Pi one gets the following equation: 
^sP Pi,t 
(4.3) 
Pif =-f + + , ' + ' + 
—(5i —(5i —(5i — 
^nD\t 5izD2>i^t 
T ; r 
(4.4) 
— • —(51 
and, the levels residuals from (4.1) are calculated as follows: 
Pflesj,, + P,., + ^ i.t ^ 
_l_ SisDZi^t 
(4.5) 
<5i <^1 
Similarly, we can derive the residuals (RReSi^t) from the revenue equation (4.2). 
These levels residuals {PReSi^t and RResi^t) will provide an indication of under 
(over) performance relative to the given wage structure and position respectively. 
Residuals from the levels are an indicator of deviations from the expected long-
run equilibrium. We use these residuals to test whether or not under performance 
increases the probability of financial distress for the football club. Here we define 
underperformance as having a negative levels residual. In other words, the club 
did not achieve a position on par with it's level of spending and came in 'below' 
its expected target. Overperformance is indicated by a positive levels residual and 
indicates when a club achieved a higher position relative to what it spent on play-
ing talent. While a specific focus of this Chapter is on how clubs react to financial 
distress, we also model adjustments by clubs that simply over or underachieve but 
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do not experience or fall into distress. First we examine the scenario of underper-
formance and its impact on the probability of financial difficulty. 
4.4,3 Performance and Probability of Distress: Limited 
Dependent Variable Analysis 
4.4.3.1 Audit Opinions 
Auditing opinions and Notes to the financial statements are recommended as good 
resources for indications of financial distress. According to Deloitte &: Touche, an 
accountancy firm and auditor of many football clubs in England and in Europe, 
balance sheets may be misleading in determining the financial health of a firm. 
"A deficiency on the balance sheet does not necessarily prevent this [meeting your 
financial obligations], nor does a positive balance sheet total necessarily mean there 
are no problems." Auditing opinions however are independently assessed by ac-
counting firms and give a more objective account of the firm's state of finances. To 
quote the accountants: "What about some independent measure of football's finan-
cial health? One useful one is what the auditors think." Hill & Perry (1996) also 
used auditing opinions in their 'research paper for predicting financial distress and 
found them to be statistically significant. Since auditing reports provide objective 
assessments by the accounting firms and are used to indicate to investors whether 
or not a firm is financially healthy, it is possibly a better standard of measurement 
than just using financial ratios or balance sheet figures. It is assumed that the 
professional accountants utilise the required and relevant information to perform 
due diligence in reporting their audit opinions. 
Auditing opinions are included as part of the annual reports produced by firms 
to disclose their current state of affairs, their results of the past fiscal year and 
their business objectives going forward. Independent auditors analyse the financial 
records of a firm and form an 'opinion' on the financial status of the company. 
Usually the fiscal year corresponds to the playing season and most annual reports 
of football clubs are produced at the conclusion of the playing season (May or June) 
thus the audit opinions contained in the Annual Reports will reflect the financial 
stability of the club at the close of that season. 
^^Deloitte & Touche Survey of Football Clubs, 1991/92, p. 20. 
isibid. 
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Auditing opinions and Notes to the financial statements usually follow a stan-
dard protocol designated by the U.K. Companies Act 1985, but there are variations 
for different types of opinions. Normal unqualified opinions consist of standardised 
statements by the auditor. They state that the financial statements give a fair 
view of the company's financial status and are in accordance with proper account-
ing procedures. If there are reservations about the financial health of a firm that 
the auditor feels he should mention in the annual report, he will either draw the 
investor's attention to it in the auditing opinion or will direct the reader to the 
Notes to the financial statements for further explanation. If the auditor has a se-
rious concern, he will say so directly in the auditing opinion. This type of audit 
opinion is referred to as a Fundamental Uncertainty/Going Concern and the audi-
tor will also direct the reader to the Notes to the financial statements for additional 
information. This is not a qualified opinion but does indicate serious reservations 
about the financial ability of the club and many times is viewed as just as bad 
as receiving a quahfied opinion. A qualified opinion is the least favourable, where 
firms have failed to produce reliable financial information, adopted non-standard 
accounting procedures or where auditors failed to receive adequate information in 
order to form an opinion. 
For the purposes of structuring our financial distress model, audit opinions are 
coded depending on their severity; 
• 0-Unqualified opinion with no concerns 
• 1-Unqualified opinion with some noted concerns 
• 2-Fundamental uncertainty/going concern 
• 3-Qualified opinion 
Audit opinions are not the only independent source of information about a firm's 
financial health as we show in the next section. 
4.4.3.2 Credit Scores 
Credit scores are another indicator of a firm's financial health. Fortunately, credit 
scores were available for most of the clubs in the English professional leagues. 
The credit scores available for English football clubs, are called QuiScores, and 
provided via the FAME database. They are developed and maintained by CRIF 
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Decision Solutions Limited^®. These QuiScores take into consideration any adverse 
documents appearing against the company on the public file and the timeliness 
of getting the accounts filed. Additionally, the underlying economic conditions 
are factored in to the assessment, which may not be the case for audit opinions. 
Most of the score's weighting relies on the financial performance of the company 
as evidenced by their balance sheet and profit and loss account. According to the 
Company, "in determining a score, a number of separate calculations are performed 
using various combinations of the key financial items these include turnover, pre-
tax profit, working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank 
loans and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, 
share capital, reserves, shareholders funds." An advantage of the credit scoring 
over the auditing opinion is that it is performed by one company with one set of 
scoring standards. Audit opinions, although guided by the Companies Act, are 
assessed by different accounting firms and depending on the standards set by the 
firm, there exists a risk for different opinions. 
The Quiscore consists of five ratings bands: Secure, Stable, Normal, Unstable 
and High Risk. As with the audit opinions, we code these in discrete terms; 
• 0-Secure 
• 1-Stable 
• 2-Normal 
• 3-Unstable 
• 4-High Risk 
The financial distress model will utilise both sets of indicators as a check for the 
model. The Quiscore is distributed such that half of the values are Normal or below 
and half are above Normal. 
4.4.3.3 Ordered Probit Model 
Because of the discrete nature of both the audit scores and credit ratings, limited 
dependent variable analysis is the appropriate estimation technique. One could 
use either an ordered probit or logit model where the difference between the probit 
^®E.g., see www.crif.com 
^''FAME User Guide - http://fame.bvdep.coni.
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and logit model is the assumption about the distribution of the error terms. The 
probit model assumes a normal distribution while the logit assumes the logistic 
distribution. According to Greene (2000) either the probit or logit can be used in 
this case, where the difference would be marginal. For completeness we present 
results from both distributions. The ordered probit (or logit) model is based on 
the following specification: 
y* = P'x + e 
where the y* is unobserved. The following is observed: 
2/ = () if <: 0, (4.6) 
y=l iiO <y* < iJ,i, 
y = 2 if /ii < y* < /i2 
y = J if yuj_i < y* 
See Greene (2000) for an extended summary.. 
Using these two types of financial distress indicators, we construct an ordered 
probit (and logit) model to determine if underperformance of a club (captured 
by negative PReSi^t and RReSi^t values) relative to the wages spent and position 
achieved has any impact on the probability of a club entering into financial dis-
tress^® or the degree of severity of financial distress. We specify the ordered probit 
as follows: 
FDi^t —li + + %-D2; t + 9zD2>i^t + d4PRi,t + O^REi^t-\-
+ OePResi^t + OfRReSi^t + 
If underperformance increases the probability of financial distress the variables 
PReSi^t and RReSi^t would have negative coefficients. Promotion and relegation 
could also affect the likelihood of distress since promotion may positively impact 
gate and television revenues while relegation would have the opposite effect^®. Di-
vision variables are included, since many lower division clubs are relatively small 
^®Where FD represents either the audit opinion ranking, AUD, or the credit score, QUI, 
depending on which code is used in the model. 
^®Both current and anticipated attendance and TV revenue can influence auditors and credit 
rating agencies. 
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'firms' compared to their Premiership counterparts and may have a higher risk of 
entering into financial difficulty. 
If the previous relationship holds, then we believe that once a club experiences 
financial distress, we expect that the club will try to reduce its wage bill via the 
transfer market as a means of mitigating the distress. If this is the case, then 
policies altering the functioning and accessibility of the transfer market (such as 
limited transfer windows) in Enghsh football could have serious repercussions for 
underachieving clubs. 
Concerning competitive balance, clubs that underachieve and fall into distress 
may be less likely to improve their team quality if they are unable to adjust. 
4.4.4 Adjusting to Deviation and Distress: Panel 
While a specific focus of this section is to examine how financially distressed clubs 
might react to their situation, the other aspect is to analyse how healthy clubs 
adjust to disequilibrium (over or underachievement). Underperformance may in-
crease the likelihood of a club entering into financial problems, but it does not 
imply that all underachieving clubs will falter. One remedy for the distressed club 
is to offload players into the transfer market to raise cash as well as to lower wage 
expenses. But the market also serves as a means for financially healthy clubs to 
adjust wages due to missed performance objectives and for future aims. This ad-
justment mechanism allows clubs to remain competitive. A poor performing club 
can try again by altering its wage structure during the next season. 
Naturally one would want to examine transfers, however, given that some trans-
fer deals incorporate incentives into the player's wage package and that distressed 
clubs are also likely to want to lower their total wage bill, we believe that examin-
ing the changes in relative wages for each specific club is not only a better gauge 
of player trading than transfer fees themselves but also captures one effect of the 
transfer: increasing financial resources. 
We have derived an indicator of trading as the log of next season's relative 
wages divided by the current season's relative wages While one 
view might be that transfer fees are a good measure of trading, only using transfer 
fees could be misleading. Transfer fees do not play a direct role in the performance 
objectives of the team whereas the wages do. Many times some portion of the 
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fees are allocated to cover the commission fee by the player's agent. As noted by 
Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) transfer spending correlates well with wage spending 
but it may take some time to realise the effects. Also, in English football, transfer 
fees are sometimes spread out over time and increased or decreased according to 
number of player appearances, sell-on clauses and other contractual stipulations. 
So even for a distressed club forced into selling, a better indicator would be the 
reduction in wages which are realised straight away rather than the transfer fee 
payments which may be spread out over time and subject to contractual terms and 
conditions. Also, the use of our indicator helps us bypass the problem of Bosman 
transfers where no fees are paid. Even though the player moves to another club 
for free, the 'selling' club can still realise financial gains through the reduction in 
wages. 
According to our definition, an indicator of selling would be if next season's 
relative wage bill for a club is less than the previous season's. A team is a buying 
team if they increase next season's relative wage bill. Note again that wages are 
represented in relative terms as it only matters how much a club spends relative 
to its competitors. 
We expect that if a club is experiencing financial difficulties then it will aim 
to reduce its relative wage bill in the following season. The easiest way to reduce 
the wage bill is via the transfer market by the offloading of players. Technically 
it is possible that a player's own club could reduce his wages, but this is not the 
norm since the player may want to move to another club in order to maintain or 
lessen the reduction in his wages. Also, we expect clubs that have missed their 
performance and revenue objectives to reshuffle their playing talent by buying and 
selhng players. 
We construct the wage adjustment process as follows; 
RELWAGEn —(pi + XiPRi^t + X2REi^t + .Reg, ( + X^RReSi^t'^ 
(4.8) 
+ XeFDi^t + f^i, 
TAThere = ajid ivliere 114 == (tlfw/VPt). 
The change in relative wages will depend on if the club was promoted or rel-
egated, its final position, by how much it missed its previous objectives and if it 
was experiencing financial difficulties. 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Results of Error Correction Model 
To establish the relationship that performance is captured and influenced by ex-
penditure on playing talent, we regressed wage expenditure of each club over the 
period against the league position of each club. Note that we take the logs of wage 
expenditure, revenue earned and position obtained measured relative to the league 
averages during each season. We also included dummy variables to indicate each 
division relative to the Premiership, to indicate if a club was promoted or relegated 
in the current season. We also include regressions that allowed for time and group 
effects. The results are presented below in Table 4.2 on page 101. The results 
show that as clubs spend more on wages relative to their competitors, performance 
increases both in the short-term and in the long-run. Promotion and relegation 
also have the correct signs and are significant. Promotion implies a long-run im-
provement in position and relegation a long-run decline in position. The long-run 
coefficients are opposite signed, but nearly equal in magnitude. It may be the case 
that most of the impact from promotion and relegation is felt in the short-term 
and in the longer-term clubs have had time to adjust to the shock. The speed of 
adjustment is moderate for Equation 4.1 and very slow for Equation 4.2. Results 
for Equation 4.2 are presented in Table 4.3. The revenue on performance error 
correction model indicates that position has a significant long-term and short-term 
effect on revenue which implies clubs do exploit position to generate more revenue. 
4.5.2 Results of Financial Distress Model 
We have established higher wages increase the likelihood of better pitch perfor-
mance and that higher positions are likely to increase revenues. Using an ordered 
probit model we regress both indicators of financial distress (the audit and credit 
scores) on the residuals from Equations (4.1) and (4.2), PReSi^t and RReSi^ t respec-
tively. We also included other factors that might influence the likelihood of entering 
financial difficulties such as promotion and relegation. Divisional dummies capture 
the increased risk that smaller-market clubs that usually play in the lower divisions 
could have financial problems as opposed to their Premiership counterparts. 
The estimates from the ordered probit estimation show that underperformance 
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in both position and revenue generation has a significant effect on the HkeUhood 
of encountering financial distress as indicated by both the credit score and audit 
report. Sub-optimal revenue generation given position has a greater influence than 
underperformance with respect to wages. The logit estimation gives similar results. 
The Divisional parameters also indicate that lower division clubs experience an 
increased risk of entering into financial difficulties. 
Next, we test the relationship between financial distress and wage adjustment, 
as well as the relationship between underperformance (and over achievement) and 
wage adjustment. We expect that distressed clubs will lower their wages next season 
as they offload players into the transfer market to raise cash but we also expect 
that clubs which overachieve will lower their relative wages while underperforming 
clubs will increase them. Below we present a diagram of the possible scenarios: 
If in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Not in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Not in Financial 
Difficulty Increase 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
If in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Expected Performance Under-performance 
Financial Distress More 
Likely 
Performance of Position 
Given Wage Spend 
Over-performance 
Financial Distress Less 
Likely 
Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Mechanism: Performance and Wages 
4.5.3 Results of Wage Adjustment Model 
We estimated several versions of equation 4.8 and present the results in Tables 
4.8 through 4.12. The first regression used the QuiScores as the financial distress 
indicators. We estimated the equation with both a binary indicator, where the 
indicator took a value of 1 if the QuiScore was greater than or equal to 3. The 
financial distress indicator was negative and significant meaning that if a club 
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If in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Not in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Not in Financial 
Difficulty Increase 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
If in Financial 
Difficulty Reduce 
Wage Spend Next 
Season 
Expected Performance Under-performance 
Performance of Revenue 
Given Position 
Financial Distress Less 
Likely 
Financial Distress More 
Likely 
Figure 4.2: Equilibrium Mechanism: Revenues and Position 
experienced financial difficulties, it decreased its relative wage bill next season. If 
a club underperformed with respect to revenue generation it increased its wage 
bill. Similarly, the club would decrease its wage bill if it overperformed. This 
means that the club reduced its relative spending next season because it has the 
resources to achieve its objective with respect to revenue generation. The coefficient 
on PReSi^t, is positive but also insignificant and can be treated as zero. One 
possible explanation for the positive coefficient is that some clubs are not well off 
financially may have overperformed and are trying to insure against failure in the 
future. An example would be a small club ascending into the Premiership that 
wishes to maintain its future position in the Premiership by investing in better 
quality players. In a newspaper article, author David Conn states "In their quest 
for promotion. First Division clubs have to spend money they don't have. Even 
if they succeed, they then have to continue spending just to ensure they stay up. 
For instance, much of the £8 million loss Bolton Wanderers incurred last season 
[2000] was bonuses to players for gaining promotion. Even access to Sky's millions 
may not wipe out Bolton's debt because they now have to spend to survive." 
As a test we created an interaction variable between the wage residual and the 
financial indicator. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive and nearly 
significant at the 10% level while the wage residual itself is no longer positive nor 
^°In The Observer, 2 December 2001. 
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significant. Results from the regression with the interaction variable are contained 
in Table 4.12. A similar test with an interaction term with the revenue residual 
did not yield any significant changes. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
statistic was not significant suggesting that a pooled regression is more appropriate. 
The results are similar to the random effects panel estimation. As a check, we 
included dummy variables for QuiScores 3 and 4 instead of the binary financial 
distress indicator. The results were almost identical and are included in Table 4.9. 
The second set of estimations used a binary indicator for audit opinions that 
were negative, i.e., audit opinions with score 1 and above. The results are similar 
to the model estimated using the QuiScore although the performance residuals are 
no longer significant. Removing the financial distress indicator from the equation 
reveals that the revenue residual is significant and there may be some multicollinear-
ity between the audit code and suboptimal revenue performance. Auditors may 
take into account a club's failure when writing the auditors report. 
Generally the results are similar and show that financially troubled clubs reduce 
their wages. Also, clubs that fail to achieve their objectives also try to improve 
performance by investing in more or better quality talent the following season. 
Conversely, clubs that overachieve will reduced the relative wages. 
4.6 Discussion and Summary 
The results from this analysis reiterate the economic relationships where football 
clubs rely on wage spending to improve the position of the team in the league 
and that position increases revenues. However, random shocks that create under-
performance with respect to position and revenue relative to league spending are 
significant factors that could result in a financial crisis for a club. While under-
performance is not the only factor that causes financial difficulty, it does increase 
the probability of entering into financial distress. Based on our analysis, once clubs 
are experiencing financial distress they are more likely to become 'sellers' in the 
summer and season following underperformance. Also, the clubs that perform bet-
ter or worse than expected given their wage spending relative to other clubs in the 
league, do try and adjust their spending more efficiently to achieve their expected 
objectives. 
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This Chapter also contributes to the theory about club objectives and compet-
itive balance. The model shows that if clubs overperform with respect to revenues 
given their league position, the following season the club will reduce relative wages. 
This implies profit maximising behaviour since the club does not have to increase 
its wage bill to reach a position that improves revenue. According to Rottenberg 
(1956) profit maximising clubs would not want to be "too successful" because it 
would make the league too predictable and harm profits. Therefore the club can 
lower costs by decreasing the expenditure on talent. This adjustment also has 
an influence on competitive balance. As the overachieving club lowers its spend-
ing relative to its league rivals, it helps distribute talent more evenly, i.e. other 
clubs have a chance to catch up by spending more on talent, relatively. A more 
even distribution of talent implies a greater number of clubs with the chance to be 
successful. 
Secondly, the mechanism presented here provides the means for any club to 
invest for success but also provide for a solution if the club fails. The transfer 
market acts as a mechanism in which the auction becomes an 'all pay auction,' 
where only the winner pays and the losers can get back some portion of their effort 
(spending). The restriction of the transfer market is likely to reduce 'effort' since 
the cost of losing is higher. However when losers are allowed to recuperate some of 
their effort spent they are likely to contribute more effort. 
Thirdly, the results have imphcations for financial viability of football clubs. 
Since under performance can increase the likelihood of financial problems, clubs 
can reduce the adverse financial impact of failure by reducing wages, i.e., by selling 
players in the transfer market. The restrictions placed on the transfer market limit 
the clubs' ability to do so. Limiting the buying and selling of players to only two 
windows per season could prove too restrictive especially for financially distressed 
teams. Restricting the transfer market is likely to push these financially distressed 
clubs more towards the option of trying to renegotiate debt contracts or courting 
wealthy investment consortiums instead of realistically adjusting expectations and 
objectives to be more in line with maintaining a healthy balance. One argument 
may be that the window periods provide ample time for clubs to adjust wage 
spending and that windows provide a more stable trading atmosphere. However, 
transfer windows not only increase the likelihood of instability due to restrictive 
trading time, but also could create a backlog of trading. For example, at the close 
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of the 2003/04 playing season, many teams are unloading large sections of their 
squads which saturates the market^^. Restrictions on mobility could cause some 
clubs to sell players below their worth out of an act of desperation or to buy players 
at inflated prices because of the time restraint. Even though player contracts could 
allow more flexibility in salaries and contain contingency clauses, these still would 
not allow a club to buy or sell outside the transfer windows. Secondly, contingency 
clauses could cause even more legal wrangling and high opportunity costs. 
Player loans are another mechanism to which clubs could ease some of the 
financial burden during the season. However these are not long term solutions and 
a player may be prevented from playing against his parent club amongst many 
other possible contraints. However they do offer a temporary solution in order 
to reduce risk to fixed-term contracts. This issue aside, there is an adjustment 
mechanism that clubs do utilise whether or not they have financial difficulties. 
This adjustment mechanism means clubs can maintain their competitiveness while 
at the same time allowing for other clubs to invest in talent in order to compete. 
This process helps to maintain competitive balance but also the financial viability 
of clubs. 
4.7 Additional Tables for Chapter 4 
^^Leicester releases 13, Wolverhampton 4, Barnsley 10, Chesteri&eld 6, Notts County 7, West 
Bromwich Albion 8, Wycombe Wanderers 10 and Bradford City has informed the entire club it can 
move on. Granted many of these clubs are adjusting for relegation however some of the backlog 
could have been mitigated and more efficiently spread out if teams were allowed to gradually 
adjust squads. 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
0.261* 0.085 3.08 0.308* 0.089 3.45 0.265* 0.091 2.91 
-0 .086t 0.042 -2 .06 -O.OSOt 0.042 -1 .92 0.086* 0.028 3.07 
APRi^t 0.475* 0.046 10.30 0.463* 0.045 10.30 0.512* 0.053 9.60 
AREi^t -0.583* 0.051 -11.50 -0.576* 0.051 -11 .40 -0.555* 0.047 - 1 1 ; 8 
ADli^t -0.247* 0.042 -5 .86 -0.239* 0.042 - 5 . 6 5 -0.269* 0.044 - 6 . 1 2 
AD2i, -0.198* 0.032 - 6 . 2 3 -0.185* 0.032 - 5 . 7 7 - 0 . 2 2 2 ' 0.040 - 5 . 6 1 
AD3<.t -0.691* 0.048 -14.30 -0.687* 0.048 -14 .30 -0.778* 0.051 -15 .30 
C Onstant 1.089* 0.210 5.19 1.043* 0.213 4.90 3.294* 0.318 10.40 
0.173* 0.035 5.00 0.206* 0.038 5.42 0.175t 0.096 1.81 
-0.511* 0.103 -4 .95 -0.526* 0.105 - 5 . 0 0 -1.017* 0.077 -13 .30 
PRi,t-i 1.252* 0.090 13.90 1.223' 0.089 13.70 1.472* 0.096 15.30 
REit-i -1.466* 0.090 -16.30 -1.449* 0.088 -16 .50 -1.574* 0.091 -17 .30 
-0.671* 0.154 - 4 . 3 5 -0.654* 0.152 -4 .30 -1.240* 0.147 
-1.097* 0.260 - 4 . 2 1 -1.065* 0.256 - 4 . 1 6 -2.165* 0.231 - 9 . 3 9 
-1.847* 0.431 - 4 ^ 8 -1.826* 0.428 - 4 . 2 7 -3.640* 0.355 -10 .30 
Observations 894 894 894 
Time Effects No Yes Yes 
Group Effects No No Yes 
i?2 0.55 0.55 0.67 
Wald (Joint) 1192 1276 1711 
v4A(l) -0.845 -0.758 -0.468 
AR(2) -1.074 -0.910 -1.549 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 4.2: Error Correction Mechanism; Performance on Wage 
0 
-a 
i 
tq 
8 § 
Q 
0 
to 
1 
§ 
i 
§ 
§ 
Independent 
Variables 
AAt,t ^Ri,t 
Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
-0.102* 0.028 - 3 . 6 7 -0.108* 0.029 - 3 . 7 8 -0 .060 0.038 -1 .57 
0.083* 0.020 4.18 0.089* 0.019 4.78 0.088* 0.022 3.96 
APRi^t 0.126* 0.039 3.23 0.123* 0.039 3.21 0.108* 0.042 2.60 
AREi^t -0.071^ 0.030 - 2 . 3 7 -0.074* 0.028 - 2 . 6 3 -0.058* 0.031 - 1 . 8 5 
-0.251* 0.031 -8 .10 -0.249* 0.031 -7 .96 -0.237* 0.032 - 7 . 4 1 
AD2{, -0.211* 0.031 - 6 . 7 7 -0.220* 0.031 - 7 . 0 7 -0.196* 0.035 -5 .64 
AD3(,( -0 .036 0.032 -1 .12 -0 .029 0.031 - 0 . 9 5 -0.038 0.035 -1 .08 
Constant -0 .011 0.037 -0 .30 ' 0.029 0.049 • 0.59 0.383* 0.122 3.13 ' 
Ri,t—1 -0.160* 0.018 - 9 . 1 3 -0.187* 0.019 -9.80 -0.491* 0.039 -12 .50 
0.077* 0.017 4.54 0.096* 0.017 5.64 0.127* 0.030 4.30 
PRi,t-l 0.447* 0.045 9.85 0.447* 0.045 9.91 0.450* 0.059 7.57 
REi^t-1 -0.333* 0.054 - 6 . 1 8 -0.330* 0.052 -6.36 -0.291* 0.062 -4 .70 
-0.204* 0.034 - 6 . 0 6 -0.210* 0.036 -5 .80 -0.379* 0.061 - 6 . 2 3 
-0.290* 0.048 - 5 . 9 8 -0.307* 0.051 -6 .00 -0.546* 0.096 —5.66 
-0.237* 0.074 -3 .20 -0.232* 0.078 -2.98 -0.531* 0.146 -3 .64 
Observations 903 903 903 
Time Effects No Yes Yes 
Group Effects No No Yes 
0.36 0.40 0.53 
Wald (Joint) 589.6 582.9 567.4 
-1.77 -1.39 -1.68 
AR{2) -0.973 0.079 -2.15 
Ri,t = log{Ri^t/Rt), Pi,t = -
"Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 95% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 4.3: Error Correction Mechanism: Revenues on Position 
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Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant 1.462* 0.192 7.62 
Dli,t 1.216* 0.262 4.64 1.696* 0.346 4.90 
1.269* (1229 5.54 1.966* 0.327 6.02 
DSi^t 1.484* 0.237 6j^ 2.391* 0.369 6.49 
PRi,t -0.004 0Ja8 -0.02 -0.108 0.155 -0.70 
REi^t -0.049 0.146 -0.34 0.063 0.148 0.42 
PResi^t -0.281* 0.107 -&62 -0.300* 0.114 -2.63 
RResi^t -0.443* 0.104 -4^7 -0.641* 0.139 -4.614 
Observations 
Effects 
972 
Random 
972 
Fixed 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^ significance at the 5% level and * significance 
at the 90% level 
QUI: 0-Secure; 1-Stable; 2-Normal; 3-Unstable; 4-High Risk 
Table 4.4: Ordered Probit of Credit Rating 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant Z57r 0.311 8^8 
-Dli,t 2.118* 0.437 4.85 3.073* &638 4.82 
D2i^t 2.192* 0.386 5.68 &463* 0.595 5^2 
D\t 2.523* 0.383 6.60 4.274* 0.677 6.31 
PRi,t -0.037 0.313 -0.12 -0.233 &284 -0.82 
REi,t 0.002 0.240 0.01 0.117 0.270 0.43 
PResi^t -0.476* 0.178 -2.67 -0.570* 0.207 -2.75 
RResi^t -0.753* 0.179 -4.22 -1.163* 0.265 -4.39 
Observations 
Effects 
972 
Random 
972 
Fixed 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ''significance at the 5% level and ^significance 
at the 90% level 
QUI: 0-Secure; 1-Stable; 2-Normal; 3-Unstable; 4-High Risk 
Table 4.5: Ordered Logit of Credit Rating 
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Independent 
Variables 
AUD 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
AUD 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -1.856* 0.229 - 8 . 1 2 
Dli,t 1.640* 0.418 3.93 2.035* 0.517 3.93 
-D2; ( 1.784* 0.296 6.02 2.246* 0.481 4.67 
D\t 2.154* 0.349 6.17 2.718* 0.526 5.17 
PRi,t - 0 . 3 3 4 0.274 - 1 . 2 2 - 0 . 3 4 6 &218 - 1 . 5 9 
&287 . (1248 1.16 0.371^ 0.196 1.89 
PReSi^t - 0 . 3 1 3 0.199 - 1 . 5 7 - 0 . 3 4 5 t 0.166 - 2 . 0 8 
RReSi^t - 0 . 3 1 7 t 0.156 - 2 . 0 3 - 0 . 4 9 l t 0.194 - 2 . 5 4 
Observations 
Effects 
787 
R a n d o m 
787 
Fixed 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 5% level and ^significance 
at the 90% level 
AUD: 0-No concerns; l -Noted concerns; 2-Pundaniental uncertainty; 3-Qualified 
Table 4.6: Ordered Probit of Audit Score 
Independent 
Variables 
AUD 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
AUD 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -2.937* 0.381 - 7 . 7 1 
Dli,t 2.5&r &699 3^8 2.679* 0.990 2.71 
D2(,( &826* 0.447 6jG 2.806* 0.932 3.01 
D\t 3.398* 0.527 6.45 3.852* 1.016 3.79 
PRi,t -0.528 0.439 - 1 . 2 0 - 0 . 4 0 0 0.402 - 0 . 9 9 
REi^t 0.476 •• 0.454 1.05 0.687* 0.376 1.83 
PResi^t - 0 . 4 9 4 0.341 - 1 . 4 5 -0 .759* 0.329 - 2 . 3 1 
RResi^t -0 .478* 0.254 - 1 . 8 8 - 0 . 4 8 0 0.373 - 1 . 2 9 
Observations 
Effects 
787 
R a n d o m 
787 
Fixed 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; t significance at the 5% level and * significance 
at the 90% level 
AUD: 0-No concerns; 1-Noted concerns; 2-Fundamental uncertainty; 3-Qualified 
Table 4.7: Ordered Logit of Audit Score 
RELWAGEi^t RELWAGEi^t RELWAGEi^t 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -0.024* 0.014 -1.73 -0.020 0.015 -1.36 0.024 0.019 1.26 
PA,,* 0.170* 0.023 7.27 0.165* 0.023 7.03 0.134* 0.025 5.42 
REi^t -0.138* 0.023 -6.05 -0.134* 0.023 -&88 -0.110* 0.024 -4.49 
Pi,t 0.019* 0.005 3.78 0.017* 0.005 3.17 -0.021 0.013 -1.57 
PResi^t 0.012 0.012 0.94 0.014 0.013 1.12 0.043* 0.016 2.71 
RResi^i -0.028t 0.012 -242 -0.032* 0.012 -2.67 -0.072* 0.016 -4.47 
-0.035* 0.015 -2.40 -0.038* 0.015 -2.49 -0.057* 0.018 -3.11 
Effects Pooled Random Fixed 
LM Test X' ' ( ! ) = 0.81 
Observations 884 884 884 
R2 0.15 0.15 0.09 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; 1'significance at the 5% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
FD: Binary indicator where the value equals 1 if Qui Score is 3 or 4. 
Table 4.8: Wage Adjustment and Financial Distress (a) 
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RELWAGEi^t RELWAGEi^t RELWAGEi,t 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -0.024* 0.014 -1.73 -0.020 0.015 -1.35 0.032+ 0.019 1.71 
. 0.170* 0.023 .7.26 0.165* 0.023 7.03 0.132* 0.025, 5.37 
REi^t -0.138* 0.023 -6.05 -0.134* 0.023 -&88 -0.109* 0.024 -4.48 
Pi,t 0.019* 0.005 3.78 0.017* 0.005 3.16 -0.024+ 0.013 -1.79 
PResi^t 0.012 0.012 0.94 0.014 0.013 1.12 0.045* 0.016 2^5 
RResi^t -0.028+ 0.012 -2.41 -0.032* 0.012 -Z66 -0.074* 0.016 -4.62 
-0.035* 0.020 -1.74 -0.033+ 0.020 -1.66 -0.031 0.021 -1.45 
-0.035+ 0.016 -Z27 -0.040+ 0.016 -2.44 -0.082* 0.021 -3.85 
Effects Pooled Random Fixed 
LM Test x' 2(1) = 0.79 
Observations 884 884 884 
#2 0.15 0.18 0.08 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 5% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 4.9: Wage Adjustment and Financial Distress (b) 
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RELWAGEu RELWAGEi, RELWAGEit 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -0.015 0.012 -1.18 -0.015 0.012 -1.18 0.013 0.017 0.77 
. 0.116* 0.024 . 4.82 0.116*. 0.024 4.82 0.094* 0.026 3.65 
REi^t -0.130* 0.023 -5.57 -0.130* 0.023 -5.57 -0.109* 0.026 -4.26 
Pi,t 0.019* 0.006 0.019* 0.006 -0.016 0.015 -1.08 
PResi^t 0.009 0.013 0.75 0.009 0.013 0.75 0.035t 0.017 2.05 
RResi^t -0.017 0.012 -1.44 -0.017 0.012 -1.44 -0.053* 0.017 -3.20 
-0.03lt 0.016 - L 9 8 -0.03lt 0.016 -1.98 -0.020 0.022 -0.89 
Effects 
LM Test 
Observations 
E? 
Pooled 
767 
0.15 
Random 
%2(1) = 1.45 
767 
0.13 
Fixed 
767 
0.08 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 5% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
FD: Binary indicator where the value equals 1 if Audit Score is > 1. 
Table 4.10: Wage Adjustment and Financial Distress (c) 
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RELWAGEi t RELWAGEi t RELWAGEi, 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -0.017 0.012 -1.51 -0.017 0.012 -1.51 0.016 0.016 0.99 
0.112* 0.024. 0.112* 0.024 4.66 0.090* 0.026 3.50 
REi^t -0.131* 0.023 -5.65 -0.131* 0.023 -5.65 -0.109* 0.026 -4.24 
Pi,t 0.018* 0.006 0.018* 0.006 -0.019 0.015 -1.29 
PResi^t 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.87 0.039t 0.017 2.25 
RResi^f -0.018 0.012 -1.58 -0.018 0.012 -1.58 -0.057* 0.017 -3.39 
-o.oeot 0.025 -&38 -o.oeot 0.025 -&38 -0.058* 0.034 -1.71 
AUD\t -0.046 0.055 -0.83 -0.046 0.055 -0.83 -0.052 0.062 -0.83 
Effects Pooled Random Fixed 
LM Test 2(1) = 1.37 
Observations 767 767 767 
0.13 0.13 0.08 
'Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 5% level and ^significance at the 90% level 
Table 4.11: Wage Adjustment and Financial Distress (d) 
i 
tq 
i 
g 
I 
§ 
s 
g 
I 
o 
00 
CHAPTER 4. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ADJUSTMENT, VIABILITY 109 
Independent 
Variables 
RELW AGEit 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
RELWAGEi^t 
Coefficient std. error t-stat 
Constant -0.019 0.014 -1.33 -0.021 0.014 -1.47 
0.168* 0.023 7.20 0.166* 0.023 7.20 
REi^t -0.136* 0183 -5.99 -0.134* 0.022 -5.98 
Pi,t 0.019* 0.005 3.86 0.019* 0.005 3^6 
PReSi^t -0.010 0.018 -0.53 
RReSi^t -0.029t 0.012 -2.47 -0.029t 0.011 -2.56 
-0.042* 0.015 -2.75 -0.040* 0.015 -2.70 
PResFDi^t 0.034 0.022 1.59 0.026* 0.015 1.77 
Observations 884 
0.15 
884 
0.08 
* Indicates significance at the 99% level; ^significance at the 5% level and ^significance 
at the 90% level 
FD: Binary indicator where the value equals 1 if Qui Score is 3 or 4. 
Table 4.12: Wage Adjustment and Financial Distress (e) 
Chapter 5 
Level Playing Field 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Winning and Performance 
Many sports leagues implement policies such as revenue sharing and salary caps 
that would normally be considered illegal in most industries. Firms are not allowed 
to restrict the movement of labour or engage in collective selling of their goods 
however, football (as well as other sports leagues) engage in such practices by using 
the argument that such measures are necessary to maintain competitive balance. 
Competitive balance is the idea that sports teams should have more or less equal 
probabilities of winning in order to sustain the notion of outcome uncertainty. The 
view is that outcome uncertainty is necessary to keep the competition interesting 
and unpredictable in order to attract spectators. Walter Neale (1964) aptly states 
that teams must pray "Oh Lord, make us good, but not that good."^ The ultimate 
way to keep a competition (or match) unpredictable is if each of the teams has a 
50/50 chance of winning the championship (or match). 
In this Chapter we will discuss the implications of that fact that not all teams 
benefit equally from winning. Some teams (e.g., big clubs that attract large crowds 
such as Manchester United) have a higher marginal return to winning than other 
teams (smaller clubs such as Norwich City). Both impose externalities on each 
other. In other words, a small-market club like Norwich City beating Manchester 
^Neale (1964), p. 21. 
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United will 'benefit' society less than if a larger-market club like Manchester United 
had won. We define welfare as the utility supporters obtain when their team wins 
as well as the revenues the teams receive by the implicit increase in aggregate 
attendance in the league. The point is that large drawing teams gain more when 
they win, than when the small drawing teams win. Thus, when small teams win, 
large opportunity costs are incurred by the larger teams. However, many policies 
in sport are geared towards creating or preserving 'competitive balance.' 
If a competition is too predictable, then it may no longer be interesting and 
eventually the fans would fail to receive any excitement from watching and possibly 
switch off from football. Nevertheless, 'dynasty' teams which continuously succeed 
still have large followings. In a startling example, over the period from 1891-2004 
the Scottish Championship has been won by Rangers or Celtic a total of 89 times 
(50 for Rangers, 39 for Celtic) and yet both teams sell out practically every game 
and in 1998/99 Celtic had the fifth highest number of season ticket subscribers 
in the world (just after Barcelona, Real Madrid, Inter Milan and Borussia Dort-
mund)^. Liverpool has won the football championship in England 11 times since 
1970, and Manchester has won the Premiership eight times since its inception in 
1992. Streaks of success abound in other sport as well, while fans and audiences 
keep growing: the New York Yankees going to 39 World Series (and winning 26 of 
them), Michael Schumacher's seven championships^ in Formula One, Lance Arm-
strong's seven straight victories in the Tour de Prance from 1999 to 2005 are to 
name a few. Yet all these teams (and sportsmen) have some of the largest follow-
ings in the world, thus some dominance does not always imply a dull competition. 
This may be because the style of play (or the individual athlete) is of such superior 
quality that spectators are happy to see the same team winning if there is excite-
ment and extraordinary skill on display. Some people like to see records broken 
(e.g. Armstrong's successive victories, English football club Arsenal's unbeaten 
streak in the 2003/04 season) and some are drawn by the anticipation of a David 
and Goliath match. 
In U.S. sports leagues a cartel-like structure exists where the number of teams is 
restricted and new teams are allowed only through a franchise system. New teams 
are elected in by a collusive process by the incumbent teams of the league who vote 
on which city is allowed to join the league. This type of collusion would be deemed 
^Stephen Morrow (http://www.le.ac.uk/crss/sf-review/99-00/00article5.html) 
^Schumacher was Formula One Champion in 1994, 1995 and for all seasons from 2000-2004. 
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as anti-competitive in any other industry. But some coordination is necessary in 
sports. In most industries, a firm would like to be rid of competition so that it 
may receive more of the market share and revenues. However sports require that 
sporting competition exist since without competitors, there would be no matches. 
Leagues serve to determine the game's rules, coordinate the scheduling of matches 
and in some countries, notably the U.S. and England, the collective selling of 
broadcast rights. Szymanski & Kuypers (1999) point out that although some 
restrictive agreements have been challenged in the U.S. courts, particularly in U.S. 
baseball, the uniqueness of sporting competition has allowed leagues as coordinators 
to carry on with these practices. Beyond simple coordination requirements, leagues 
have argued for additional restraints that are sustained under the argument that 
they maintain or improve competitive balance and protect the weaker teams. This 
argument has been used by the leagues to maintain antitrust exemption status and 
because these measures are vital for maintaining the integrity of the league. 
The reserve clause in Major League Baseball introduced in 1879 was a means 
by which clubs could keep baseball players at the club and restrain them from 
moving to another club without the club granting permission. The baseball league 
justified this requirement in a case^ before the U.S. Supreme Court that it served 
to restrain the big teams from buying up all the good players, thus protecting the 
smaller teams and maintaining competitive balance®. Eckard (20016) maintains 
that the original reason for the reserve clause was to protect club profits from open 
salary competition. In 2000, Major League Baseball produced the Blue Ribbon 
Economic Report which suggested competitive balance had declined in baseball 
over the years and new changes such as a payroll tax and draft expansions were 
necessary (See Eckard (2001a)). 
Salary capping was introduced in the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
in 1983 as a means of equating the wage spending® and a rookie draft system is 
used in all four of the U.S. major league sports. The draft system is a means by 
which the worst performing team of a season gets first pick of new talent (usually 
university students opting to go professional) as a means to spread talent equally 
across teams. Roster limits have been imposed in all American professional sports. 
The purpose of roster hmits is to limit the number of players on a team so that 
^Flood vs. Kuhn, 407 US 258 (1972). 
®This was struck down by a Supreme Court ruling in 1976. 
®There are exemptions to this rule and many teams use loopholes. 
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player quality is spread evenly amongst all teams, thereby increasing the viability of 
more clubs able to compete for the championship. In English football, a "retain and 
transfer system" (a mechanism similar to the reserve clause in baseball) remained 
in place from 1889 until 1963 when it was deemed to be unjustified in promoting 
competitive balance. A maximum wage also existed in English football until 1961. 
One of the most common ways of redressing competitive imbalance is through 
revenue sharing. Between 1920 and 1983, English football clubs split gate revenues 
with 20% of the net home receipts paid to the away team (Szymanski & Kuypers 
(1999)). Gate revenue sharing is still in effect for U.S. professional leagues such 
as the National Football League and Major League Baseball. Another form of 
cross-subsidisation is via the collective selling of broadcast rights. The respective 
leagues negotiate on behalf of all the member clubs the number of games sold 
to broadcasters and the revenues generated from this sale is then redistributed 
amongst the teams in the league. English football redistributes its television income 
based on a merit system (where the best performing team gets the largest share) 
and according to a team's number of television appearances. Premier League clubs 
are guaranteed a minimum number of live television appearances. In the U.S., 
revenues generated from television broadcasts are share equally amongst clubs. 
The reason given for collective bargaining and revenue sharing is to maintain 
competitive balance by correcting for asymmetries in market size and earning power 
of clubs. The reasoning is that by redistributing some of the revenue generated by 
large-market teams to the smaller-market teams the smaller teams would be able 
to compete financially for the best talent. As we shall see later this assumption 
depends whether clubs are win-maximisers or profit-maximisers. 
While most of these restrictive measures are argued to be necessary for the 
preservation of competitive balance, some research has disputed this claim and 
that the true motivations behind these measures are to protect or increase profits. 
5.1.2 Previous Work 
5.1.2.1 Competitive Balance 
The idea of competitive balance was first articulated by Rottenberg (1956) who 
argued that the free movement of baseball players would not necessarily imply 
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that the richest teams would acquire the best players and thus reduce the outcome 
uncertainty of the league. Advocates for the reserve clause argued that it was nec-
essary for such a clause so that a more even distribution of playing talent could 
be maintained across all teams. If baseball players were free to move, then rich 
teams would be able to outbid smaller (and relatively poorer) teams for the best 
players thereby acquiring all the 'talented' players and thus improving the proba-
bility of winning the championships. So if the larger teams acquired the bulk of 
the best players, then the outcome of the championship would be more predictable 
and thus the competition would become boring. All of this however relies on the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis which will be discussed below. However, Rot-
tenberg's analysis stated that it would not be in the self-interest of teams to become 
too good because each team is reliant on the existence and well being of another 
team—"in baseball no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive 
and prosper sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of play among teams 
are not 'too great. Sporting competition relies on you actually having a competi-
tor without which there would be no match and thus no product. So teams that 
tried to acquire all the good talent would experience diminishing returns (because 
at some point his marginal revenue product will no longer exceed his cost, thereby 
leading to sub optimal profits) and some of that acquired talent would be more 
useful (and more valuable) to another team. Therefore, if sporting clubs are profit 
maximisers, they would realise this and self-regulate themselves in order not to get 
too good lest it damage the attractiveness of the competition and hence dampen 
revenues. Rottenberg concluded, "if they [the wealthy teams] behave like rational 
maximisers playing talent will be more or less equally distributed among teams."® 
The claims by Rottenberg preceded a more formal publication by Ronald Coase in 
1960 about ownership (Coase (1960)). Coase's famous theory stated that in the 
absence of transaction costs, all allocations of ownership rights would be efficient 
since the concerned parties could bargain to correct any externalities. Putting this 
in a baseball context, regardless of operating under free agency or with a reserve 
clause, players will move to the teams that valued them most. Thus competitive 
balance would remain unaffected under either set of regulations governing player 
movement. 
The notion of competitive balance was further developed by El-Hodiri & Quirk 
^Rottenberg (1956) p. 254. 
^Rottenberg (1956) p. 255. 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 115 
(1971) who used a theoretical and mathematical formulation to describe the eco-
nomics of a sports league. They noted the fundamental fact that as teams become 
too dominant and their probability of winning approaches one, gate receipts will 
fall as the game or competition becomes too boring. This statement underlies the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. The more predictable a match or competition 
the less interesting it is and the less likely it will appeal to spectators. However 
they do point out that home team gate receipts are an increasing function of prob-
ability of the home team winning up to a point that is beyond 0.5, so some degree 
of superiority is desired by the individual teams. They note that if all clubs had 
similar revenue functions and equal market sizes then profit maximising behaviour 
would ensure an appropriate amount of competitive balance. However since most 
teams are likely to be heterogeneous and most definitely distributed across varying 
market sizes, they state that policies should be installed to maintain a degree of 
competitive balance. What we would like to demonstrate in this Chapter is that 
with these asymmetries, perfect competitive balance is not optimal for revenue 
maximisation. 
In fact most studies concerning competitive balance have been prompted by 
the imposing of new (or a challenge to existing) restrictions that might otherwise 
be considered anti-competitive. Rottenberg's analysis centred on baseball's reserve 
clause® and the El-Hodiri and Quirk paper was prompted by the exemption of the 
sports industry from antitrust legislation^^. However, most research has centred 
around policies initiated by the leagues themselves, such as revenue sharing, salary 
caps and a draft system. 
Some research has been focused on the redistribution of resources. Quirk & 
El-Hodiri (1974) first postulated that in a league consisting of profit motivated 
owners, the sharing of gate revenues will result in the same distribution of talent 
(players) that would have been achieved if the league had been centrally controlled 
by a syndicate. In other words, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium obtained 
by profit maximising owners is the same as one appropriated by a central planner 
®In the words of the U.S. Representative from Illinois Thomas Gallagher players were "enslaved 
and forced to accept salaries and terms or be forever barred from playing." 
i°The U.S. Supreme Court exempted baseball from antitrust law in 1922 because it was a 
"sport not a business," however a series of Congressional hearings began in the 1950s to review 
baseball's exemption in a move to force the sport to spread past St Louis into the western states 
of the U.S. Challenges to the antitrust exemption have appeared over the years but as of yet it 
still remains in place. 
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seeking to maximise joint profits. This notion is commonly known as the invariance 
principle first articulated by Rottenberg in 1956 (and formally by Coase (1960)) 
and reiterated by Fort and Quirk (1995) who looked at the economic incentives 
for cross-subsidisation (which includes the reserve clause, salary caps, the rookie 
draft and revenue sharing). Fort & Quirk (1995) argue that this will not affect 
competitive balance and allude that the only redistributive policy aimed at main-
taining the survival of weak-drawing teams that will improve competitive balance 
is the use of salary caps. Vrooman (1995) concurs that revenue sharing will not 
improve competitive balance (if revenue is winning-elastic) but rather will have 
adverse effects on the incentives to win and will lead to exploitation of players. 
Atkinson et al. (1988) examine the effects of revenue sharing in the National Foot-
ball League (NFL) in the U.S. under a principal-agent framework and found that 
under the profft-maximising assumption, revenue sharing does lead to an optimal 
distribution of playing talent (i.e. as the Nash equilibrium is inefficient). Mar-
burger (1997) examines a luxury tax and redistribution scheme that also finds in-
creased sharing leads to a more balanced distribution of resources. Kesenne (1996) 
examined revenue sharing under a win-maximisation assumption and found that 
revenue sharing does create a more equal distribution of playing talent distribution 
while Rascher (1997) examines revenue sharing under both profit-maximising and 
win-maximising assumptions and sides with the conclusion of El-Hodiri & Quirk 
(1971) and Quirk & Fort (1997). In order to rectify the confusion, Kesenne (2000) 
modelled the effects of revenue sharing under profit and utility maximising models 
and found that under both types of assumptions, revenue sharing does improve 
competitive balance if one considers the absolute quality of a team as a significant 
determinant of revenues. 
The work by Szymanski & Kesenne (2004) however demonstrate theoretically 
that under certain conditions, gate revenue sharing can actually decrease compet-
itive balance. Siding with the,long established notion that gate revenue sharing 
reduces the profit maximiser's incentive to win as it reduces the returns to winning, 
they state that this effect is greater for the weak drawing teams than for the strong 
drawing teams. This result relies on the notion that the higher probability of the 
weak-drawing team winning implies a larger loss of gate revenue for the opponent. 
This is because, as they succinctly put it "the marginal impact on the dominant 
team's winning probability of an increase in the investment of the weaker team is 
greater than the marginal impact on the weaker team's winning probability of an 
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increase in the investment of the dominant team." In each case this is an example 
of a competitive externality. Smaller teams over-invest in talent by more than the 
larger teams, whereas revenue sharing internalises the externality. Thus as they 
point out, since complete revenue sharing is the same as joint profit maximisa-
tion, less competitive balance (or less equal talent distribution) will occur than 
what would be achieved under a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we 
propose in this chapter is that a centralised league planner would also choose less 
competitive balance than occurs under a noncooperative equilibrium. If the central 
planner's goal is joint profit maximisation of the clubs in the league she would al-
locate win distribution (or probability of winning based on the allocation of talent) 
with a favourable weighting towards those clubs with higher marginal revenue per 
win. In other words, clubs who marginally gain more attendance out of winning 
would be allocated a better win probability than those teams that are weaker in 
adding new spectators per win. 
5.1.2.2 Attendance 
One method in which to increase revenues would be to increase attendance. The 
literature on the determinants of attendance and the effects of outcome uncer-
tainty on attendance for American, British and Australian sports is thoroughly 
summarised in Borland & McDonald (2003)^^. They consider both a variety of 
sports and methodologies used as well as the determinants chosen to fall on the 
right hand side: factors influencing demand. Most of the literature focuses on how 
outcome uncertainty influences demand, although the literature has not produced 
consistent conclusions. 
Borland & McDonald (2003) point out that only a handful of studies had strong 
evidence that outcome uncertainty increased demand (see Peel & Thomas (1997)). 
Others indicated a negative influence above a certain win percentage threshold 
(see Knowles et al. (1992)). Most of the analysis indicated no influence at all 
(see Baimbridge et al. (1996)) or they find home attendance increases with the 
probability of a home win (see Forrest & Simmons (2002a)). Although it appears 
there is a lack of certainty about outcome uncertainty it is more than reasonable to 
assume that most spectators paying to attend a match go to see their home team 
win. Szymanski (2003) aptly states that "Given even supportive studies on the 
11 Other surveys include Dobson & Goddard (2001) and Szymanski (2003). 
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issue of match uncertainty seem to imply that attendance is maximised when the 
home team is twice as likely to win as the visiting team, the empirical evidence in 
this area seems far from unambiguous." 
Given this inconclusiveness, there is surprisingly a lack of empirical literature in 
measuring the effect of competitive balance on attendance and less so at a seasonal 
level. Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) examined aggregate attendance deter-
mined by a loyalty effect (lagged attendance), price, team performance (position) 
and entertainment (goals scored) in a time series and panel setting respectively. 
Their main objective was to find the determinants of football demand while in-
cluding a price variable for the first time such an analysis. While they found price 
to be statistically significant, they found attendance to be price inelastic but more 
responsive to fluctuations in performance and entertainment. The aspect of loyalty 
appeared consistent across all the clubs however the sensitivity of attendance to 
different clubs' successes was significant in 64 cases out of 94. Simmons (1996) esti-
mated the effect of price on demand for 19 of the largest clubs using a dynamic error 
correction model and he also found league position to be an important determinant 
of attendance. Szymanski & Smith (1997) estimate a set of equations to describe 
the behaviour of a profit maximising owner subject to demand and production 
constraints and they find position as an important determinant of revenues. 
Two American studies have examined the effect of competitive balance on at-
tendance in baseball. Schmidt & Berri (2001) examine whether competitive balance 
(measured by the Gini coefficient) had any effect on attendance in both a time se-
ries setting (1901-1998)and a panel setting^^ (1975-1988). The time series analysis 
showed that competitive balance was a significant determinant of attendance^^, 
with higher imbalance decreasing attendance. However their panel data analysis '^^  
portrayed a different outcome than the time series estimation. The single-year 
Gini coefficient demonstrated a significant and positive coefficient indicating in-
creasing imbalance increases attendance. Humphreys (2002) develops a different 
measure of competitive balance, the Competitive Balance Ratio, to capture within 
and between-season variation of win percentages. He measures the effect of com-
petitive balance on baseball attendances over a 100 year period and finds that 
his measure is better at explaining attendance variation than previous competitive 
^^The shorter panel set was utilised in order to incorporate available price data. 
^^Attendance here is aggregate league attendance, not individual team attendance. 
^''Attendance here consisted of 12 American League teams and 11 National League teams. 
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balance measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or the standard 
deviation of win percentages in a league^^. Zimbalist (2002) also experimented 
with regressing attendance on winning percentages and price for two different time 
periods (1950-1965 and 1985-2000) and found that win percentage had a posi-
tive and significant effect on attendance, as well as the notion that attendance is 
increasingly sensitive to team performance. 
Studies that have looked into competitive balance trends in the UK (e.g. Michie 
& Oughton (2004) and Football Governance Research Centre (2005)) have used 
measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Concentration Ratios^®. 
Dobson & Goddard (2004) examine inter-divisional competitive balance by infer-
ring changes through statistical investigation of F.A. Cup win probabilities. How-
ever our concern in this Chapter is intra-divisional competitive balance. We ex-
amine each division in isolation and determine the degree of competitive balance 
within it thus a measure such as the standard deviation of win percentages is 
appropriate. 
The above studies also show that attendance is sensitive to team performance 
and suggest that the degree of competitive balance within a league can influence at-
tendance. If some clubs experience a higher sensitivity to winning than other clubs, 
clubs that benefit more from a win are more likely to increase their contribution to 
aggregate league attendance than less attendance sensitive teams. The implication 
is that under perfect competitive balance, aggregate attendance has the potential 
to be sub-optimal. In the case of a revenue-maximising central league planner, she 
would allot the higher win percentages to teams with the largest sensitivities. Our 
analysis will build upon that of Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) by estimating 
team-specific attendance sensitivities to winning, but we will also determine the 
joint attendance majcimising win percentages for each team and simulate seasons in 
which the attendance maximising win percentages are used in order to calculate the 
potential optimal attendance for each season compared to the actual attendance 
and the potential attendance under complete competitive balance. 
Although, all three measures of competitive balance are averages of five year increments. 
^^Concentration ratios examine the concentration of points obtained by teams in the top posi-
tions (usually the top five). 
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5.2 Theoretical Background 
The purpose of this section is to outhne the strategic approach and model structure 
and proposition. The first aim is to obtain team-specific attendance sensitivities 
to winning. The second step is to use these estimates to calculate the optimal win 
percent for each team. Next, we simulate what the average seasonal attendance 
would have been for each team within a division using the optimal win percentages 
for the respective clubs. Lastly we compare the standard deviations of the optimal 
win percentages versus that of the actual win percentages to determine the level of 
competitive balance in each case. 
5.2.1 Model Structure 
To begin the model structure we start with a set of assumptions that are commonly 
used in the literature: 
a. Attendance {Q) is a concave function, Qi{vi), of win percentage (v), such that 
Q- > 0 and Q" < 0 and it is possible for there to exist some critical value 
beyond which Q- < 0. 
b. The probability of winning is influenced by teams investing in talent, t. Clubs 
purchase talent (players) in a competitive market at a constant marginal cost. 
Increasing the investment in talent, increases the probability of winning as 
shown below: 
= 0,, 'U{(cx3) = 1, ^ > 0, ^ < 0- (5.1) 
In English football, every team in a league plays every other team twice 
(home and away). Each team can win between 0 and 100% of its matches, 
therefore the aggregate win percentage of a league will be n/2 where n is 
the number of teams in the league^^. Draws are common and in our analysis 
are treated as half wins. We also assume an elastic supply of talent since 
calculate win percentage as the seasonal win percentage not the sum individual matches, 
i.e., 
Vi = rriijVij (5-2) 
where Mi is the number of matches played by team i and rriij is the number of games played 
between teams i and j during the season and Vij is the percentage of games won by team i. 
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teams can purchase players from higher and lower domestic divisions, from 
international teams abroad or take players on loan. 
c. Teams maximise profits and the central league planner maximises attendance. 
We also assume identical ticket prices to facilitate comparisons of the plan-
ner's choice and the clubs' choices in a competitive market. This also im-
plies that profit maximisation and attendance maximisation will be the same. 
There are several reasons for making this assumption about identical prices. 
Finding an overall summary price for attending a match is problematic. Due 
to the lack of individual ticket price data, previous literature has simply used 
total revenue divided by the attendance. However this measure is subject to 
severe measurement error especially in more recent times where revenue con-
sists of not only gate receipts, but television broadcast money, merchandising 
and catering. 
Secondly, research on the demand of football has suggested that the demand 
is highly price inelastic. Forrest, Simmons & Feehan (2002) review the results: 
—0.22 (Bird (1982)), —0.078^^ (Dobson & Goddard (1995)), —0.38 (Szymanski & 
Kuypers (1999)), and —0.40 (Simmons (1996)). In the 2004 issue of the Annual 
Review of Football Finance, Deloitte & Touche also declare "price increases have 
also had no effect on demand which continues to increase"^® although they point 
out the real price increases over the past 5 years have been modest (2.0-2.5%) 
and if one considers the improvements in stadium facilities, customers also receive 
more value for money. As Forrest et al. (2002) point out, the previous findings 
of demand inelasticity are inconsistent with profit maximisation. They suggest 
that results from previous research may have omitted variable bias, specifically the 
neglecting of travel costs. Taking into account the additional costs in attending 
a match in the Premiership, they still found the median of the 20 clubs to be 
inelastic but more elastic than previous studies. One of the reasons for this, they 
posit is that clubs also rely on non-ticket income, such as expenditure on food, 
drink and club merchandise. Thirdly, there are various prices for tickets within the 
stadiums. An accurate measure of price is difficult to estimate due to various price 
^®Dobsoii & Goddard (1995) results also indicate that in only 19 cases out of 94 was price 
significant at 5% or better. 
i9p. 52. 
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If we first suppose that both the individually competitive and planner's equilibrium 
are interior solutions, then given the technology of winning, the Nash equilibrium 
is defined by the following set of first order conditions^^ for the choice of talent 
investment: 
n' — 
= -1^ -, for ajl J (5.4) 
sti 
Suppose ti > t j at the Nash Equilibrium (5.4) then ^ and therefore > Q'j, 
i.e., the marginal revenue with respect to winning of team i (the dominant team) 
is greater than that of team j (the weaker team). Thus for the league planner to 
maximise joint profits: 
^ = 1 for all %, j (5.5) 
Thus in order for condition (5.5) to be met, the marginal revenue (Q-) of team 
i needs to fall and the marginal revenue (Q'j) of team j needs to rise for the 
equilibrium in (5.4). This can happen only if Vi increases and Vj falls, meaning 
increased dominance for team i. 
If instead of an interior solution, there existed a corner solution at the Nash 
equilibrium, there exists three different possibilities for any two teams in the league: 
(i) one team has a win percent of 1 and the other 0, (ii) one team has a win percent 
of 1 and the other a win percent between 0 and 1, (iii) one team has a win percent 
of 0 and the other a win percent between 0 and 1. During one season, only one 
team can have a win percentage of 1 and only one can have a win percentage of 0. 
Under case (i) the central planner has no other way to improve marginal revenue so 
competitive balance remains the same. Under (ii) and (iii) the planner can improve 
the win percentage for the stroiig team and lower the win percentage for the weak 
team thereby increasing the competitive imbalance in the league. 
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5.3 Empirical Evidence 
5.3.1 Measures of Competitive Balance 
To begin our empirical estimations we must choose a measure of competitive bal-
ance. We utilise the within-season standard deviation of win percentages, which 
has been used extensively in the literature (see Quirk & Fort (1997)). This measure 
is both convenient and allows for season comparisons. Other measures^^ have been 
used or constructed such as the Competitive Balance Ratio which scales average 
team-specific between-season variation by the average within-season variation over 
the same period (see Humphreys (2002)), Eckard's variance decomposition (see 
Eckard 1998, 2001b) which accounts for season to season variation in teams' rela-
tive standings; the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index which measures the concentration 
of championships and other standings (see Depken (1999)), Lorenz curves (see Fort 
& Quirk (1995)), Gini coefficients (see Schmidt & Berri (2001)), and entropy (see 
Horowitz (1997)). Buzzacchi et al. (2003) construct a dynamic measure of com-
petitive balance in order to compare the 'closed' leagues in the United States with 
'open' leagues common in Europe. The within-season standard deviation of win 
percentages is defined as the following: 
- 0.500)VAr 
This measure of competitive balance is chosen as it is suitable for our purposes 
here and will easily demonstrate the lessening of competitive balance chosen by the 
league planner. 
5.3.2 Win Percentages 
While the previous studies we have mentioned utilise position as a performance 
variable, we choose to utilise win percentages. Since we are looking at English 
football, the league structure has undergone a few changes over the years. Since 
1982, wins have been awarded three points and a draw 1 point. Previously, wins 
were awarded two points. By using win percentages we avoid this problem alto-
gether. The correlation between team position, points and win percentages are 
high: 
^^For a comprehensive summary of measures see: http;//www.football-research.bbk.ac.uk/ 
docs/competitivebalance.pdf 
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Tier Win Percentage & Points Win Percent & Position^ 
Tier 1 0.92 0.94 
Tier 2 0.87 0.94 
Tier 3 0.91 0.95 
Tier 4 0.90 0.95 
fThe reported number is the magnitude. The actual correlation is 
negative since a high win percent will correspond with lower positions. 
Table 5.1: Win Percentages and Correlations with Points and Position 
In this chapter we calculate win percentages based on the following formula; 
_ + (0-5)-Pt,f 
^ ) 
where Vi^ t are the total number of games won by team i in season t, Di^t are the 
total number of games drawn by team i in season t, and Gi^ t are the total number 
of games played by team i in season t. 
5.3.3 Football League 
Football leagues are 'open' leagues in the sense that anyone can form a club and 
work their way up the leagues by winning through a series of promotions. Usually 
the top two performers (positions 1 and 2) of a league gain automatic promotion 
while the next four teams (positions 3 to 6) engage in a playoff sequence to win 
promotion. The bottom three performers (position depends on league i.e., in the 
Second Tier, positions 22, 23 and 24) are relegated to the division below their cur-
rent division. Due to the restructuring, renaming and more recently 're-branding' 
of the leagues over the years, some nomenclature is necessary in order to clarify 
and prevent any confusion. From 1921 until 1992 there were four leagues organised 
by the Football League, and until 1992, the top division in English football was 
referred to as the 'First Division.' In 1992, this top division broke away from the 
Football League and formed the FA Premier League under the FA (Football As-
sociation) while the other three divisions remaining under control of the Football 
League were re-named. Beginning with the 2004/05 season, the Football League 
re-branded its divisions: the First Division became the Championship, the Second 
Division became League One and the Third Division became League Two '^^ . In this 
Chapter, when we refer to the 'First Tier' we refer to what is now the Premiership; 
^^The FA Premiership remains the Premiership though its name may change depending on the 
sponsor for that season, i.e. the Barclay's Premiership as it's currently known. 
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the 'Second Tier' refers to what is now known as the Championship; the 'Third 
Tier' refers to what is now know as League One, and the 'Fourth Tier' refers to 
the lowest league, League Two. 
5.3.4 Data Overview 
Football attendance and performance data is widely published (current statistics 
can be recovered from newspapers while historical figures are available in annually 
published yearbooks from various publishers) and available for download from a 
variety of websites. We obtained annual home attendance data from the annual 
Rothmans Football Yearbooks'^^, and Brian Tabner's substantial collection of atten-
dance figures, Through the Turnstiles for the years 1947 to 2004. Team performance 
data was gathered from the RSSSF (Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation) web-
site^®. Data for these sources are compiled from the club ledgers and from the 
Football Association and Football League. 
In our analysis, we choose to focus on the English football league and more 
specifically to the lower tiers in English football. Due the increasing popularity 
of the Premier League and the conversion of grounds to all-seater stadiums, quite 
a few clubs in this 'First Tier' have become capacity constrained^^ and this can 
easily be seen in Figure 5.1, where after 1997 the capacity utilisation is near 100% 
and the attendance bounded. 
Capacity constraints make estimating the win-attendance sensitivities difficult 
because there is no way to capture an appropriate measure of demand when the 
attendance is censored at an upper bound. Limited dependent variable estimation 
techniques for censored data may be more appropriate for analysis involving these 
clubs, so we avoid this problem by focusing on clubs in the lower leagues. They 
rarely if ever approached capacity. As noted in Dobson & Goddard (2001) Tobit 
analysis requires constrained and unconstrained observations and for some clubs 
^®This is now published as the Sky Sports Football Yearbook. 
^®See www.rsssf.com. 
^^Defined as attendance being 90% filled to capacity. A prime example of this is Arsenal 
Football club which plays its matches at a severely capacity constrained Highbury (capacity 
38,500). Arsenal is in the process of building Emirates Stadium which would almost double the 
capacity of Highbury. It is estimated that the number of people already subscribed to the Season 
Ticket and Ticket Registration Scheme waiting lists are enough to fill this capacity. Another 
example is Southampton, who when moved to St Mary's from The Dell immediately doubled 
attendance. 
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Figure 5.1: Attendance and Capacity Utilitisation in First Tier English Football 
1977-2004 
(i.e., Arsenal), more recent observations on season attendance merely reflect the 
capacity of the stadium. However, we estimated win-attendance sensitivities for 
all clubs using the methodology illustrated below and make note of those capacity 
constrained teams. 
Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 contain the total attendance and the standard devia-
tion of win percentage for each of the lower tiers of English football from 1977 to 
2004. Aggregate football attendance dechned from the 1950s through the 1980s. 
Attendance trends follow a peak and trough type trend with hooliganism and re-
structuring of stadiums causing some of the dechne. In the Second Tier, the lowest 
cumulative attendance of around 3.5 million occurred in 1985/86 season with the 
highest attendance occurring last season (2003/04) at around 8.7 million. The 
standard deviation of win percentage (defined above) between 1977 and 2004 has 
fluctuated between a low of 0.072 in the 1995/96 and a high of 0.131 in the 1983/84 
season. Over the past five seasons, this measure has hovered around 0.11 while at-
tendance has been increasing around 3%. 
In the Third Tier, the highest attendance since 1978 occurred in 1999 (cor-
responding to when Manchester City played at this level) and the lowest average 
total attendance having occurred in the 1986/87 season. The standard deviation of 
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Figure 5.2: Total Attendance • and Capacity Utilisation in Second Tier English 
Football 1977-2004 
win percentage ranged from a low of 0.083 in 1981/82 to a high of 0.121 in 1999/00 
and averaged approximately 0.10 during the examined time period. 
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Figure 5.3: Total Attendance and Capacity Utilisation in Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1977-2004 
The Fourth Tier gives similar results with the highest attendance occurring in 
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the 2003/04 season and the lowest happening in the 1984/85 season. The standard 
deviation of win percentage ranged from a high of 0.132 in 1981/82 and a low in 
1998/99 at 0.077. 
1978 1878 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1888 1887 1888 1888 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1888 1887 1888 1888 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Season 
I—>—Total Attendance • Capadly UtilisaliorTI 
Figure 5.4: Total Attendance and Capacity Utilisation in Fourth Tier English 
Football 1977-2004 
As mentioned previously, English football has undergone many structural changes 
since its inception in the 1888. The league began was initially composed of 12 teams 
and later divided into two divisions at the start of the 1892/93 season. Expansions 
to create four divisions took place over the period 1920-1923. In 1950/51 the league 
expanded slightly to include a total of 92 teams (the number still in the professional 
leagues today), while European football began to take hold throughout the 1950s. 
By the 1958/59 season the old 'third' division was split with the top 12 teams 
forming the new third division and the bottom 12 forming Division 4. Regular TV 
coverage of Enghsh football began in 1964 with the BBC's Match of the Day and 
televised broadcasts are now responsible for 44% of English Premiership revenue in 
the 2002/03 season compared to just 12% in the [1995/95 season]^®. Various pro-
motion and relegation changes occurred through the 1970s (such as the three-up 
three-down system). In 1981/82 the points system changed as mentioned previ-
ously to try and bring about a more attacking style of game. The Taylor Report 
in 1990 forced all stadiums to become all-seater by the end of the century. Since 
^®Deloitte & Touche Annual Review of Football Finance, 2004. 
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then the largest restructuring happened in the 1992/93 season with the formation 
of the Premier League. 
We also decided to choose the last 26 years because of the abolition of the 
maximum wage in 1961 and the introduction of free agency in 1978. Free agency 
meant a player could move to another club if he wanted once his contract ended. 
This meant that the club could offer the player a new contract, offer him a free 
transfer or sell him to a new club for a transfer fee. Ultimately, this lead to a large 
increase in the value of transfer fees and also opened up the international transfer 
market. These changes loosened the restrictions on the labour market and lead 
to large increases in wage spending from the late 1970s onwards (Szymanski & 
Kuypers (1999)). With that came the increased ability to buy success or at least 
a higher probability of success and this could have affected competitive balance. 
Therefore we decided to focus on the last quarter of a century for our analysis. 
Although we focus only on the lower tiers of English football, we ran regressions 
and estimated win-attendance sensitivities for each of the 82 teams that remained 
in English football over the past 26 years^. 
5.3.5 Methodology 
Building on the methodology of Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) and Simmons 
(1996), we have opted for time series estimation as this facilitates the estimation 
of team specific sensitivities. Where Dobson and Goddard focused on what drives 
football demand generally, we prefer to concentrate on the sensitivity of attendance 
to winning. Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) included position as a measure of 
performance whereas we utihse win percentages. We believe win percentages are 
preferable in our analysis since we want to measure how attendance reacts to a win 
(or loss) and this is not always captured in the position value, i.e., a team can lose 
a game and not move position because his nearest competitor may have lost as well 
in which the rankings may not change. Also, win percentages are used in many 
competitive balance measures as mentioned previously. Simmons (1996) similarly 
estimates club-specific models of demand equations, but focuses on a subset of Eng-
^®Due to promotion and relegation, some teams dropped out of the Football league into the 
Conference (i.e., Shrewsbury Town in 2004) while some Conference teams made their way up 
(Wimbledon). Teams that perhaps were out of the league for one or two season were still esti-
mated, however if they remained out of the League for longer periods of time, we dropped them 
from our sample. 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 131 
lish clubs. His analysis is more concerned with measuring accurate price elasticities 
by correcting attendance for season-ticket holders, but he also uses a measure of 
performance (position) in his time series estimations. Both Dobson and Goddard 
(1995, 2001) and Simmons (1996) choose time series analysis over panel data esti-
mation. Panel estimation is inappropriate as its greatest feature is the ability to 
pool the data and single out effects not apparent in cross-sectional or time series 
analysis alone. However it is exactly because we need team specific coefficients 
and because we are looking for team heterogeneity, that we avoid pooling the data 
into a panel. Pooling assumes some homogeneity and as Simmons (1996) points 
out, "given the importance of football-specific factors, it is not clear what form a 
pooled model should take." For example, the effect of promotion on attendance for 
Sunderland moving from the Second Tier to the First Tier could differ in intensity 
when compared to an effect of similar promotion for Wigan Athletic. The pooled 
variable for promotion could be skewed in favour of Sunderland and could bias the 
attendance effect on Wigan. Pesaran & Smith (1995) demonstrate that aggregating 
and pooling dynamic heterogeneous panels can produce misleading estimates. 
5.3.5.1 Stationarity 
Due to football's structural changes: league expansions (and breakaways), hooli-
ganism, reduction in stadium capacity, a surge in popularity in the late 1990s, it 
can be very challenging to robustly test the stationarity of football attendance, due 
to the low power of stationarity tests. Structural changes can cause the tests to 
give incorrect results, i.e., the tests can indicate non-stationarity when a series is 
stationary and vice versa. Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) de-trend the data by 
standardising using whole-league averages and standard deviations for each season. 
Simmons (1996) implements an error correction model which relies on cointegration 
thus he differences the series for the variables involved. He performed augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests on his series of attendance (sample 1963-1991) and could not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Although Schmidt & Berri (2001) find evi-
dence of unit roots in their analysis of baseball, this is only for total attendance over 
the 100 years. In their smaller, 14 year sample, the find no such evidence and point 
to the low number of observations which "reduces concern" over non-stationarity 
(Schmidt & Berri (2001), Footnote 22, p. 166). 
Finite sample bias and low power is often as the main drawbacks of Dickey-
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Fuller tests. Another drawback pointed out by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt & 
Shin (1992) is that given the structure of the test (the null of a unit root) one 
would have to have very strong evidence to reject the null and in many economic 
series, one fails to reject the null of a unit root. Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), develop 
an alternative test where the null is that the series is trend stationary and find this 
test is also robust to small samples. This KPSS test (as it is known in the literature 
and textbooks) can test the null of a stationary series around a trend or the null of 
a series being level stationary. If one uses KPSS to test the null of level stationarity 
for the same sample, one cannot reject the null at 10% significance for 8 clubs and 
not at 5% significance for 4 clubs. Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) suggest that even if 
the null of trend stationarity is rejected it could be that the alternative is actually 
stationarity around a nonlinear trend. Since attendance for most football clubs has 
experienced a downward trend since the late 1950s and for most clubs an upward 
trend after 1985/86 we utilise a time and time-squared variable to take into account 
this trend. 
Perron (1989) demonstrates that Dickey-Puller unit-root tests will fail to reject 
the hypothesis of a unit-root if the data are trend stationary but experience a 
break in trend. Thus, trend breaks or structural breaks will not be accounted for 
in standard Dickey-Puller tests and the unit-root tests will produced biased results. 
Rappoport & Reichlin (1989) also support the Perron (1989) conclusions. Since 
these initial findings, several papers have developed tests and statistics for detecting 
a unit-root in the presence of a break in trend^° Clemente, Montaiies & Reyes 
(1998) develop tests as well but also allow for a double break in trend variables. 
We tested the attendance data for two periods (1947-2004) and (1978-2004) and 
found that in the whole series, the unit-root hypothesis^^could be rejected for 72 
clubs at the 5% level, 9 clubs at the 10% level. KPSS tests were also performed 
on the remaining 9 clubs where null of unit root could not be rejected. Results 
from KPSS indicated that for 5 of these clubs, the null of trend stationarity could 
not be rejected. We also performed tests on the smaller series (1978-2004) even 
though most of the tests have very low power on small samples. Tests indicated 
that the unit-root hypothesis could be rejected at the 5% level for 66 clubs and at 
10% for 3 clubs. The remaining 27 clubs were then subjected to KPSS tests where 
^°Examples of these are Perron (1989), Banerjee, Lumsdaine & Stock (1992), Christiano (1992), 
Zivot & Andrews (1992), Perron (1995), Vogelsang & Perron (1995). 
^^We performed the standard Augmented Dickey-Puller tests, the test described by Zivot & 
Andrews (1992) and the test by Clemente et al. (1998). 
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for all but one club (Newcastle) the null of trend stationarity (and in some cases 
level stationarity) could not be rejected at the 10 or 5% level. Thus, even given 
the low power of the tests, the evidence appears to be at the very least in favour 
of the hypothesis of trend stationarity for attendance. 
Granger & Newbold (1974) point out that spurious regression is a risk when 
the two series being regressed are 1(1). Differencing the data can resolve this 
possibility. However, a complication arises if one differences the data when it is 
trend stationary, as this will induce autocorrelation in the form of a MA(1) process 
(Greene (2000)). Aggregate attendance could be 1(1) for some clubs based on the 
ADF tests, but 1(0) given the three other unit-root tests (KPSS (1992), Zivot & 
Andrews (1992), and Clemente et al. (1998)). All of the unit-root tests could be 
rejected for the null of a unit-root in winning percentages and the KPSS tests 
confirmed that the win percentage series were level stationary, thus eliminating 
any possibility or regressing two 1(1) variables on each other. 
We proceed with our estimation based on the assumption that both series are 
1(0) with attendance following a non-linear time trend. As a precaution, we pay 
special note to the regression diagnostics generated concerning AR(1) errors and 
Durbin-Watson statistics which can be indicators of non-stationarity. 
5.3.5.2 Basic Model 
The basic model we would like to estimate should capture the sensitivity of atten-
dance on winning as well as any additional effects caused by promotion, relegation, 
winning the championship, as well as 'stadium' effects such as building a new sta-
dium (i.e., Manchester City, Leicester City), renting another ground (i.e., Brighton 
at Gillingham or Pulham at Queens Park Rangers), or renovating existing grounds 
(Manchester United, Liverpool). Football has also endured a downward trend 
since the late 1950s. Many have pointed to the introduction of televised matches^^ 
socio-economic changes such as home ownership and increased affluence (Dobson 
& Goddard (2001)), the decline of the English national team^^, the abohshment of 
^^Though the effect is disputed with many agreeing television has not harmed gate attendance 
(See Baimbridge et al. (1996)). Nonetheless, football governing authorities imposed a 'television 
blackout' period from 3pm until 5pm on Saturday afternoons when no games are allowed to be 
televised, with the argument that this would serve to protect the smaller clubs. 
^^Though there are spikes in attendance when England does well. More recently, Rugby Union 
in England has benefited from England's victory in the 2003 World Cup. 
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the maximum wage as well as hooliganism and stadium renovations. After the lull 
of the 1980s the popularity of football started to increase. To take this parabolic 
effect into account, as well as the stationarity issues mentioned above, we include 
time and time squared-variables. We also include a squared performance term, to 
allow for decreasing marginal returns to a win as well as the possibility of negative 
marginal returns after some critical value. 
5.3.6 Dynamics 
Football clubs have loyal supporters (usually season ticket holders) who would fol-
low the team through good and bad spells. Each season a cohort of new fans enter 
the league where the successful teams attract a disproportionate share of these new 
supporters they are likely to remain loyal to their chosen club. Season-ticket hold-
ings can reflect the intensity of interest though loyalty may not be obvious. In order 
to take into account some of the dynamics of support, we include lagged variables 
in our estimation. The lagged dependent variable captures the 'loyalty' aspect as 
well as persistent and hopeful responses to poorly performing teams which Schmidt 
& Berri (2001) term 'wait till next year' responses. The lagged performance vari-
ables can take into account more short-term responses which may include euphoric 
responses to events such as winning the championship, or a jump-ship attitude due 
to relegation or a continuous slide in performance. Given the dynamic structure 
of football, it is possible however to construct long-term equilibrium 'steady-state' 
relationships. These long-run relationships are what will be important when build-
ing the team specific sensitivities of attendance on winning. It is assumed that 
market size qualities are capture within the teams' winning sensitivity coefficients. 
5.3.7 Estimated Model 
The model we estimate for each team appears below: 
ATTi^ t —oii + PiiATTi^t-i + PCTi^t + PsiWPCT^^^ 4- P4:iWPCTi^t-i+ 
(5.6) 
+ PCTl^_i + ^ PkiZ^f + PsF,iSif + Xiit -t- A2ii^  + £i,t-
k=i 
The dependent variable ATTi^ t is team z's attendance in year t, WPCTi^t is the 
team's win percentage, is a vector of dummy variables to take into account 
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'attendance factors' such as division, promotion and relegation, or winning the 
championship, and is a vector of dummy variables to represent 'stadium fac-
tors' such as playing in a new stadium or a newly renovated stadium. 
After the dynamic model estimation we calculated the long-term model which 
is defined as follows: 
AT?;" = 4- CT!" + (5.7) 
where 
CKi r A + A r A + /?5 
For simplicity we assume the coefficients of the dummy variables are zero in equi-
librium. However, long-run coefficients are calculated in the exact same way. 
In all cases the constant term was insignificant from zero and could be dropped. 
Theoretically this makes sense, as teams win zero games then spectators cease to 
go. Also, dropping the constant imposes the concave curvature for attendance since 
we are using the quadratic functional form. In very few cases the win percentage 
coefficient may have been insignificant. We chose not to set them equal to zero in 
order to consistently estimate the winning percentages for every team. In other 
cases, some of the promotion and relegation variables, divisional dummies and time 
variables were also insignificant^^. This reiterates the argument against pooling the 
data when one wants team specific sensitivities. The coefficients for WPCTi and 
WPCTf were positive and negative respectively, as expected. The diagnostics 
indicate the regressions pass the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for AR(1) errors, 
as well as tests for normality, heteroskedasticity and Ramsey's RESET test. We 
also note that the Durbin-Watson statistics for auto correlated errors were in the 
acceptable ranges (with the null of no autocorrelation in the errors) indicating 
spurious regression is unlikely. All the estimation results can be found at the end 
of the Chapter. 
Now that we obtained team specific coefficients, Su and for WPCTi and 
WPCT? respectively, we are able to calculate the attendance maximising win per-
centages for each team and the distribution of win percentages for the league. Using 
equation (5.7) or the long-run coefficients, the central league planner will distribute 
win percentages where the marginal attendance for each team with respect to wins 
^^This would occur for example with a team like Scunthorpe United which barely moved divi-
sions and when it did stayed in the lower tiers of English football. 
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is equalised; 
(5.8) 
for all i and j. Solving for WPCTi. 
WPCTi = + ^WPCTj (5.9) 
202i 02i 
Summing over WPCTi not including WPCT 3 
E wpcyr , = ^ + s^iWPCTi ^ (s.io) 
i¥=3 i¥=J 
and using the adding up constraint 
n WPCTi = - - WPCTj (5.11) 
where n is the number of teams in the league. Therefore we have 
n 
2 
WPCTj = 
Sij-Sg 
2S2i 
1 + 4 , ( 5 
(5.12) 
While there is no constraint on equation (5.12) that the win percentages lie between 
0 and 1, out of the 240 Tier 2 cases we estimated over the last decade, only 14 
(5.8%) fell outside of this range. In each of these 14 cases, we assigned 1 if the 
optimal win percentage was greater than 1 and 0 if it was below 0. In order to 
satisfy the adding-up constraint, any remaining discrepancies were allocated to the 
second best team or second worst team if the discrepancy were positive or negative 
respectively. For example, if the best team had a 1.04 optimal win percentage and 
the worst team had a greater than zero win percentage, the extra 0.04 went to the 
second best team. If the best team had a 1.04 win percentage and the worst team 
had a —0.03 win percentage, 0.03 out of the extra 0.04 from the best team went 
to the worst team, with the remaining 0.01 going to the second best performing 
team. In another possible case, if the best team had a 1.04 win percentage, and 
the worst team a —0.05 win percentage, the extra 0.04 went to the worst team, 
with the extra —0.01 from the worst team going to the second worst team. 
There were 24 out of 216 (11%) cases in the third tier, and 27 out of 140 (19%) 
instances in the fourth tier that exceeded the range of 0 and 1. While it may 
appear that large numbers are,falling out of the 0 to 1 range, it must be kept in 
mind that the fourth tier contains a mixture of teams that have been historically 
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professional and clubs that are recently semi-professional who have succeeded to 
reaching beyond non-league status. Thus it can be expected that the quality of 
teams in this division varies greatly and without constraints there would be a 
larger dispersion of winning percentages. This does not take away the fact that 
competitive balance would have decreased if the planner were trying to maximise 
attendance. Both of these tiers also had cases where there were a few teams in 
each season that exceeded the 0 to 1 boundary. In both the 1993/94 and 1994/95 
seasons, tier 3 had three cases above 1 and one case below 0. In each of the 1997/98, 
1999/00 and 2001/02 seasons there was one case greater than 1 and two cases less 
than 0. In the 1998/99 season there were two optimal win percentages greater 
than 1 and one less than 0. In the fourth tier, three cases exceeded 1 and two cases 
fell below 0 in the 1995/96 season, while in each of the seasons 1996/97, 1997/98, 
and 1998/99, three instances of optimal win percent values beyond 1 and three 
below 0. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Sensitivities 
The time series estimations reveal the team specific sensitivities of attendance on 
winning. The results are not surprising with Manchester United topping the list, 
followed by Manchester City, Aston Villa, Arsenal and Liverpool to round out the 
top 5. The bottom five also yielded no surprises with Torquay United coming in 
last, and Scunthorpe United, Rochdale, Northampton and York City propping up 
the rest of the list. Large city teams make up the bulk of the top 10 where the 
bottom 10 consist of smaller town teams, with the exception of Leyton Orient, a 
poor performing East London team. 
5.4.2 Optimal Win Percentages 
Using equation (5.12) we calculated the optimal win percentages for the lower tier 
teams over the past decade. With respect to the Second Tier teams that we more 
closely examine over the past decade, the likes of Crystal Palace, Stoke, West 
Bromwich Albion and Wolverhampton Wanderers are near the top while Tranmere 
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Rovers, Crewe Alexandra and Huddersfield Town are near the bottom. In the 
Third Tier, Cardiff City, Hull City and Plymouth Argyle were teams that were al-
located the most wins while the likes of Chester City, Northampton Town and York 
City were given the least. In the last tier, consistently near the top were Cardiff, 
Hull and Lincoln, while Torquay United and Chester City rounded out the bottom. 
The distribution of wins indicates that less competitive balance (as measured by 
the standard deviation of win percentages) would occur when marginal attendance 
with respect to wins is equalised. Even correcting for win percentages that fell out 
of the 0 to 1 range, the standard deviation of winning percentage was much greater 
than occurred in any of the actual seasons we simulated. Over the past decade 
all but one season (1994/95) in the Second Tier had a standard deviation of opti-
mal win percentage greater than 0.20 indicating increased competitive imbalance. 
The largest standard deviation of optimal win percentage occurred in the 2000/01 
season. We summarise these results for each tier^^ in the tables below: 
Second Tier Second Tier Third Tier Third Tier Fourth Tier Fourth Tier 
Actual Constrained Actual Constrained Actual Constrained 
Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard 
Deviation of Deviation of Deviation of Deviation of Deviation of Deviation of 
Win Optimal Win Win Optimal Win Win Optimal Win 
Season Percentage Percentage - Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
1994 0.086 0.241 0.110 0.283 0.094 0.300 
1995 0.081 0.187 0,128 0.253 0.126 0.288 
1996 0.072 0.232 0.104 0.230 0.108 0.292 
1997 0.094 0.232 0.094 0.240 0.086 0.289 
1998 0.115 0.235 0.084 0.239 0.118 0.268 
1999 0.116 0.242 0.107 0.257 0.077 0.302 
2000 0.111 0.237 0.121 0.251 0.104 -
2001 0.115 0.246 • 0.118 0.246 0.100 -
2002 0.112 0.227 0.114 0.269 0.113 -
2003 0.106 0.203 0.118 
-
0.094 
-
Table 5.2: Standard Deviation of Optimal & Actual Win Percentages Lower Tiers 
English Football 1994-2003 
In Tables 5.3 through 5.5, we present the optimal win distributions for the 
2002/03 season for the Second Tier, the 2001/02 season for the Third Tier and the 
^®Note: Season 2002/03 in the Third Tier and seasons 1999/00 through 2002/03 for the Fourth 
Tier were not simulated due to quite a few teams coming out of the Conference level for which we 
did not have sufficient time series data to estimate sensitivities, (i.e., Cheltenham Town, Boston 
United, and Rushden & Diamonds). 
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1996/97 season for the Fourth Tier of teams in EngUsh football^®. 
Additional tables for the optimal win percentage distributions for the remaining 
nine seasons we examined are contained in Section 5.6. Clearly we can see the 
largest drawing teams benefiting from increased or unchanged win percentages 
while the weak drawing teams experienced decreases. Teams that are more sensitive 
to winning (i.e. that have higher attendances per win) will have a higher win 
percentage relative to less sensitive clubs. These highly sensitive clubs can draw 
in more spectators and add more to the aggregate attendance of the league than 
the weakly sensitive teams per win. By using the win sensitivity estimates, we can 
estimate an attendance maximising win distribution in each of the lower leagues. 
5.4.3 Simulation of League 
5.4.3.1 Second Tier 
This section simulates what attendances could have been, if teams had been allo-
cated the optimal win percentages. We estimate attendances based on the optimal 
win percentage distribution for the Second Tier for the past decade and find that 
in all cases attendance could have been increased with increased competitive im-
balance. We present the total possible attendances if the optimal win percentage 
distribution had been used along with the actual total attendances for the seasons 
1994 through 2003 in the Second Tier. We see an increase in total attendance 
in every season if the optimal win percentages had been used. For example in 
the 2002/03 season the actual total average attendance was 370,240 spectators. If 
the clubs had won according to the optimal win percentage distribution, a total 
average of 411,852 spectators would have attended matches, an 11.2% increase in 
attendance. 
5.4.3.2 Perfectly Balanced League — Tier 2 
As a means of contrast, we compare actual attendance with that of a perfectly 
balanced league and that of a league with an optimal win percentage distribution. 
^®Even though we estimated the 1997/98 and 1998/99 seasons for the Fourth Tier, these seasons 
also contained Macclesfield Town, a team that shot through the ranks of the Fourth and Third 
tiers after first being promoted to the league in 1998, thus we prefer to present the season without 
this club due to the relatively low number of observations. 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Bradford City 0.413 0.423 0.423 
Brighton & Hove Albion 0.370 0.457 0.457 
Burnley 0.435 ouag 0.488 
Coventry City 0.413 0.670 0.670 
Crystal Palace 0.489 1.040 1 
Derby County 0.402 0.588 0.588 
Gillingham 0.500 0.281 0^81 
Grimsby Town 0.326 0.310 0.310 
Ipswich Town 0.554 0.686 0.686 
Leicester City 0.717 0.383 0.383 
Millwall 0.511 0.580 0.580 
Norwich City 0.543 0.514 0.514 
Nottingham Forest 0.587 0.449 0.449 
Portsmouth 0.750 0.550 0.550 
Preston North End 0.489 0.478 0.478 
Reading • 0.587 0.212 0.212 
Rotherham United 0.478 0.352 0.352 
Sheffield United 0.620 0.655 0.655 
Sheffield Wednesday 0.391 0.377 0.377 
Stoke City 0.413 0.818 0.858 
Walsall 0.424 0.294 0.294 
Watford 0.467 0.455 0.455 
Wimbledon 0.511 0.159 0.159 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.609 0.782 0.782 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.3: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 2002/03 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.457 0L438 0.476 
Bournemouth 0.370 0.516 0^&4 
Brentford 0.641 0.740 0.778 
Brighton &; Hove Albion 0.707 0.492 0.530 
Bristol City 0.565 0.371 0.409 
Bury 0.359 0.414 0.452 
Cambridge United 0.293 0.309 0.347 
Cardiff City 0.652 2.181 1 
Chesterfield 0.424 0.512 0.551 
Colchester United 0.457 -0.015 0.043 
Huddersfield Town 0.620 0.199 0.237 
Northampton Town 0.380 -0.360 0 
Notts County 0.402 0.361 0.399 
Oldham Athletic 0.565 0.602 0.640 
Peterborough United 0.435 0.069 0.107 
Port Vale 0.457 0.872 0.910 
Queens Park Rangers 0.565 0.537 0.575 
Reading 0.663 0.704 0.742 
Stoke City 0.620 0.967 0.967 
Swindon Town 0.478 0.669 0.707 
Tranmere Rovers 0.511 0.219 0.257 
Wigan Athletic 0.522 0.499 0.537 
Wrexham 0^48 0.385 0.423 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.511 0.321 0.359 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.4: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Football 
2001/02 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Bar net 0.478 0.215 (1362 
Brighton k, Hove Albion 0.391 0.508 0.656 
Cambridge United 0.511 0.393 0.541 
Cardiff City- 0.533 &825 1 
Carlisle Untied 0.652 0.732 0.879 
Chester City 0.565 -0.441 0 
Colchester United 0.554 0.144 0.292 
Darlington 0.413 0.030 0.177 
Doncaster 0.413 0.250 0.397 
Exeter City 0.391 0.365 0.513 
Fulham 0,674 0.521 0.669 
Hartlepool United 0.402 0.325 0.473 
Hereford 0.391 0.134 0.281 
Hull City 0.478 2.101 0.957 
Leyton Orient 0.457 0.299 0.447 
Lincoln 0.522 1.397 0.913 
Mansfield Town 0.522 0.521 0.669 
Northampton Town 0.565 0.552 0.700 
Rochdale 0.478 0.113 0.260 
Scarborough 0.511 0.156 0.303 
Scunthorpe United 0.489 -0.021 0.087 
Swansea City 0.543 0.505 0.652 
Torquay United 0.402 -0.204 0.043 
Wigan Athletic 0.663 0.581 0.729 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.5: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Fourth Tier English Foot-
ball 1996/97 Season 
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This is interesting because much of the pohcy in sport today is based on the 
argument to improve or protect competitive balance; that competitive balance is 
important for attendance. Many argue that if competitive balance declines, the 
competition would become less interesting and attendance would fall. 
If we compare the potential attendance given a perfectly balanced league^ the 
results are practically unchanged from what occurred actually. If we compare 
attendance from a perfectly balanced league with the attendance from our optimal 
win-percentage distribution, the results are astonishing. In most cases, a perfectly 
balanced league would have decreased the total average attendance. In the 2002/03 
season a perfectly balanced league would have yielded a total average attendance 
of 373,954, a mere 1% increase over the actual total average attendance, but in 
2001/02 a perfectly balanced competition would have decreased attendance by 
nearly 5%. We present results for the past decade below in Table 5.6. 
% Change Perfectly % Change 
Actual Optimal From Balanced From 
Season Attendance Attendance Actual League Att. Actual 
1994 281,938 301,753 7.03 273,741 -2.91 
1995 261,222 276,444 5^3 259,000 -0.85 
1996 284,512 314,128 10.41 282,087 -0.85 
1997 300,336 330,202 9.94 299,022 -0.44 
1998 362,128 368,571 1J8 349,950 -3.36 
1999 327,961 380,948 16.16 348,349 6j% 
2000 339,712 369,655 8.81 341,301 0.47 
2001 344,097 385,262 11.96 343,142 4128 
2002 366,164 391,053 6.80 348,198 -4.91 
2003 370,240 411,852 11.24 373,954 1.00 
TOTALS 3,238,310 3,529,868 9.00 3,218,744 -0.60 
Table 5.6: Actual & Feasible Attendances for the Second Tier of English Football 
1994-2003 
In many cases, the percentage increase in total average attendance from the 
optimal win percentage distributions exceeded 10% and in all cases but one atten-
dance would have been increased by 5%. The results show that increased imbalance 
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always increased the potential attendance whereas complete competitive balance 
almost always decreased attendance or left it marginally unchanged. However, cau-
tion must be exercised here concerning the potential increase in attendances. This 
is assuming that the grounds of the clubs involved have the capacity to cope with 
the increase in attendance. There were 8 cases out of the 240 in our sample where 
capacity was lower than the optimal attendance and seven of those cases were for 
Crystal Palace (the last case was for Brighton & Hove Albion in 2003)^^. However, 
even given the capacity constraints of Crystal Palace's Selhurst Park, attendance 
would have been significantly increased even if the potential attendance was capped 
at capacity^®. It is also key to note that Crystal Palace achieved promotion in the 
2002/03 season and currently plays in the First Tier. Thus for teams that continue 
to be successful, renovating existing stadiums to accommodate more spectators (as 
Manchester United have done several times with Old Trafford) or moving into new 
stadiums (as did Sunderland in 1997) is not infeasible. The point here is that even 
though some of our optimal attendances are beyond the capacity of the team's 
stadiums, it is not unrealistic to assume that capacity could be increased. The 
results show that an increase in competitive imbalance can significantly increase 
attendances. 
5.4.3.3 Third Tier 
The dramatic increases in attendance in the Second Tier by allocating the optimal 
win percentage distribution were replicated in the Third Tier. Five seasons had 
attendance increases in excess of 10% and only one season (1995/96) experienced an 
increase of less than 5%. Even more striking is the degree to which perfect balance 
decreases attendance. In all ten seasons we simulated, perfect competitive balance 
decreased attendance, sometimes as much as 5%. The changes in attendance for 
the Third tier are presented below in Table 5.7. Again, there were a few instances 
where the optimal attendance exceeded the capacity of the ground (Shrewsbury in 
^^However, for anyone who knows the history of Brighton & Hove Albion, they have had 
notorious bad luck and difficulty securing a new ground. Prior directors sold Brighton's for-
mer ground, Goldstone, in 1997 to make way for a retail park, while the club was exiled to 
play 'home' games nearly 70 miles away at Gillingham's Priestfield Stadium for two seasons. 
The club returned to Brighton for the 1999/00 season to play at Withdean, a former athletics 
ground. Supporters groups and directors have fought a long ongoing battle with the Coun-
cil to secure a new ground but the battle still wages to this day. For more information see 
http: / / www. clubsincrisis. com/BrightonHistory. asp. 
^®The average shortfall for Crystal Palace was 14.3% of capacity. 
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1994/95, Brighton in 2001/02 and Cardiff City^® in 1999/00 and 2001/02). Even 
if we constrain the attendances to fall within the capacity limitations, the increase 
in attendance is still significant. 
% Change Perfectly % Change 
Actual Optimal From Balanced From 
Season Attendance Attendance Actual League Att. Actual 
1994 129^26 140,617 8.65 122,179 -5.6 
1995 132,065 152,226 15.27 131,316 -0.6 
1996 122,965 126,156 2.59 118,833 -3.4 
1997 138,443 159,929 15.52 139,705 0.9 
1998 151,108 161,844 7.10 149,691 -0.9 
1999 180,572 191,987 &32 170,851 -5.4 
2000 160,890 178,391 10.88 155,526 -3.3 
2001 151,507 165^01 9.45 150,309 -0.8 
2002 172,948 187,412 &36 166,912 -3.5 
2003 169,203 188,867 11.62 166,324 -1.7 
T O T A L S 1,509,127 1,653,250 9.55 1,471,645 -&48 
Table 5.7: Actual & Feasible Attendances for the Third Tier of English Football 
1994-2003 
On average the optimal win percentage distribution increased divisional atten-
dance by nearly 10% whereas perfect balance would have decreased it by 2.5% 
5.4.3.4 Fourth Tier 
In the Fourth Tier we see dramatic changes. This tier has seen teams that have 
been established in the professional leagues for some time (Cardiff City) which 
may have experienced underperformance and fallen into the lower divisions, and 
also clubs that are relatively new, just coming out of semi-professional leagues 
and have not had the time to build up their support base, e.g., Rushden and 
Diamonds. Dobson & Goddard (1995) empirically test the advantage that older 
teams have over younger teams in terms of attendance base. They found that 
39 Cardiff City now has a capacity that would have held the calculated attendance. 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 146 
the a team's historical tradition has a major bearing on attendance. The Fourth 
Tier is the entry-level division for the professional leagues and it may experience a 
larger mix of relatively new clubs and older clubs, so we should expect even larger 
standard deviations of win percentage. This is because the clubs established later 
in the league have not had time to generate a long historical tradition and fan base 
relative to the older clubs so the sensitivity for these new clubs may not be as great 
as the older ones. There is the possibility, as Dobson & Goddard (1995) point out, 
that new clubs such as Wycombe Wanderers who have less local competition and a 
good demographic base can achieve higher attendances than well established clubs. 
Therefore this tier may experience a higher breadth in its standard deviation of 
optimal win percentages. All of the seasons we simulated in this tier with the 
optimal win percentages experienced increases in attendance by more than 10%, 
with an average increase of 20%. The only capacity constraints we reached were 
for Preston North End^° during the three seasons it featured in this lowest tier. 
Yet again even if we cap the attendance at capacity the increase in attendance was 
substantial. Complete competitive balance also harmed this tier if we simulated 
season attendance based on such a win distribution. We present these figures in 
Table 5.8 below. 
% Change Perfectly % Change 
Actual Optimal From Balanced From 
Season Attendance Attendance Actual League Att. Actual 
1994 75,375 89,683 18.98 69,609 -7.65 
1995 74,304 85,424 14.97 69,829 -6.02 
1996 85^^ 103,643 20.72 79,806 -7.58 
1997 80,073 97,775 22.11 83,877 4.75 
1998 77,718 96,341 2&96 85,575 10.11 
1999 9^380 111,360 19.25 93,317 -0.07 
TOTALS 486,703 584^26 20.04 482,013 -0.96 
Table 5.8: Actual & Feasible Attendances for the Fourth Tier of English Football 
1994-1999 
"^"Preston now has a capacity that would hold the calculated attendance. 
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.5.1 Implications 
What this analysis has demonstrated is that the distribution of win percentages 
obtained at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium is more balanced than it would be if 
a central league planner were to jointly maximise profits, assuming that attendance 
maximisation corresponds to profit maximisation. This finding is contrary to the 
consensus that there is actually too little competitive balance and that supporters 
and football in general would be better off with increased competitive balance. 
Recently Manchester United called for UEFA to revamp the structure of the 
Champions' League. Chief Executive David Gill suggested that a seeding system 
as opposed to the current 'random draw' would be preferable since so many 'big' 
clubs failed to survive the Round of 16, insinuating that the competition would 
lose some of its 'pulling power' if the 'glamour clubs' exit the contest early^^. 
William Gaillard, spokesman for UEFA retorted that "If Manchester United had 
won their group then they would not have been drawn against AC Milan in the 
knockout stage" and that such a revamp would actually drive away supporters and 
television companies because the competition would become too boring. However, 
Manchester United and Arsenal concurred that it was less than desirable that 
so many large clubs exited the competition relatively early, "You can't afford to 
have Real Madrid and Manchester United-big clubs who invest so much money-
going out in the last 16." Given the results in this Chapter, their arguments have 
some merit. As organisers of the Champions' League, if UEFA wants to maximise 
attendance and viewership, they should want to make sure that the big-draw teams 
are not all eliminated early on in the competition. 
Concerning policy, a more recent pohcy move in world football has been the 
implementation of transfer windows, mentioned previously in the thesis. These 
windows were introduced to bring focus back to coaching and tactics as opposed 
to buying players. This was done in order to keep rich (big) clubs in check, which 
had the financial advantage over smaller clubs and thus could buy whomever they 
wanted when necessary. UEFA has also made the decision to implement player 
quotas for the number of "locally" and "nationally" trained players fielded in Eu-
^ B B C Sport, 22 March 2005. E.g., h t tp: / /news.bbc.co .Uk / sport l /hi / footbal l / teams/m/ 
man_utd/4373075.stm. 
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ropean competitions. To justify some of these pohcies UEFA states: "But should 
we accept that a very rich club can buy an unlimited number of players, pay them 
massive salaries, and ensure that their smaller rivals never have a chance to win a 
competition? That is not what sport is about. There needs to be some degree of bal-
ance, some means to keep the playing field at least reasonably level. Our proposals 
are simply aimed at this... "^2 
In the U.S. some of the leagues' policies have had negative effects on players' 
wages (salary caps) and ticket prices (sustaining anti-trust protection and club mo-
nopolies). The collective selling of TV rights (by the NFL etc.) restricts television 
access for football consumers all for the sake of trying to make the game fairer fi-
nancially for the smaller teams and more attractive for the fans. The results of this 
chapter show that trying to maintain or increase competitive balance relative to the 
noncooperative equilibrium is contradictory to its aims: it decreases attendance. 
If anything these results demonstrate that complaints against competitive im-
balance may not be entirely sound. We have shown that a higher degree of im-
balance is preferred to that of the non-cooperative Nash equihbrium, if a central 
league planner wants to maximise league attendance. This Chapter also shows 
that not only is aggregate attendance under perfect competitive balance similar to 
the attendances of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium but also that it would be 
significantly lower than the attendance achieved under an optimal win-percentage 
distribution. Whether or not the aforementioned policies improve competitive bal-
ance is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is reasonable to question if such 
policies should be pursued for the sake of levelling the playing field. Many have 
argued that these restrictions are only in place to maintain and protect the profits 
of the clubs and do not affect competitive balance. 
5.5.2 Caveats 
Aside from potential data measurement problems (aggregate attendance figures 
which may hide some of the season cyclicality due to problems such as weather are 
ignored), we have also ignored price in our analysis. We stated some of the reasons 
for this assumption in section 5.2.1. However at this point we would like to con-
sider what the implications including price would be. Given the results concerning 
^^Question 10: http://www.uefa.coni/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/UEFAMedia/273606_ 
DOWNLOAD.pdf 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 149 
price inelasticity in previous research one might expect that for price increases the 
decrease in demand would be marginal. Even if the effect on attendance were sub-
stantial, an increase in price would hurt attendance and would thus dampen our 
sensitivity estimates. The implication being that the win-attendance sensitivities 
would be even greater than what we have estimated. If price decreased, however, 
attendance may be overestimated but we view this as unlikely. Therefore we be-
lieve that even if we overestimated attendance, it is likely to only be marginal since 
the bigger driver of attendance is performance and the win-attendance sensitivities 
are likely to be unaffected. 
Another potential criticism is that this analysis deals with 'within-season' com-
petitive balance instead of 'between-season' competitive balance. However many 
of the arguments in support of measures to increase competitive balance, complain 
about 'within-season' dominance by a small number of teams as a reason to improve 
competitive balance. 
There is also room for comparative models other than the quadratic functional 
form. We chose the quadratic functional form in order to allow attendance to 
decline at higher win percentages, i.e. the games are too predicable. However a 
log form could be considered as well as non-quadratic linear models. One may also 
wish to use a panel estimation with fixed effects and compare this with our results 
here. 
5.5.3 Further Research 
There are also ways in which one could extend this research. In this analysis we 
have focused on average home attendance, thus neglecting television audiences. It 
could be the case that teams with large gate attendance sensitivities also have large 
television 'audience' sensitivities and since television broadcasters have some flexi-
bility in deciding on which games to broadcast they could maximise their potential 
audience and 'pay-per-view' subscribers by broadcasting matches with high win-
attendance sensitive teams. Research by Forrest et al. (2005) has already started 
to pursue how television audiences may react to competitive balance although they 
specifically use match-outcome uncertainty. They find that broadcasters choose to 
show matches where at least one team was a contender for the Championship or a 
European qualifier, in other words matches with successful clubs. Additional con-
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siderations might be to include longer time series, include robust measures of price 
and disaggregate the attendance though it is unclear if these would compound or 
mitigate the data problems given the structural changes mentioned earlier. Lastly, 
although this paper deals with within-season competitive balance, most arguments 
in favour restrictive policies are' aimed at improving within-season competitive bal-
ance. Whether or not a league planner would choose to increase between-season 
competitive balance is a research topic worth pursuing. 
5.5.4 Summary 
The results of this Chapter indicate that increased competitive balance may not be 
desirable if the objective is to maximise attendance. Most arguments for improving 
competitive balance are that it will promote and improve attendance and revenues 
for the game. Other studies suggest however, that the true effect of such policies 
are to increase the profits of club owners and keep wages low. 
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium has resulted in suboptimal competitive 
balance in their view, so pohces (such as revenue sharing) are necessary to cor-
rect this. However, our findings suggest that a league planner seeking to max-
imise attendance would actually choose more imbalance than results under the 
non-cooperative equilibrium because some teams have higher win-attendance sen-
sitivities than others. Thus, large drawing teams that win will contribute more 
to the aggregate league attendance than a small, less win-sensitive club. However 
the point here is not to argue for increased competitive imbalance, but rather to 
suggest that policies and restrictions used to pursue strict competitive balance may 
be more harmful and have less than desireable consequences than anticipated. 
We urge caution when restrictive trade policies are used to protect or promote 
competitive balance in order to increase demand for the game. There may be other 
less restrictive polices (i.e. policies to increase the scoring potential of games or re-
gional divisions to create geographical rivalries) which may create more excitement 
and spur consumer demand. As we demonstrate in the next Chapter, perhaps one 
of the key factors for demand is not so much competitive balance as much as it is 
about entertainment through goals and making the likelihood of draws less. 
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5.6 Additional Tables for Chapter 5 
Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley 0.565 0.288 0.288 
Bolton Wanderers 0.609 0.559 0.559 
Bristol City 0.370 0.344 0.344 
Burnley 0.380 0.590 0.590 
Charlton Athletic 0.467 0.425 0.425 
Derby County 0.522 0.601 0.601 
Grimsby Town 0.522 0.413 0.413 
Luton Town 0.467 0.346 0.346 
Middlesbrough 0.641 0.405 0.405 
Millwall 0.500 0.605 0.605 
Notts County 0.337 0.315 0.315 
Oldham Athletic 0.489 0.494 0.494 
Port Vale 0.467 0.576 0.576 
Portsmouth 0.467 0.568 0.568 
Reading 0.609 0.318 0.318 
Sheffield United 0.554 0.667 0.667 
Southend United 0.478 0.291 0.291 
Stoke City .0.511 0.850 0.850 
Sunderland 0.457 0.552 0.552 
Swindon Town 0.391 0.589 0.589 
Tranmere Rovers 0.587 0.095 0.095 
Watford 0.554 0.462 0.462 
West Bromwich Albion 0.457 0.840 0.840 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.598 0.807 0.807 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.9: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 1994/95 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley 0.500 0.277 0.277 
Birmingham City 0.467 0.478 0.478 
Charlton Athletic 0.587 0.417 0.417 
Crystal Palace 0.598 1.046 1.000 
Derby County 0.630 0.591 0.591 
Grimsby Town •0.457 0.336 0.336 
Huddersfield Town 0.500 0.118 0.118 
Ipswich Town 0.543 0.691 0.691 
Leicester City 0.565 0.385 0.385 
Luton Town 0.370 0.337 0.337 
Millwall 0.424 0.586 0.586 
Norwich City .0.467 0.517 0.517 
Oldham Athletic 0.457 0.472 0.472 
Port Vale 0.489 0.515 0.515 
Portsmouth 0.424 0.554 0.554 
Reading 0.467 0.238 0.238 
Sheffield United 0.500 0.658 0.658 
Southend United 0.478 0.276 &276 
Stoke City 0.576 &826 0.872 
Sunderland 0.663 0.545 0.545 
Tranmere Rovers 0.489 0.069 0.069 
Watford 0.413 0.457 0.457 
West Bromwich Albion 0.478 0.822 0^82 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.457 0.788 0U%8 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.10: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 1995/96 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley 0.630 0.279 0.279 
Birmingham City 0.533 0.479 0.479 
Bolton Wanderers 0.761 0.551 0.551 
Bradford City 0.391 0U27 0.427 
Charlton Athletic 0.467 0.419 0.419 
Crystal Palace 0.565 1.050 1.000 
Grimsby Town 0.380 0.350 0.350 
Huddersfield Town 0.446 0.121 0.121 
Ipswich Town 0.587 0.694 0.694 
Manchester City 0.478 0.513 0.513 
Norwich City 0.500 0.519 0.519 
Oldham Athletic 0.359 0.476 0.476 
Oxford United 0.446 0.258 0.258 
Port Vale 0.543 0.527 0.527 
Portsmouth ,0.522 0.557 0.557 
Queens Park Rangers 0.522 0.490 0.490 
Reading 0.457 0.253 0.253 
Sheffield United 0.576 0.660 0.660 
Southend United 0.337 0.279 0.279 
Stoke City 0.500 0.830 0.880 
Swindon Town 0.424 0.576 0.576 
Tranmere Rovers 0.522 0.074 0.074 
West Bromwich Albion 0.467 0.826 0^86 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.587 0.792 0.792 
TOTAL= (n/2) • 12 12 12 
Table 5.11: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 1996/97 Season 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 154 
Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Birmingham City 0.598 0.501 0.501 
Bradford City 0.467 0.453 0.453 
Bury 0.446 0.316 0.316 
Charlton Athletic 0.674 0.441 0.441 
Crewe Alexandra 0.446 -0.100 0.000 
Huddersfield Town 0.424 0.159 0.159 
Ipswich Town 0.652 0.733 0.733 
Manchester City 0.391 0.522 0.522 
Middlesbrough 0.696 0U22 0L422 
Norwich City 0.446 0.549 0.549 
Nottingham Forest 0.717 0.468 0J168 
Oxford United 0.457 0.305 0.305 
Port Vale 0.391 0.696 0.696 
Portsmouth 0.391 0.594 0.594 
Queens Park Rangers 0.424 0.513 0.513 
Reading 0.337 0.474 0.474 
Sheffield United 0.598 0.686 0.686 
Stockport County 0.500 0.317 0.317 
Stoke City 0.380 &897 0.897 
Sunderland 0.696 0.566 0.566 
Swindon Town 0.413 0.622 0^82 
Tranmere Rovers 0.457 0.145 0.046 
West Bromwich Albion 0.489 0.875 0.875 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.511 0.845 0.845 
TOTAL= (n/2) , 12 12 12 
Table 5.12: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 1997/98 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley 0.489 0.305 0.305 
Birmingham City 0.630 0.498 0.498 
Bolton Wanderers 0.609 0.573 0.573 
Bradford City 0.663 0.450 0.450 
Bristol City 0.359 0.353 0.353 
Bury 0.402 0.305 0.305 
Crewe Alexandra 0.391 -0.115 0.000 
Crystal Palace 0.478 1.096 1.000 
Grimsby Town 0.478 0.540 0.540 
Huddersfield Town 0.500 0.155 0.155 
Ipswich Town 0.652 0.728 0.728 
Norwich City 0.511 0.545 0.545 
Oxford United 0.370 0.299 0.299 
Port Vale 0.370 0.676 0.676 
Portsmouth 0.391 0.589 0.589 
Queens Park Rangers 0.380 0.511 0.511 
Sheffield United 0.533 0.683 0.683 
Stockport County 0.446 0.311 0.311 
Sunderland 0.804 0.564 0.564 
Swindon Town 0.402 0.616 0.616 
Tranmere Rovers 0.478 0.137 0.118 
Watford 0.609 0.472 0.472 
West Bromwich Albion 0.467 0.869 0U#9 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.587 0.838 0jW8 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.13: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier EngUsh Foot-
ball 1998/99 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley 0.630 0.299 0.299 
Birmingham City 0.598 0.494 0.494 
Blackburn Rovers 0.511 0.477 0.477 
Bolton Wanderers 0.598 0.568 0.568 
Charlton Athletic 0.696 0.434 0.434 
Crewe Alexandra 0.402 -0.143 0.000 
Crystal Palace •0.446 1.085 1.000 
Fulham 0.543 0.422 0.422 
Grimsby Town 0.413 0.496 0.496 
Huddersfield Town 0.576 0.147 0.147 
Ipswich Town 0.674 0.720 0.720 
Manchester City 0.685 0.519 0.519 
Norwich City ,0.467 0.539 0.539 
Nottingham Forest 0.457 0.463 0.463 
Port Vale 0.315 0.641 0.641 
Portsmouth 0.413 0.582 0.582 
Queens Park Rangers 0.543 0.506 0.506 
Sheffield United 0.446 0.678 0.678 
Stockport County 0.446 0.300 0.300 
Swindon Town 0.304 0.607 0.607 
Tranmere Rovers 0.457 0.122 0.064 
Walsall 0.380 0.357 0.357 
West Bromwich Albion 0.424 0.859 0.859 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.576 0.827 0.827 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.14: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 1999/00 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnsley • 0.424 0.313 0.313 
Birmingham City 0.598 0.504 0.504 
Blackburn Rovers 0.707 0.503 0.503 
Bolton Wanderers 0.685 0.579 0.579 
Burnley 0.554 0.774 0.774 
Crewe Alexandra 0.435 -0.079 0.000 
Crystal Palace 0.402 1.110 1.000 
Pulham 0.772 0.442 0.442 
Gillingham 0.457 0.383 0.383 
Grimsby Town 0.413 0.598 0.598 
Huddersfield Town 0.402 0.165 0.165 
Norwich City 0.435 0.553 0.553 
Nottingham Forest 0.522 0.471 0.471 
Portsmouth 0.424 0.599 0.599 
Preston North End 0.598 0.625 0.625 
Queens Park Rangers 0.359 0.517 0.517 
Sheffield United 0.533 0.690 0.690 
Sheffield Wednesday 0.413 0.393 0.393 
Stockport County 0.435 0.325 0.325 
Tranmere Rovers 0.315 0.156 0.156 
Watford 0.533 0.476 0.476 
West Bromwich Albion 0.576 0.882 0.914 
Wimbledon 0.565 0.166 0.166 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.446 0.853 0.853 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.15: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 2000/01 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Baxnsley -0.402 0.296 0.296 
Birmingham City 0.598 0.492 0.492 
Bradford City 0.435 0.442 0.442 
Burnley 0.587 0.649 0.649 
Coventry City 0.500 0.699 0.699 
Crewe Alexandra 0.402 -0.157 0.000 
Crystal Palace 0.500 1.080 1.000 
Gillingham 0.500 0.338 &338 
Grimsby Town 0.413 0.472 0.472 
Manchester City 0.739 0.518 0.518 
Millwall 0.598 0.620 (1620 
Norwich City 0.576 0.536 0.536 
Nottingham Forest 0.457 0.461 0.461 
Portsmouth 0.435 0.578 0.578 
Preston North End 0.565 0.561 0.561 
Rotherham United 0.424 0.406 0.406 
Sheffield United 0.489 0.675 0.675 
Sheffield Wednesday 0.413 0.386 0.386 
Stockport County 0.217 0.295 0.295 
Walsall 0.413 0.349 0.349 
Watford 0.467 0.467 0.467 
West Bromwich Albion 0.674 0.854 0.854 
Wimbledon 0.533 0.163 0.085 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.663 0.822 &822 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.16: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Second Tier English Foot-
ball 2001/02 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Birmingham City 0,696 0.533 0.594 
Blackpool 0.500 0.471 0.532 
Bournemouth 0.402 0.568 0.629 
Bradford City 0.478 0.490 0.551 
Brentford 0.652 0.798 0.858 
Brighton &; Hove Albion 0.489 0.499 0.559 
Bristol Rovers 0.652 0.469 0.530 
Cambridge City 0.402 0.345 0.406 
Cardiff City 0.315 2.457 1.000 
Chester City 0.250 -1.323 0.000 
Crewe Alexandra 0.630 0.100 0.160 
Huddersfield Town 0.641 0.216 0.277 
Hull 0.576 1.739 0.957 
Leyton 0:217 0.222 0.283 
Oxford United 0,587 0.374 0.435 
Peterborough United 0.500 0.168 0.229 
Plymouth 0.370 1.211 0.913 
Rotherham 0.457 0.542 0.602 
Shrewsbury 0.435 0.324 0.385 
Stockport 0.500 0.393 0.454 
Swansea 0.565 0.484 0.545 
Wrexham 0.511 0.423 0.484 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.620 0.377 0.438 
York City 0.554 0.120 0.180 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.17: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1994/95 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.641 0.460 ouas 
Bournemouth 0.457 0.551 0.589 
Bradford City 0.554 0.487 0.524 
Brentford 0.467 0.779 0.817 
Brighton & Hove Albion 0.326 0.496 0.534 
Bristol City- 0.489 0.376 0.413 
Bristol Rovers 0.543 0.461 0.498 
Burnley 0.446 1.029 0.957 
Carlisle 0.402 0.430 0.467 
Chesterfield 0.565 0.618 0.656 
Crewe Alexandra 0.554 0.080 0.118 
Hull OjW3 1.652 1.000 
Notts County 0.620 0.369 0.407 
Oxford United 0.641 0.367 0.405 
Peterborough United 0.424 0.136 0.174 
Rotherham 0.457 0.531 0.569 
Shrewsbury 0.435 0.317 0.355 
Stockport 0.554 0.386 0.423 
Swansea 0.391 0.479 0.516 
Swindon Town 0J28 0.683 0.720 
Walsall 0.543 0.479 0.517 
Wrexham 0.565 0.411 0/W8 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.489 0.359 0.396 
York City 0.424 0.061 0.000 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.18: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1995/96 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.554 0.464 0.481 
Bournemouth 0.489 0.557 0.574 
Brentford 0.587 0.785 0.802 
Bristol City 0.565 0.377 0.394 
Bristol Rovers 0.446 0.464 0.481 
Burnley 0.533 1.040 0.957 
Bury 0.652 0.447 0.464 
Chesterfield 0.543 0.634 0.651 
Crewe Alexandra 0.554 0.087 0.104 
Gillingham 0.522 0.477 0.493 
Luton Town 0.620 0.400 0.417 
Millwall 0.489 0.716 0.733 
Notts County 0.304 0.370 0.387 
Peterborough United 0.391 0.147 0.164 
Plymouth 0.457 1.192 1.000 
Preston North End 0.467 0.761 0.778 
Rotherham 0.304 0.535 0.552 
Shrewsbury 0.380 0.320 0.336 
Stockport 0.641 0.388 0.405 
Walsall 0.522 0.483 0.500 
Watford 0.554 0.497 0.514 
Wrexham 0.565 0.415 0.432 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.435 0.365 0.382 
York City 0.424 0.080 0.000 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.19: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1996/97 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.489 0.445 0.435 
Bournemouth 0.522 0.527 0.517 
Brentford 0.424 0.752 0.742 
Bristol City- 0.652 0.373 0.363 
Bristol Rovers 0.543 0.449 0.439 
Burnley 0.424 0.984 0.975 
Carlisle 0.348 0.345 0.335 
Chesterfield 0.533 0.545 0.536 
Pulham 0.543 0.482 0.473 
Gillingham 0.554 0.457 0.447 
Grimsby 0.576 0.809 0.799 
Luton Town 0.467 0.394 0.384 
Millwall 0.446 0.703 0.693 
Northampton Town 0.576 -0.278 0.000 
Oldham Athletic 0.500 0.608 0.598 
Plymouth 0.402 1.143 1.000 
Preston North End 0.478 0.733 0.723 
Southend United 0.348 0.367 0.357 
Walsall 0.435 0.464 0.454 
Watford 0.696 0.492 0.483 
Wigan Athletic 0.489 0.506 0.497 
Wrexham 0.565 0.393 0.383 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.500 0.333 0.323 
York City 0.489 -0.025 0.043 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.20: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1997/98 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.457 0.483 0.455 
Bournemouth 0.598 0.586 0.559 
Bristol Rovers 0.467 0.479 0.451 
Burnley 0.457 1.094 1.000 
Chesterfield 0.511 0.723 0.695 
Colchester United 0.435 0.077 0.050 
Fulham 0.761 0.503 0.476 
Gillingham 0.630 0.496 0.469 
Lincoln City 0.719 0.691 
Luton Town 0.457 0.407 0.380 
Macclesfield 0.348 -0.722 0.000 
Man City 0.652 0.538 0.511 
Millwall 0.489 0.730 0.702 
Northampton Town 0.413 0.168 0.141 
Notts County 0.435 0.377 0.350 
Oldham Athletic 0.402 0.639 0.612 
Preston North End 0.620 0.789 0.762 
Reading 0.489 0.839 0.811 
Stoke City 0.522 1.008 0.957 
Walsall 0.663 0.502 0.474 
Wigan Athletic 0.587 0.547 0.519 
Wrexham 0.435 0.437 0.409 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.413 0.397 0.370 
York City 0.402 0.184 0.157 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.21: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1998/99 Season 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 164 
Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Blackpool 0.359 0.420 0.435 
Bournemouth 0.446 0X&8 0.503 
Brentford 0.424 0.709 0.723 
Bristol City 0.533 0.367 0.382 
Bristol Rovers 0.620 0.429 0.444 
Burnley 0.685 0.912 0.926 
Bury 0.478 0.391 0.406 
Cambridge City 0.391 0.290 0.304 
Cardiff City 0.380 2.031 1.000 
Chesterfield 0.315 0.428 0.443 
Colchester United 0.413 -0.052 0.043 
Gillingham 0.652 0.431 0.446 
Luton Town 0.478 0.385 0.400 
Millwall 0.641 0.685 0.699 
Notts County 0.511 0.355 0.369 
Oldham Athletic 0.478 0.587 0.601 
Oxford United 0.359 0.342 0.356 
Preston North End 0.728 0.696 0.710 
Reading 0.500 0.650 0.664 
Scunthorpe -0.624 0.000 
Stoke City 0.641 0.951 0.966 
Wigan Athletic 0.663 0.480 0.495 
Wrexham 0U&9 0.364 0.379 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.489 0.290 0.305 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.22: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 1999/00 Season 
CHAPTER 5. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 165 
Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Bournemouth 0.576 0.566 0.566 
Brentford 0.489 0.795 0.795 
Bristol City- 0.543 0.378 0.378 
Bristol Rovers 0.424 0.468 0.468 
Bury 0.457 0.454 0.454 
Cambridge City 0.424 0.344 0.344 
Colchester United 0.457 0.050 0.050 
Luton Town 0.337 0.402 0.402 
Millwall 0.707 0.720 0.720 
Northampton Town 0.457 0.014 0.014 
Notts County 0.543 0.373 0.373 
Oldham Athletic 0.467 0.628 0.628 
Oxford United 0.217 0.373 0.373 
Peterborough United 0.478 0.164 0.164 
Port Vale 0.500 0.945 0.945 
Reading 0.663 0.799 0.799 
Rotherham 0.696 0.540 0.540 
Stoke City 0.609 0.996 0.996 
Swansea 0.315 0.483 0.483 
Swindon Town 0.424 0.688 0.688 
Walsall 0.630 &488 0U188 
Wigan Athletic 0.609 0.533 0.533 
Wrexham 0.500 0.422 0.422 
Wycombe Wanderers 0.478 0.375 0.375 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.23: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Third Tier English Foot-
ball 2000/01 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnet cwas 0.248 0.289 
Bury 0.679 0.540 0.581 
Carlisle 0.762 0.850 0.891 
Chesterfield 0.690 0.976 0.952 
Colchester United 0.500 0.188 0.229 
Darlington 0.357 0.173 0.214 
Doncaster 0.524 0.260 0.301 
Exeter City 0.310 0.414 0.455 
Fulham 0.548 0.533 0.574 
GiUingham 0.369 0.552 0.593 
Hartlepool United 0.381 0.352 0.393 
Hereford 0.440 0.245 0.286 
Lincoln City 0.488 1.845 1.000 
Mansfield Town 0.560 0.539 0.580 
Northampton Town 0.405 0.806 0.847 
Preston North End 0.571 0.870 0.911 
Rochdale 0.452 0.216 0.257 
Scarborough 0.310 0.209 0.250 
Scunthorpe 0.524 0.115 0.156 
Torquay United 0.488 -0.093 0.000 
Walsall 0.702 0.555 0.596 
Wigan Athletic 0.452 0.604 0.645 
TOTAL= (n/2) 11 11 11 
Table 5.24: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Fourth Tier English Foot-
ball 1994/95 Season 
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Actual Attendance Constrained 
Win Maximising Attendance Maximising 
Team Percentage Win Percentage Win Percentage 
Barnet 0.565 0.223 0.345 
Bury OjGO 0.520 O j ^ 
Cambridge United 0.435 0.400 0.522 
Cardiff City 0.370 2.873 1.000 
Chester City 0.565 -0 .326 0.000 
Colchester United 0.587 0.156 0.278 
Darlington 0.630 0.068 0.190 
Doncaster 0.467 0.253 0.375 
Exeter City 0.478 0.378 0.500 
Pulham 0.446 0.525 0.647 
Gillingham 0.663 0.536 0.657 
Hartlepool United 0.402 0.332 0.454 
Hereford 0.587 0.164 0.286 
Leyton Orient 0.380 0.309 0.431 
Lincoln City 0.435 1.517 0.957 
Mansfield Town 0.457 0.526 0.648 
Northampton Town 0.533 0.621 0.742 
Plymouth 0.609 1.340 0.913 
Preston North End 0.685 0.847 0.969 
Rochdale 0.446 0.141 0.263 
Scarborough 0.348 0.170 0.292 
Scunthorpe 0.489 0.016 0.138 
Torquay United 0.261 - 0 . 1 7 4 0.043 
Wigan Athletic 0.543 0.587 0.709 
TOTAL= (n/2) 12 12 12 
Table 5.25: Optimal Win Percentage Distribution in the Fourth Tier English Foot-
ball 1995/96 Season 
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Club Level Term (WPct) Squared Term (WPct)^ 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Aldershot Town 21449.5 4627 -15158.7 6752 
Arsenal 141116 50200 -145562 80200 
Aston Villa 141207 80300 -103652 11500 
Barnsley 40017.7 22100 -44123.6 35200 
Birmingham City 73006.8 18000 -60110 27200 
Blackburn Rovers 36528^ 21900 -24004.7 34200 
Blackpool 25534.6 6764 -17645.1 8523 
Bolton Wanderers 74356.9 9735 -53468.5 16100 
Bournemouth 21700.2 3694 -11254.7 6926 
Bradford City 59411.4 17100 -51504.5 23700 
Brentford 25103.4 7938 -10149.2 11300 
Brighton & Hove 9293&2 9154 -84248.2 12000 
Bristol City 72671.7 33500 -84299.4 65000 
Bristol Rovers 29860.7 1951 -22317.9 3664 
Burnley 21803.6 11800 -6078.9 21400 
Bury 21555.4 1724 -13862.4 2604 
Cambridge United 20132 2807 -16250.1 5568 
Cardiff City 19353.4 3880 -2124.9 5512 
Carlisle United 12051.2 3918 -3213.9 6129 
Charlton Athletic 63372.9 2907 -57304.4 4989 
Chelsea 96112.9 25900 -69948.8 33400 
Chesterfield 13951.5 4090 -3771.8 6318 
Coventry City 60769.2 18900 -33524.4 34800 
Crewe Alexandra 10848.7 5238 -9718.4 11000 
Crystal Palace 67418 31700 -24782.2 51000 
Derby County 75181.5 17500 -50412.5 35600 
Everton 89930.4 45500 -58885.2 71700 
Exeter City 12996.9 3974 -7734.7 7311 
Pulham 40431.4 7748 -31723 11200 
Grimsby Town 19619.9 10600 —6046.6 18300 
Gillingham 25498.6 4813 -17136.6 8161 
Hartlepool United 16427.1 2744 -13961.5 4209 
Huddersfield Town 23597.9 18300 -33990.6 33900 
Hull City 16427 6202 -2160.1 8854 
Ipswich Town 61596.5 21700 -33305.8 32100 
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Club Level Term (WPct) 
Coefficient Std Error 
Squared Term (WPct)"^ 
Coefficient Std Error 
Leeds United 70761.4 13200 -49990.2 20000 
Leicester City 68099.7 22200 -68214.7 42100 
Leyton Orient 13428.5 10700 -10167.8 18100 
Liverpool 136785 23400 -102483 28900 
Luton Town - 49347.6 6394 -50172.8 11200 
Manchester City 154231 10100 -135405 15000 
Manchester United 180911 16200 -150696 25800 
Mansfield Town 28904.2 4467 -20684 7188 
Middlesbrough 56931.5 53600 -52251.9 11300 
Millwall 44384.3 9219 -24585.7 14300 
Newcastle United 98231.1 8456 -68258.4 11700 
Northampton 9004.5 2201 -1498.9 3097 
Norwich 61163.9 4777 -44073.5 7990 
Nottingham Forest 85400.7 19700 -77504.3 28200 
Notts Co 45575.1 4840 -49140.6 9042 
Oldham Athletic 35456.8 9684 -21082.5 15000 
Oxford United 29716.2 12100 -27800.4 21700 
Peterborough United 10899.8 6259 -5903.5 10600 
Plymouth 25480.6 6251 -6841.2 10800 
Portsmouth 54651.3 20900 -35257.3 26000 
Port Vale 23471.6 6229 -7676.1 6807 
Preston North End 27186.4 4866 -11836.2 9167 
Queens Park Rangers 70828.7 7229 -56549.8 11300 
Reading 18358.5 5935 -5878.2 7487 
Rochdale 8irA6 2581 -3672.0 4631 
Rotherham 28818.5 7461 -18379.6 13500 
Scunthorpe 7232.2 2562 -2796.6 4410 
Sheffield United 80964.4 8900 -49694.2 17300 
Sheffield Wednesday 98982.3 40900 -110118 76500 
Shrewsbury Town 27602.6 3963 -28849.2 7295 
Southampton 81015.7 8832 -68207.4 13800 
Southend United 33085.2 5665 -31709.7 9146 
Stockport 28855.8 7839 -25353.9 10800 
Stoke City 47463.5 9616 -19322.8 17100 
Sunderland 85916.8 14800 -64604.4 21000 
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Club Level Term (WPct) Squared Term (WPct)'^ 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Swansea 45704.2 12600 -38010.2 12900 
Swindon Town 48443.8 7498 -28683.9 8478 
Torquay United 5949.6 3536 -3429.4 6931 
Tottenham 114637 18700 -86325.1 31900 
Tranmere Rovers 18072.9 5889 -18205.8 10100 
Walsall 26293.2 2972 -17740.3 4356 
Watford 88542.2 16900 -79914.5 26100 
West Bromwich Albion 58968 12600 -26392.3 19000 
West Ham United 81526.2 10400 -50525.7 16600 
Wigan Athletic 26699 7169 -16647.7 8952 
Wimbledon 94691.6 82900 -248022 182000 
Wolverhampton 54118.2 17500 -24466.6 33000 
Wrexham 21789.3 15300 -15212.5 25800 
York 9676.9 2534 -3194.1 3886 
Table 5.26: Team Sensitivities 
Variable Aston Birm Black- Black- Bourne- Brad-
Alder shot Arsenal Villa Bamsley City bum pool Bolton mouth ford ford Brighton 
WPct 21449.5t 141116* 141207+ 40017.7+ 73006.8+ 36528.9+ 25534.6+ 74356.9 21700.2+ 59411.4+ 25103.4+ 92932.2+ 
(4627) (5.02E+04) (8.03E4-04) (2.21E-t-04) (1.80E4-04) (2.19E4-04) (6764) (9735) (3694) (1.71E4-04) (7938) (9154) 
WPct^ -15158.7t -145562+ -103652 -44123.6 -60110+ -24004.7 -17645.1+ -53468.5 -11254.7 -51504.5+ -10149.2 -84248.2+ 
(6752) (8.02E+04) (1.15E-I-05) (3.52E+04) (2.72E+04) (3.42E4-04) (8523) (1.61E4-04) (6926) (2.37E-t-04) (1.13E-H04) (1.20E4-04) 
Divl -7328.79 -8776.56+ -8777.38+ -10280.9 -8229* -1424.43 
(1.06E+04) (4627) (2443) (2678) -3254.51+ (2215) (911) 
Div2 -14728.3+ -2116.54 -11832.7 (485.9) -14027.1+ -1675 
(6041) (1275) (4004) -4008.25+ (2662) (1341) 
DivZ -1803.6* -2804.84+ -16835.5 (553.7) -13776.3+ -7381.64+ 
(438.8) (1461) (5237) 1319.85 (3318) (2427) 
PRO 38198.1+ 12317.1+ 16925.5+ 729.84 9064.41 (1082) 3523.62 4322.99+ 
(1.12E-H04) (5819) (6891) (638.7) (5155) 2208.78+ (2602) (1405) 
REL -1637.03 -4860.07 -1662.13 -7190.49 149.80 2339.34 (788.6) 6586.7+ 
(1306) (4774) (4315) (6791) (1006) (2713) (1681) 
t -789.28+ -725.77 -1717.51 484.85+ -2034.73+ 554.26+ -285.45+ -1204.62 212.16+ -515.69+ -1761.77+ 
(147) (828) (1164) (161.8) (464) (131.4) (118.9) 5(40.6) (97.39) (146.9) (265) 
50.61* 43.85 55.35+ 87.31+ 11.40+ 50.56 -3.29 16.72+ 40.20+ 
(11.23) (32.98) (31.8) (13.98) (3.85) (21.59) (16.79) (5.04) (9.41) 
CHAMP 12962.7 12819.8 20925.9+ 
(1.23E4-04) (1.57E4-04) (7646) 
R^ 0.95 0.65 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.87 0.95 0.82 0.96 
AR(LM) 0.01 1.23 0.12 0.23 2.75 0.53 0.01 1.74 0.53 0.55 0.25 0.59 
DW 2.07 2.08 2.03 2.03 2.8 2.1 2.02 1.86 1.76 2.2 2.15 1.91 
Hetero 0.24 0.33 0.12 0.19 0.12 1.17 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.93 0.42 0.37 
Normality 2.16 3.73 4.24 0.93 4.34 3.12 1.76 2.09 3.86 2.55 0.10 2.13 
RESET 0.23 0.48 0.28 4.35 2.01 1.09 0.22 2.28 0.22 0.97 0.09 13 
I 
s 
i 
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Table 5.27: Team Sensitivities (Regression Coefficients) (a) 
Variable Bristol 
City 
Bristol 
Rovers Burnley Bury Cambridge Cardiff Carlisle 
Charlton 
Athletic Chelsea 
Chester-
field Coventry 
CYeiue 
Variable 
WPct 72671.7* 29860.7* 21803.6* 21555.4* 20132* 19353.4* 12051.2* 63372.9* 96112.9* 13951.5* 60769.2* 10848.7* 
(3.35E+04) (1951) (1.18E-f04) -1724 -2807 -3880 -3918 -2907 -2.59E-f-04 -4090 -1.89E-1-04 -5238 
WPcfi 
-84299.4 -22317.9* -6078.85 -13862.4* -16250.1* -2124.93 -3213.91 -57304.4* -69948.8* -3771.81 -33524.4 -9718.42 
(6.50E+04) (3664) (2.14E+04) -2604 -5568 -5512 -6129 -4989 -3.34E+04 -6318 -3.48E4-04 -1.10E4-04 
Divl -7817.91 -4353.07* -7921.03* -12199.7* 5599.7 
(4832) -399.1 -4298 -3092 -5046 
Div2 -1365.14 -1478.67* -3716.79* -2513.53* -2368.15* -3502.71* -595.68 -7260.08* 
(4889) (338.1) (1179) -297.5 -392.8 -800.2 -528.9 -1127 
DivS -2934.29* -4111.66* -3574.26* -2633.76* -6404.09* -899.82 
(553.1) (1768) -332.4 -366.8 -959.2 -561.9 
PRO 16113.3t 1799.72* 6854.36 3076* 2209.72* 13026.6 5930.62 
(8777) (1037) (4964) -1323 -1147 -1.64E-I-04 -4828 
REL -21911.8t 1499.8* -6522.18* 732.24* 948.32* 5258.41* -254.49 2201.39 
(9146) (474.2) (3591) -338.1 -507.6 -665.5 -1.01E4-04 -1613 
t -591.34* 196.41* -221.58* -164.79* -177.21 -114.56 -1371.25* -2102.75* -280.25* -1281.86* -64.66 
(65.04) (65.55) -38.34 -58.74 -176.8 -104 -71.04 -762 -125.4 -327.2 -162.2 
24.23* 7.82* 7.43* 14.04* 4.57 64.50* 95.92* 9.40* 58.87* 1.24 
(2.417) -1.34 -1.95 -5.62 -3.42 -2.3 -20.42 -4.36 -12.37 -10.11 
CHAMP 
0.93 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.97 0.92 0.76 0.97 0.93 0.73 0.88 0.97 
AR{LM) 1.98 1.34 0.04 1.09 2.76 1.42 0.02 0.15 0.12 2.05 2.89 0.54 
DW 1.49 2.16 1.9 2.62 2.76 1.31 1.76 1.83 1.86 1.46 2.15 1.6 
Hetero 0.54 0.31 0.10 0.24 0.31 1.08 0.22 0.98 0.57 0.84 0.14 0.99 
Normality 3.23 1.27 0.53 2.26 3.2 0.53 1.44 0.19 3.28 4.25 1.7 0.94 
RESET 3.90 1.00 1.53 1.19 0.89 2.29 0.12 0.71 8.33 4.88 0.02 0 
i 
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Table 5.28; Team Sensitivities (Regression Coefficients) (b) 
Variable Crystal Exeter Gill- Hartle- Hudders- Hull Ipswich Leeds 
Palace Derby Everton City Fulham Grimsby ingham pool field City Town Utd 
Variable 
WPct 67418* 75181.5* 89930.4* 12996.9* 40431.4* 19619.9* 25498.6* 16427.1* 23597.9 16427* 61596.5* 70761.4* 
-3.17E+04 -1.75E+04 -4.55E4-04 -3974 -7748 -1.06E4-04 -4813 -2744 -1.83E-t-04 -6202 -2.17E-t-04 -1.32E-t-04 
WPct^ -24782.2 -50412.5 -58885.2 -7734.69 -31723* -6046.6 -17136.6* -13961.5* -33990.6 -2160.07 -33305.8 -49990.2* 
-5.10E+04 -3.56E+04 -7.17E4-04 -7311 -1.12E4-04 -1.83E4-04 -8161 -4209 -3.39E-t-04 -8854 -3.21E+04 -2.00E-f-04 
Divl -8139.62* -9649.56* -4508.24* 2025.28* -4377.57* -9928.87* 
-2988 -2327 -2396 -863.8 -2424 -1635 
Div2 -13133.1* -7256.34* -1219.01 
-4193 -2483 -995.6 
DivZ -1010.82* -9170.91* -1054.45 -1169.37* 
-250.7 -2437 -1129 -337.6 
PRO 9983.03' -189.47 1616.82 11266.4* 3851.18* 2660.84 1151.43 24076.7* 6770.16 9778.51* 
-5383 -4775 -1124 -4644 -1690 -1632 -719.4 -1.20E4-04 -6243 -4956 
REL 2670.85 219.494 -2808.37* 2576.96* -16638.8* -1910.27 5244.89 
-4458 -374 -1149 -1427 -8627 -1345 -3683 
t -1900.52* -839.06 -1195.92 -117.07+ -263 -409.34* -575.70* -231.68* 297.68 -435.54* -1382.75* 208.71 
-510.3 -533.8 -850.1 -65.93 -363.7 -165.9 -140.4 -49.21 -220.3 -210 -427.2 -438 
(2 73.76* 45,96* 64.00* 5.60* 15.63 14.61* 22.64* 9.14* 18.51* 59.45* 17.24 
-17.72 -18.42 -28.67 -2.11 -14.14 -5.83 -5.49 -1.8 -8.1 -13.89 -15.14 
CHAMP 5298.21 
-1.06E4-04 
0.92 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.98 0.91 0.92 0.79 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.97 
AR(LM) 3.33 0.46 3.43 0.89 2.1 0.74 1.64 1.25 1.05 2.51 0.28 0.1 
DW 1.41 1.83 2.41 2.01 2.01 1.87 2.32 1.83 2.64 2.35 2.19 1.74 
Hetero 0.53 0.46 0.15 0.26 0.5 0.47 0.03 0.38 0.13 0.06 0.15 
Normality 0.77 5.06 3.44 0.93 0.11 1.3 0.74 1.19 0.84 1.79 1.46 1.42 
RESET 1.67 2.4 3.18 1.35 2.34 8.08 1.56 1.66 0.89 1.45 0.34 0.61 
I I 
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Table 5.29: Team Sensitivities (Regression Coefficients) (c) 
Variable Leicester Leyton Luton Manchester Middles- Newcastle North-
City Orient Liverpool Town City Utd Mansfield brough Millwall Utd ampton Nortuick 
Variable 
WPct 68099.7* 13428.5 136785* 49347.6* 154231* 180911* 28904.2* 56931.5 44384.3* 98231.1* 9004.51* 61163.9* 
-2.22E+04 -1.07B+04 -2.34E4-04 -6394 -l .OlE+04 -1.62E4-04 -467 -5.36E-f-04 -9219 -8456 -2201 -4777 
WPcfi 
-68214.7 -10167.8 -102483* -50172.8* -135405* -150696* -20684* -52251.9 -24585.7* -68258.4* -1498.91 -44073.5* 
-4.21E+04 -1.81E+04 -2.89E4-04 -1.12E+04 -1.50E-f04 -2.58E+04 -188 -1.13E+05 -1.43E+04 -1.17E+04 -3097 -7990 
Divl 1987.99 -1645.36* -3328.3* -11995.9* -9459.96* -7970.62* -4110.79* 
-3706 -617 -1172 -5585 -1927 -1269 -853.1 
Div2 -3604.89* -2698.21* -4321.78+ -3271.54* -19151.5* -11053.3* 
-1323 -1039 -2518 -732.9 -9045 -1955 
Div^ -4028.96* -2748.72 -4908.28* -1400.24* 
-1568 -2076 -748.6 -364.9 
PRO 15995.5 8941.58* 30.61 13505.1 2460.55* 7176.97* 
-9593 -2948 -631.3 -2.07E-t-04 -3066 -2608 
REL -8764.48 -1821.49 2028.35* -6234.15 3491.74* 6444.16* 2679.63* 
-9380 -1914 -384.7 -8297 -1446 -2302 -1183 
t -1120.58t 448.88* -1058.38* -2628.1* -2219.84* -312.10* 1021.04 -131.76 -1434.08* 89.09* -659.18* 
-511.9 -256.8 -506.9 -258.6 -411.5 -3.46 -984 -175.2 -280.9 -20.84 -105.9 
<2 55.1385* -10.91 39.90* 99.21* 93.29* 11.20* -34.3793 10.15* 75.49* 30.93* 
-20.37 -8.19 -15.98 -9.31 -18 -0.4 -37.41 -6.01 -10.82 -4.47 
CHAMP 3034.81 
-4998 
0.83 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.79 0.9 
AR{LM) 0.27 2.22 0.86 0.38 0.05 0.28 0.39 1.16 0.02 3.59 0.26 1.52 
DW 1.71 2.3 2.38 2.12 1.85 2.1 1.63 1.86 1.81 1.92 2.14 2.31 
Hetero 2.89 0.27 0.57 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.4 1 0.33 
Normality 4.72 0.06 0.53 3.28 0.21 1.04 0.88 2.62 2.75 1.87 1.31 1.29 
RESET 0.11 1.13 0.77 4.31 0.38 0.77 4.29 0.02 0.87 8.95 0.51 0.97 
0 
"v 
i Ox 
i 
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Table 5.30; Team Sensitivities (Regression CoefEcients) (d) 
Variable Nottingham Notts Peter- Port Preston 
Forest Co Oxford borough Argyle Vale NE QPR Reading Rochdale 
Variable 
WPct 85400.7% 45575.1* 35456.8* 29716.2* 10899.8* 25480.6* 54651.3* 23471.6* • 27186.4* 70828.7* 18358.5* 8177.57* 
-1.97E+04 -4840 -9684 -1.21E+04 -6259 -6251 2.09E+04 6229 4866 7229 5935 2581 
WPd? -77504.3% -49140.6* -21082.5 -27800.4 -5903.46 -6841.15 -35257.3 -7676.12 -11836.2 -56549.8* -5878.21 -3671.99 
-2.82E+04 -9042 -1.50E+04 -2.17E+04 -1.06E-I-04 -1.08E-I-04 2.60E4-04 6807 9167 1.13E4-04 7487 4631 
Divl -15511.7* -1693.93* -5905.98* -1268.17 -4540.37 -5664.62* 
-4992 -780.4 -1535 -1123 4054 956.1 
Div2 -3364.95* -7804.26* -2777.73* -1692.4* -3954.77* -8302.46 -3706.39* -1269.64* -12982.3* -1596.5* 
-969.1 -1667 -1282 -725.6 -664 4874 864.3 471.7 2699 713.5 
Div3 -1239.61 -6495.86* -5981.96* -1621.3 
-955.2 -1003 1367 1579 
PRO 10600.6* 5791.21* 11166* 9323.38* 4094.85* 1153.38 5336.9* 1982.52 4118.72* 
-5050 -2318 -3686 -3895 -1391 -1693 3021 1889 2333 
REL -609.67 -4225.17* 2380.59* 1798.74* -2922.74 -1494.24* 2453.24 
-3605 -1847 -866.9 -934.7 4363 786.3 1732 
t -1019.96* -83.88 45.92 -19.77 98.73* -264.67* -606.17 -112.82 -692.16* -1345.11* -407.08* -174.76* 
-551 -141.7 -72.55 -55.43 -35.15 -136.4 553 230.3 111.5 253.8 201 86.42 
(2 63.22* 1.93 11.77* 27.57 3.04 32.16* 56.29* 23.34* 7.10* 
-21.88 -4.89 -5.01 17.31 7.13 4.05 10.35 8.63 2.94 
CHAMP 30887* 
-1.04E+04 
R^ 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.83 
AR{LM) 0.71 0.3 0.38 0.07 5.04 1.34 0.74 1.00 2.13 2.61 1.40 0.87 
DW 1.73 2.1 2.11 2.09 2.8 1.45 2.26 2.16 1.65 2.53 1.33 1.60 
Hetero 1.25 0.32 0.23 0.33 0.03 0.12 0.39 1.86 0.16 0.64 0.56 0.12 
Normality 0.39 1.35 1.71 0.3 0.15 0.59 2.60 1.00 3.08 1.69 0.54 0.58 
RESET 0.33 0.06 1.35 0 0.01 3.81 3.04 0.30 0.01 0.02 1.36 0.55 
i 
px 
S 
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Table 5.31: Team Sensitivities (Regression Coefficients) (e) cn 
Variable Rother- Scun- Sheffield Sheffield Shrews- South- Southend Stoke Sunder- Swansea Swindon 
ham thorpe Utd Wed bury Utd Stockport City land City Town 
Variable 
WPct 28818.5* 7232.23* 80964.4* 98982.3* 27602.60* 81015.7* 33085.2* 28855.8* 47463.5* 85916.8* 45704.2* 48443.8* 
7461 2562 8900 4.09E4-04 3963 8832 5665 7839 9616 1.48E+04 1.26B+04 7498 
WPct^ -18379.6 -2796.57 -49694.2* -110118 -28849.20* -68207.4* -31709.7* -25353.9* -19322.8 -64604.4* -38010.2* -28683.9* 
1.35E+04 4410 1.73E4-04 7.65E-t-04 7295 1.38E4-04 9146 1.08E4-04 1.71E-f04 2.10E4-04 1.29B-I-04 8478 
Divl -9838.27* -10037.2 -1809.5 -2880.4* -1872.64 -3251.2* -8193.38* 
1171 7263 1558 1451 1728 887.2 2468 
Div2 -3719.15* 99.35 -11962.9* -8469.04 -966.95* -2960.04* -2373.4* -2929.55 -5737.19* -10476.4* 
663.3 394.5 1785 7957 423.7 470.2 867 2124 881.3 2421 
Div3 -3945.14* -15550.1* -1017.75 -3613.1* -4974.81* -6474.97* -14356.5* 
1044 3893 749.9 472.3 1239 1107 2432 
PRO 1682.01 1739.45 64716.3 4951.88* 4322.56* 2718.34 
1432 1992 5.60E-t-04 1423 1102 1806 4202.17* 
REL 1006.56 -199.22 4987.03* 591.97 1061.36* 2209 
768.5 381.80 1933 408 498 6105.44* -2783.89 1844.6 
t -254.36t -51.90 -1134.08* -296.10* -912.06* -498.74* -14.00 1997 2168 992.3* 
144.9 64.34 204.7 76.57 172.4 92.06 60.24 -662.50* -933.32* -1351.64* 38.83 
(2 6.54 3.31 43.98* 8.20* 27.28* 18.97* 244.2 537 161.4 38.2 
4.98 2.23 7.03 2.83 5.88 3.11 20.45* 32.45 40.18* 
CHAMP 7.74 23.01 5.08 
0.93 0.85 0.91 0.85 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.83 0.96 0.94 0.94 
AR{LM) 2.37 1.44 0.43 0.22 0.05 1.63 0.30 2.15 0.24 1.51 1.09 0.52 
DW 1.40 2.49 1.86 2.03 2.07 1.43 1.96 1.61 1.68 1.5 2.55 2.27 
HeteTo 0.26 0.73 0.54 0.18 1.21 0.22 0.71 0.63 0.34 0.08 2.81 0.03 
Normality 1.28 0.34 1.26 0.04 0.50 2.62 1.82 1.10 0.92 0.04 1.82 2.16 
RESET 0.03 4.32 2.39 0.55 10.59 0.88 0.49 0.20 0.97 2.83 3.08 2.25 
i 
I 
Cn 
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Table 5.32: Team Sensitivities (Regression Coefficients) (f) S? 
Variable Torquay Totten- Tranmere West Ham Wigan Wolver- York 
Utd /tam Rovers Walsall Watford WBA Utd Athletic Wimbledon hampton Wrexham City 
Variable 
WPct 5949.58t 114637* 18072.9* 26293.2* 88542.2* 58968* 81526.2* 26699 94691.6 54118.2* 21789.3 9676.89* 
3536 1.87E+04 5889 2972 1.69E4-04 1.26E4-04 1.04E4-04 7169 8.29E-t-04 1.75E4-04 1.53E4-04 2534 
WPcfi -3429.36 -86325.1* -18205.8* -17740.3* -79914.5* -26392.3 -50525.7* -16647.7 -248022 -24466.6 -15212.5 -3194.06 
6931 3.19E-f04 l.OlE+04 4356 2.61E+04 1.90E+04 1.66E-t-04 8952 1.82E-I-05 3.30E4-04 2.58E+04 3886 
Divl -7694.16* -1944.47 -18839 -14095.4* 
1672 1709 1.26E+04 3726 
Div2 -1774.73* -4099.52* -4110.23* -2586.96 -22458.4* 
701.6 663.8 2328 2298 5150 
DivZ -3517.17* -4763.89* -3182.31 -23467.6* -449.10* 
858.6 658.4 2092 4604 243.4 
PRO 6146.4* 13334.1* 9342.62* 84.05 66014.4 5059.6 2950.72 2538.87* 
2900 4156 2431 933.3 4.90E4-04 5495 3723 971.9 
REL 1167.09* 6608.3* 3862.59* 4080.4* 1606.74 -53841.8 -2370.65 392.44 
455 2870 1517 1528 1416 4.25E-I-04 1919 363 
t 38.16 -1377.23* 184.59* -20.32 -1564.85* -1556.57* -1358.23* -579.46 3242.28 646.55* -561.76 -126.85* 
25.36 254 46.49 20.35 435 260.4 237.2 190.8 2281 189.6 357.3 55.5 
56.20* 56.21* 58.14* 57.05* 22.69 -80.45 18.53 5.52* 
8.66 14.77 8.69 8.24 6.39 69.62 11.68 1.88 
CHAMP 
0.60 0.85 0.97 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.86 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.94 
AR(LM) 0.06 0.07 1.50 0.58 0.06 0.51 1.18 0.80 1.96 0.64 1.93 1.44 
DW 2.09 1.85 1.84 2.09 2.1 2.15 1.59 2.01 2.76 1.73 2.53 1.46 
Hetero 0.65 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.45 0.80 0.24 0.06 0.15 
Normality 5.72 4.55 2.62 1.38 2.66 0.03 0.61 6.81 0.39 5.97 2.21 0.68 
RESET 1.96 1.63 3.73 0.39 2.31 3.11 0.03 0.00 1.68 0.14 19.45 0.09 
0 
'T3 
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Table 5.33; Team Sensitivities (Regression CoefEcients) (g) 
Chapter 6 
Television Viewership 
6.1 Introduction 
The most fundamental issue in the study of the economics of sport is the 'uncer-
tainty of outcome' hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the greater the un-
certainty of outcome of a sporting event, the greater the demand^. Sports leagues 
have consistently justified competitive restraints on the grounds that they permit 
resource distribution, which in turn promotes outcome uncertainty and thereby 
benefits the consumer by providing a more attractive league product. Sports 
leagues are, on the face of it, cartels^. Agreements among the clubs to restrain 
economic competition, such as salary caps, roster limits, draft rules, transfer fee 
systems or agreements to share income, from ticket sales, broadcasting or merchan-
dising would in any other context be prohibited. Yet such agreements have been 
accepted by the courts^ and even encouraged by the legislature'^, largely on the 
basis of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. 
There exists a substantial economics literature aimed at testing the hypothesis 
by relating game attendance to some ex ante measure of uncertainty. Such studies 
^The earliest statements of this hypothesis are to be found in Rottenberg (1956) and Neale 
(1964). 
^According to Fort & Quirk (1995) "Professional team sports leagues are classic, even textbook, 
examples of business cartels". 
^For a brief review of court cases in the US and Europe see Szymanski (2003), p. 1178-1181; 
for a more detailed review of US case history see Weiler & Roberts (1998). 
^For example, the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act in the US permitted collective selling of 
broadcast rights by a league, while in Germany, parliament amended the competition act to 
exempt collective selling of football rights after the courts ruled collective selling anticompetitive. 
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are fraught with difficulty for a number of reasons. First, since the majority of 
attendees are fans of the home team, they presumably demand a strong probability 
that their team will win, and so home team demand may well be decreasing in the 
uncertainty of outcome, at least over a significant range of the data. Second, it 
is often hard to disentangle the quality of the two teams from the balance of the 
competition, and therefore hard to identify the true impact of outcome uncertainty. 
Third, game attendance is often determined by factors that have little to do with 
the outcome uncertainty of the game in question; for example season-ticket owners 
are likely to be committed to attending regardless of the current balance between 
the opposing teams. Fourth, many games in the major leagues are sold out and 
therefore observed demand cannot be explained by outcome uncertainty. 
In this paper we adopt a novel approach that evades these problems and there-
fore offers a more plausible estimate of the impact of outcome uncertainty on de-
mand. Instead of using game attendance we use TV viewing figures, so that all 
else equal, supporters of the away team are as capable of viewing the match as 
supporters of the home team^. Furthermore, we use viewing data measured on a 
minute-by-minute basis throughout the game. This allows us to control for game-
specific factors, such as the quality of the teams, while examining the effect on 
demand of the evolving outcome uncertainty of the game. To do this we estimate 
the probability of each possible result (a home win, an away win, a no-score draw 
or a score draw®) conditional on the current score at each minute of the game, each 
team's form and red cards'^. We examine three measures of outcome uncertainty; 
1. The squared difference between the probability of the home team winning 
and the away team winning. 
2. The probability of draws. 
®In the US there are often TV blackouts of home games within a certain radius of the locale 
of the home team. This is to encourage attendance at the stadium. Some home fans may have 
restricted opportunities to watch on TV. However there is no local area blackout in English soccer. 
For further information on how blackouts may affect attendance see Siegfried & Hinshaw (1979), 
Welki & Zlatoper (1999) and Putsis & Sen (2000). 
®No-score draws are where neither team scores; score draws are where both teams score the 
same number of goals. 
^Only red cards are included in the regression. When a red card is issued, the offending 
player is expelled from the game and his team must play on with one less player which could 
make it easier for the full-strength team to score. Yellow cards have very little impact as the 
offending player is only warned and not dismissed. There exists some statistical evidence that 
the probability of a card being issued increases for losing teams. However the instances of red 
cards in our sample is small enough to not merit concern for card engogeneity to score. 
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3. The sum of squared deviations from the initial probabilities. 
We find that viewership is decreasing in the first of these measures, so that a 
more even game, in the sense that either side could win, attracts more viewers. This 
result is consistent with the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. However, we also 
find that viewership is decreasing in the probability of draw, suggesting that viewers 
are averse to watching games that are expected to end in a stalemate. Lastly, we 
find some evidence to support the proposition that viewership is increasing in 
the deviation of outcome probabilities during the game from the initial outcome 
probabilities (i.e., those at the start of the game), suggesting that viewers are 
attracted to the unexpected. 
To the extent that we can generalise from the case of the English Premier 
League, these results significantly enhance our understanding of the relationship 
between demand and uncertainty in sport. Leagues have consistently pleaded the 
need to maintain competitive balance among teams as a justification for restraints 
on economic competition in the labour market and in the product market (e.g. 
collective selling of rights). While this justification is intuitively appealing, the 
precise kind of uncertainty that is desirable has proved difficult to articulate. Our 
results do not support the idea that simply evening up resources among teams will 
improve the attractiveness of games; much depends on the predictability of the 
contests that the leagues create. In the next Section we describe the data and 
summary statistics, Section 6.3 summarises previous research. Section 6.4 defines 
the methodology and the estimation models and Section 6.5 displays the results. 
Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Data 
6.2.1 Description 
Television ratings data were collected for 248 English F.A. Premiership matches 
broadcast on television between 1 January 2002 and 15 May 2005. Data on audi-
ence size were estimates made by the Broadcasters' Audience Research Board Ltd. 
(BARB)®. Supplemental television information was collected from the Monopolies 
®BARB obtains viewing estimates from a panel of viewers who have all their television sets 
electronically monitored by a device called a peoplemeter. The peoplemeter collects information 
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and Merger Commission (1999) report. Individual match data for all Premiership 
games including team fixtures, positions, goals scored and red cards were taken 
from the Rothmans Football Yearbooks^ and www.soccerbase.com^°. Actual match 
kick-off times and injury minutes played were supplied by PA Sport. 
The tables below list summary statistics for average TV Ratings, goals scored 
and the distribution of goals, which give a brief overview about how most games 
progress, the most common types of scores and how soon a goal is scored. 
Averages 
Number Total Goals Scored 
of Games TV Goal All All Score 
Season Broadcast^ Rating^ Difference Games Draws Draws Wins 
2002* 30 1.79 1.60 2.80 2.41 
2003 65 2.45 1.37 2.88 2.59 2.93 1.83 
2004 66 2.44 1.15 2.67 1.90 3.16 3.00 
2005 87 2.21 . 1.13 2.41 1.82 3.00 2^8 
* Games between 1 January and 11 May 2002. 
^Does not include Prem-Plus or pay-per-view. 
^ A TV Rating is the percentage of people watching that program out of the television 
population. 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Premiership Games Broadcast 2002-2005 
Table 6.1 lists averages for the TV ratings, goal differences, and total goals 
scored for the games broadcast between January 2002 and May 2005. The average 
goal difference has declined through the sample and this corresponds to the decline 
in the total number of goals scored in draws, which indicates that no-score draws 
are becoming more common. Table 6.2 gives a summary of match outcomes in 
our sample. The most common outcome is a win by one goal (43.6% of games). 
The second and third most common outcomes are a win by two goals (18.6%) and 
a score draw (18.1%). These outcomes have higher TV ratings on average than 
the other games indicating that close games that have a winner appear to attract 
higher audiences on average. The 'high' average TV rating for the no-score draw is 
misleading as many of the games that end in no-score draws are games that involve 
'big' teams (e.g. Manchester United and Liverpool) playing each other. The high 
TV rating (as shown later) is largely due to higher initial numbers of viewers tuning 
in to watch which tends to remain stable throughout the game. If we exclude these 
'large showdowns', the average TV rating for a no-score draw drops to 2.04. 
We present Table 6.3 to demonstrate our smaller sample of match outcomes 
for televised matches between 2002 and 2005 closely follows the outcomes of all 
about what channel and programme the viewer is watching and feeds the information back to 
BARB overnight. On January 1, 2002, BARB revised its viewer panel to correct for dispropor-
tionate demographics, improve geographic representation and to increase panel controls. Since 
our panel starts from 1 January 2002, all of our TV ratings measurements are compiled using the 
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Number % o/ Average 
Result of Games Total TV Rating 
No-score Draw 20 8.196 2.58* 
Score Draw 45 18.1% 2.35 
Home Win by 1 goal 61 24.6% 2j# 
Home Win by 2 goals 29 11.7% 2.21 
Home Win by 3 goals 7 2.8% 2.08 
Home Win by 4 goals 5 2.0% 1.85 
Home Win by 5 goals 3 1.2% 2.10 
Home Win by 6 goals 1 0.4% 1.21 
Away Win by 1 goal 47 19.0% 2^9 
Away Win by 2 goals 17 6.9% 2.40 
Away Win by 3 goals 5 2.0% 1.86 
Away Win by 4 goals 6 2.4% 2.21 
Away Win by 5 goals 2 0.8% 1.84 
* Almost half of these were 'big' matches or derby matches. 
Excluding those matches, the average was 2.04. 
Table 6.2: Summary of Match Outcomes for Games Broadcast 2002-2005 
Number ^ 0 / 
Result of Games Total 
No-score Draw 458 8.83% 
Score Draw 977 18.84% 
Home Win by 1 goal 1178 22.72% 
Home Win by 2 goals 694 13.38% 
Home Win by 3 goals 304 5.86% 
Home Win, by 4 goals 126 2.43% 
Home Win by 5 goals 54 1.04% 
Home Win by 6 goals 14 0jl7% 
Home Win by 7 goals 3 0.06% 
Home Win by 8 goals 1 0.02% 
Home Win by 9 goals 1 0.02% 
Away Win by 1 goal 802 15.46% 
Away Win by 2 goals 374 7.21% 
Away Win by 3 goals 129 2.49% 
Away Win by 4 goals 53 1.02% 
Away Win by 5 goals 12 0.23% 
Away Win by 6 goals 5 0.10% 
Away Win by 7 goals 1 0.02% 
Games=5186 
Table 6.3: Summary of Match Outcomes for Premiership 1993-2005 
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Premiership games between 1993 and 2005, both televised and non-televised. Thus 
we can be confident that our sample does not have a biased or skewed set of 
outcomes that deviates from the average outcome distribution. 
First Goal Cumulative 
Within Minute Percent 
Within 
Timeband 
Absolute 
Percent 
5 11.4% 1--5 11.4% 
10 25.0% 6- 10 13.6% 
15 32.9% 11--15 7.9% 
20 39.9% 16--20 7.0% 
25 46.9% 21--25 7.0% 
30 53.9% 26^  -30 7.0% 
35 61.0% 31--35 7.0% 
40 67.5% 36--40 6.6% 
45 73.7% 41--45 6.196 
50 76.8% 46--50 3.19% 
55 79.4% 51--55 2.6% 
60 82.5% 56--60 3.196 
65 87.3% 61--65 4.8% 
70 917% 66--70 4.4% 
75 95.2% 71--75 3.59% 
80 96.5% 76--80 1.39% 
85 9&9% 81--85 0.4% 
90 100.0% 86--90 3.196 
Gaines=228 
Table 6.4: Distribution and Frequency of First Goal Scored for Games Broadcast 
2002-2005 
Table 6.4 and Figure 6.1 depict when the first goal of a game is typically scored 
in games that were not no-score draws. Over half of all first goals scored occurred 
within the first 30 minutes of the game. This demonstrates that most games which 
have a non-zero score are not 0-0 stalemates throughout most of the period of the 
match. Table 6.5 and Figure 6.2 reflect the entire distribution of "first goals" for 
the Premiership between 1993 and 2005. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 depict the timebands when goals are scored as well as how 
many goals occur during a given timeband. Goals occur uniformly throughout the 
game, so there is no one time period that appears to have more goals occurring 
within it than another time period. 
Given the summary statistics and the distribution of goals, we can be fairly 
certain that our small sample closely represents all the games that have occurred 
in the Premiership since 1993. We find no abnormalities or skewed distributions 
that might bias the panel sample we employ for viewing behaviour. 
latest BARB methodology. 
®Now published as the Sky Sports Football Yearbook. 
^°An extensive football database that supplies betting and match result information to The 
Racing Post, The Mirror, The Sunday Mirror, The People and the Belfast Newsletter. 
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2005 
First Goal Cumulative Within Absolute 
Within Minute Percent Timeband Percent 
5 10.6% 1-5 10.6% 
10 21.9% 6-10 11.2% 
15 31.7% 11-15 9.9% 
20 41.2% 16-20 9.4% 
25 49.0% 21-25 7.9% 
30 56.1% 26-30 7.0% 
35 62.6% 31-35 6.6% 
40 68.8% 36-40 6.2% 
45 74.8% 41-45 6.0% 
50 78.5% 46-50 3.7% 
55 82.8% 51-55 4.2% 
60 86.3% 56-60 3.6% 
65 89.4% 61-65 3.0% 
70 92.1% 66-70 2.7% 
75 94.5% 71-75 2.4% 
80 96.8% 76-80 2.3% 
85 98.2% 81-85 1.3% 
90 100.0% 86-90 1.8% 
Gaines=4728 
;ribution and Frequency of First Goal Scored in Prei 
Minute Number of Absolute 
Timeband Goals Percent 
1-5 26 4.0% 
6-10 37 5.6% 
11-15 27 4.1% 
16-20 27 4.1% 
21-25 24 3.7% 
26-30 31 4.7% 
31-35 40 6.1% 
36-40 41 6.2% 
41-45 38 5.8% 
46-50 35 5.3% 
51-55 46 7.0% 
56-60 32 4.9% 
61-65 42 6.4% 
66-70 35 5.3% 
71-75 44 6.7% 
76-80 35 5.3% 
81-85 35 5.3% 
86-90 62 9.4% 
Games=228 
Table 6.6: Distribution of All Goals Scored in Games Broadcast 2002-2005 
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Minute Number of Absolute 
Timeband Goals Percent 
1 - 5 525 3.9% 
6-10 633 4.7% 
11-15 611 4.5% 
16-20 654 4.8% 
21-25 656 4.8% 
26-30 668 4.9% 
31-35 663 4.9% 
36-40 728 5.4% 
41-45 874 6.4% 
46-50 686 5.0% 
51-55 817 6.0% 
56-60 781 5.7% 
61-65 805 5.9% 
66-70 774 5.7% 
71-75 778 5.7% 
76-80 845 6.2% 
81-85 823 6.1% 
86-90 1267 9.3% 
Gaines=4728 
Table 6.7: Distribution of All Goals Scored in Premiership 1993-2005 
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of First Goal Scored in Games Broadcast 2002-2005 
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*Note: The spike in the 45th minute actually represents goals scored in injury time after the 
first half, although they are logged as having occurred in the 45th minute. 
Figure 6.2: Distribution of First Goal Scored* in Premiership 1993-2005 
6.3 Demand and Outcome Uncertainty 
6.3.1 Testing Outcome Uncertainty 
There are at least three measures of outcome uncertainty used in the literature; 
1. Match (game based measures). 
2. Seasonal/championship (measures based on the state of the championship or 
the dispersion of results within the a season). 
3. Long run (between season uncertainty, using measures of between season 
dispersion and persistence) 
The economic analysis of the relationship between demand and outcome uncer-
tainty goes back to Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964). Rottenberg (1956) first 
postulated the theory that attendance is a function of the quality of play and if 
there is a wide dispersion in quality, the contests would be more predictable thereby 
reducing attendance. Neale (1964) also noted that sport is a complex product that 
consists not only of the match itself but also the 'League-Standing Effect' where 
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utility is generated by the excitement surrounding the standings of the clubs and 
the churn of those standings. The more teams alternate league positions, the more 
exciting the championship race. 
There is a large literature dedicated to measuring the relationship between 
demand and outcome uncertainty which has focused on a variety of different leagues 
and different measures for uncertainty. Most US studies have focused on Major 
League Baseball or American Football (e.g., Knowles et al. (1992) and Welki & 
Zlatoper (1999)), whereas the majority of UK studies have centred on football (e.g. 
Peel & Thomas (1988), Baimbridge et al. (1996) and Forrest & Simmons (2002a)). 
Empirical tests have also been extended to other sports such as rugby (Peel & 
Thomas (1997)) and cricket (Hynds & Smith (1994)) as well as football in other 
countries (Falter & Perignon (2000) and Garcia & Rodriguez (2002)). Measures of 
outcome uncertainty have mostly been derived from match betting odds (Peel & 
Thomas (1988) and Peel & Thomas (1992)) or team positions (Baimbridge et al. 
(1996) and Garcia & Rodriguez (2002))^^. 
The problems in testing the relationship between demand and outcome un-
certainty centre on the choice of measures for uncertainty and demand. Forrest 
& Simmons (2002a) show that UK betting odds are biased and therefore do not 
reflect the true probabilities of the various match outcomes. They find that the 
probability of a home win may be understated while an away win is overstated^^. 
With respect to demand, almost all studies focusing on match uncertainty use the 
average gate attendance. Two problems arise when using gate attendance: (1) at-
tendance is 'censored' because of capacity constraints and (2) stadium attendance 
is mostly composed of home fans many of whom are season ticket holders. Because 
home fans usually want to see their team win and because season ticket holders 
purchase their seats in advance, these fans may be less likely to be affected by 
uncertainty of outcome. Using tobit estimations such as those in Welki & Zlatoper 
(1999) and Czarnitzski & Stadtmann (2002) gets around the first problem but not 
the second. To avoid both of these estimation issues, Forrest et al. (2005) utilise 
television audiences as a measure of demand. Television audiences are not limited 
in that those who want to watch the match can do so by viewing at home or in a 
public place such as a sports bar. Secondly, television audience is more likely to 
^'•Borland & McDonald (2003) and Szymanski (2003) provide literature surveys about these 
and other studies concerning demand and outcome uncertainty. 
^^This is known in the literature as the 'favourite-longshot bias'. See Cain, Law & Peel (2000). 
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be evenly divided between not only home and away fans, but also casual specta-
tors. Two previous American studies, Hausman & Leonard (1997) and Kanazawa 
& Funk (2001) both look into the determinants of viewership with a focus on the 
effects of superstars and race respectively, but neither investigate the effect of out-
come uncertainty on audience size. Forrest et al. (2005) do however test the effect 
of outcome uncertainty on viewership and find that although the impact is modest, 
it is a significant determinant of audience size. 
Our analysis builds on Forrest, et al. by using previously unavailable minute 
by minute audience data. By using minute by minute audience estimates we are 
able to measure the relationship between demand and outcome uncertainty as the 
match progresses. To begin building our measures of outcome uncertainty, we 
first estimate the probabilities of a home win, an away win and a draw as a game 
progresses conditional on the current score of the game. 
6.3.2 Television Ratings 
Our dataset consists of 248 matches broadcast on Sky Sports between 2002 and 
2005. The formation of the FA Premier League and the broadcasting of live matches 
by the satellite television company BSkyB were almost concurrent. In 1992 BSkyB 
outbid free-to-air television broadcasters ITV and the BBC for the exclusive rights 
to show Premiership matches and since then all Premiership matches have been 
broadcast on Sky Sports channels^^. Sky initially broadcast 60 matches out of 380 
Premiership fixtures eventually expanding the schedule to the current broadcast of 
138 matches where 88 are shown on Sky Sports 1, 2 or 3 and 50 are televised on 
Prem-Plus^^. Sky Sports channels are subscription based and only accessible via a 
satellite or cable platform. We have excluded pay-per-view programming (Prem-
Plus) since these games cost extra and viewing behaviour may be less susceptible 
to outcome uncertainty. This is something to consider for future research, however. 
The most widely used measure of demand for TV viewership is the TVR (or 
^^Initially, most matches were broadcast on Sky Sports, now known as Sky Sports 1. During 
the 1990s, the sports-dedicated channels expanded to include Sky Sports 2 (1994), Sky Sports 3 
(1996), and Sky Sports Xtra (1999). A pay-per-view channel, Premiership Plus (now known as 
Prem-Plus), was started in 2001. Sky Sports News (2000) could be counted as a sixth channel as 
it shows some highlights and interviews. 
^^See Forrest, Simmons & Szymanski (2004) for an anti-trust discussion about the restriction 
of games broadcast. 
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television viewership rating). A TVR is the percentage of viewers watching the 
program out of a potential audience, called a universe. For example, if a match has 
a rating of 2.53, this translates to 1.404 million viewers out of a terrestrial universe 
of 55.4 million^®. 
Section 6.7 provides additional definitions for television terminology. 
6.4 Methodology 
6.4.1 Stage 1 — Probability Model 
In order to derive our measures of outcome uncertainty, we need to estimate the 
probability of the four distinct match outcomes (a no-score draw, a score draw and 
a home or away win) at every minute during the game. We distinguish between 
score draws (both teams score the same number of goals) and no score draws 
(neither team scores) because the former involves significant changes in the outcome 
probability during the game (i.e. after each goal is scored), and therefore it is 
possible that demand may respond to these discrete events. We also separate no-
score and score draws because people may be turned off by a boring 0-0 stalemate, 
but entertained by a 4-4 draw. Using only one variable for a 'draw' outcome could 
compound the two effects and be misleading.^® 
We therefore construct a multinomial logit model of match outcome for each 
base our ratings on the terrestrial television universe because it is a more stable measure 
than a Sky-subscriber only universe. Since the late 1990s, Sky subscribers have been increasing 
along with the number of channels available to subscribers. If we utilised the Sky audience 
universe, it would give the impression that fewer people are watching when in reality it is the 
denominator (or universe) that is increasing. Although this will not make a difference for the 
minute by minute analysis, it could give the impression that games in 2002 were more popular 
and that audiences are in decline relative to the recent seasons. 
Additionally, the separation of draws into no-score and score draws is particularly important 
for betting pools. Before the National Lottery came into prominence in 1994, betting on the 
football pools was one of the largest and most accessible forms of gambling available in the 
United Kingdom. Every week, participants would try to select eight football matches whose 
results would maximise the bettors' points according to a specific scoring scheme. Predicting the 
score draws maximised the points received thereby increasing the chances of winning a percentage 
of the pool. In this scoring scheme, points were awarded depending if a match was a score draw, 
a no-score draw or a home or away win. In current pools betting, score draws are awarded three 
points, no-score draws receive two points and a home or away win will get one point. (Source: 
http://www.littlewoodspools.co.uk.) Pools were also important because a small percentage of the 
entry fees went to the Football Trust which distributed the money amongst the teams to help 
finance seater stadiums after the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 in which 96 fans were crushed 
during an F.A. Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. 
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minute during the match^'^. Thus we can estimate the probabihties of a win, draw 
or loss at each minute of the game given the score and other factors. While our 
viewership sample may be small relative to the number of games broadcast since 
1992, there is no reason to restrict our logit estimation. Thus we utilise the entire 
population of games ever played in the English Premiership to get a more accurate 
distribution of the various possibilities and changes that occur during the game. 
Prom its inaugural season in 1992-1993 until the end of the 2004-2005 season, there 
were 5,186 Premiership matches, which implies over 466,740 match minutes^®. The 
outcome will also be dependent on the relative strength of the two teams. We 
constructed a team 'form' variable using the average points earned per game for 
each team over the previous five games, a form variable similar to that used by 
Forrest et al. (2005)^®. We also condition the outcome on red cards^° as these 
should have an effect on the probability of a team winning. We excluded yellow 
cards on the grounds that they are likely to have a relatively small impact on the 
outcome of a game. 
A multinomial logit regression was run for each minute during a match for four 
possible outcomes (0=no-score draw, l=score draw, 2=away win, 3=home win) on 
home and away goals, home and away red cards and both the home and away team 
form. Home advantage is implicitly captured in the home win coefficient for the 
probability calculation as home teams are designated separately from away teams 
and this is apparent by the probabilities for each outcome in minute zero (See 
Minute Zero in Table 6.8). Here the home win probability is nearly twice that of 
the away team. This goes back to the home advantage Forrest & Simmons (2002a) 
Our general multinomial logit model (Greene (2000)) is the following. 
^^The statistical software STATA can run a multinomial regression for each minute by pro-
gramming the commands to repeat the regression for each group, i.e. minute. 
^®ImpHcitly there are more than 90 match minutes due to injury time. However, goals are 
recorded as occurring in the 45th or 90th minute even if they were actually scored in injury time. 
An additional form variable was also calculated based on the average number of points earned 
over the past five home games for the home team and over the past give away games for the away 
team. It could be the case that some teams do well at home but fail to succeed while playing 
away. (Although the reverse could also be true.) Calculating the 'home-team form' based on 
home games and the 'away-team form' would capture this trend. Form based on 'home' or 'away' 
games would also account for home advantage. This did not alter the probability distribution 
significantly, and we chose to use the measure based on the past five games (as opposed to the 
past five home or away games). The form variable using the five most recent games is more likely 
to capture the impact of injuries or player performance than a measure incorporating games 
potentially played more than 8 weeks prior. 
^°When a player receives a red card, he is ejected from the match and his team must play with 
one less player. 
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where j is the outcome and an x, vector of explanatory variables which consists of 
the following: 
• home goals 
• away goals 
• home team red cards 
• away team red cards 
• home team form 
• away team form 
The results correlate well with the actual match outcomes for a given score and 
at a specific minute. A sample of the probability distribution from our estimates 
is given in Table 6.8. The 'Historic Frequencies' contain the actual frequencies as 
occurred during the Premiership from the 1992-1993 season until the 2004-2005 
season. The 'Estimated Logit Probabilities' contain the probabilities based on the 
logit model. The correlations between the two are presented at the bottom of 
Table 6.8. As an example, Figure 6.3 graphs these probabilities over time where 
the 'Logit' indicates those probabilities from the logit model. The graph shows 
the correlation of the probabilities of both types of draws predicted by the model 
and the frequency as they actually occurred in the history of the Premiership for 
two equal strength clubs. Both the logit probabilities and actual frequencies for 
a no-score are highly correlated whereas there is a slight discrepancy between the 
two score-draw probabilities. 
Using these probabilities, we construct our measures of outcome uncertainty and 
test whether these have any effect on demand, as measured by television ratings. 
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Match Between Two Equal-Strength^ Teams 
Historic Premiership Frequencies Estimated LogitProbabilities 
Away Home No-Score Score Away Home No-Score Score 
Minute Win Win Draw Draw Win Win Draw Draw 
0 &265 0.458 0.088 0.188 0.259 0.461 0.0895 0.191 
1 0.265 0.457 0.089 0 J ^ 8 0.259 0.460 0.0907 0.190 
2 0.265 0.456 0.091 0.187 &258 0.460 0.0925 
3 0.266 0.453 0.093 &188 0.259 0.457 0.0945 0.190 
4 0.265 0.453 0.096 0.187 &258 0.456 0.0969 0J^9 
5 0.264 0.451 0.098 0.187 0.257 0.454 0.0991 0.190 
6 0.264 0.450 0.100 0.186 0.257 0.453 0.1014 0.188 
7 0.264 0.449 0.102 0.185, 0.257 0.452 0.1039 0.187 
8 0.262 0.447 0.106 0.186 &254 0.450 0.1070 0.189 
9 0.261 0.446 0.108 0.185 0.253 0.449 0.1095 0J88 
10 0.261 0.444 0.110 0.185 0.254 0.447 0.1116 0.187 
11 0.261 0.441 0.113 0.184 0.255 0.444 0.1144 0.187 
12 0.260 0.439 0.116 0.185 0.253 0.442 0.1175 0J^8 
13 0.259 0.438 0.119 0.184 0.252 0.441 0.1200 0.187 
14 0.259 0.437 0.121 &182 0.252 0.440 0.1229 0.186 
15 0.260 0.436 0.124 0.180 0.252 0.437 0.1258 0.185 
16 0.259 0.435 0.127 0.178 0.251 0.436 0.1285 0.185 
17 0.257 0.434 0.131 0.178 0jW9 0.434 0.1324 0.185 
18 0.256 0.431 0.135 0.178 0.248 0.431 0.1362 0.185 
19 0.256 0.429 0.138 0.178 0.247 0.428 0.1395 0.185 
20 0.256 0.424 0.141 0.179 0.247 0.423 0.1432 0.186 
21 0.253 0.423 0.145 0.179 0.245 0.421 0.1467 0.187 
22 0.252 0.422 0.149 0.177 0.245 0.419 0.1504 0.186 
23 0.252 0.421 0.152 0.175 0.244 0.417 0.1543 0.185 
24 0.252 0.419 0.156 0.173 0.245 0.415 0.1576 0.183 
25 0.252 0.416 0.160 0.172 0.243 0.413 0.1613 0.183 
26 0.251 0.416 0.164 0.169 0.242 0.412 0.1655 0.181 
27 0.251 0.414 0:168 0.167 0.241 &409 0.1699 0.180 
28 0.250 0.412 0.172 0.165 0.240 0.407 0.1743 0.179 
29 0.250 0.407 0.176 0.167 0.240 0.401 0.1786 0.180 
30 0.251 0.403 0.181 0.165 0.240 0.396 0.1832 0.180 
31 0.250 0.400 0.185 0.164 0.239 0.392 0.1875 0.181 
32 0.250 0.398 0.190 0.162 0.238 0.390 0.1926 0.180 
33 0.245 0.400 0.195 0.160 0.234 0.389 0.1974 0.180 
34 0.242 0.400 0.200 0.158 0.231 0.387 0.2028 0.179 
35 0.241 0.396 0.206 0.157 0.230 0.383 0.2083 0.179 
36 0.241 0.390 0.211 0.157 0.231 0.377 0.2141 0.178 
37 0.242 0.387 0.217 0.154 0.232 0.374 0.2187 0.175 
38 0.240 0.386 0.225 0.149 0.228 0.372 0.2265 0.174 
39 0.239 0.385 0.231 0.146 0.224 0.369 0.2327 0.174 
40 0.238 0.380 0.237 0.145 0.224 0.363 0.2393 0.174 
41 0.238 0.377 0.242 0.144 0.224 0.358 0.2442 0.175 
42 0.237 0.372 0.246 0.145 0.223 0.352 0.2480 0.176 
43 0.239 0.365 0.254 0.142 0.222 0.346 0.2558 0.177 
44 0.239 0.359 0.262 0.141 0.221 0.340 0.2632 0.177 
45 0.233 0.352 o^ms 0.137 0.214 0.331 0.2785 0.176 
46 0.233 0.352 0.282 0.133 0.211 0.330 0.2836 0.175 
47 0.233 0.347 0.290 0.130 0.211 0.323 0.2914 0.175 
48 0.232 0.343 0.296 0.129 0.209 0.319 0.2972 0.175 
49 0.231 0.340 0.302 0.127 0.207 0.317 0.3039 0.172 
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Match Between Two Equal-Strength'^ Teams 
Historic Premiership Frequencies Estimated LogitProbabilities 
Away Home No-Score Score Away Home No-Score Score 
Minute Win Win Draw Draw Win Win Draw Draw 
50 0.229 0.338 0.311 0.122 0.204 0.313 0.3127 0.170 
51 0.227 0.335 0.319 0.119 0.204 0.313 0.3127 0.170 
52 0.225 0.330 &328 0.117 0.199 0.302 0.3301 0.169 
53 0.221 0.326 0.339 0.114 0.193 0.297 0.3412 0.169 
54 0.218 0.320 0.350 0.112 0.190 0.292 0.3522 0.167 
55 0.214 0.317 0.360 0.108 0.184 0.287 0.3618 0.167 
56 0.211 0.315 0.371. 0.104 0.180 0.283 0.3720 0.164 
57 0.212 0.307 0.382 0.098 0.179 0.274 0.3841 0.162 
58 0.208 0.301 0.392 0.098 0.177 0.267 0.3940 0.162 
59 0.206 0.296 0.401 0.097 0.175 0.261 0.4020 0.163 
60 0.200 0.296 0.414 0.090 0.168 0.255 0.4163 0.160 
61 0.198 0.289 0.427 0.087 0.165 0.246 0.4289 0.160 
62 0.193 &287 0.437 0.083 0.160 0.242 0.4402 0.158 
63 0.188 0.279 0.452 0.081 0.154 0.235 0.4551 0.156 
64 0.183 0.274 0.466 0.077 0.148 &229 0.4700 0.153 
65 0.183 0.266 0.477 0.074 0.145 0.220 0.4809 0.154 
66 0.176 0.263 0.494 0.068 0.139 0.215 0.4974 0.149 
67 0.177 0.255 0.511 0.057 0.134 0.203 0.5154 0.148 
68 0.170 0.249 0.523 0.057 0.129 0.194 0.5303 0.147 
69 0.159 0.247 0.539 0.055 0.121 0.190 0.5443 0.145 
70 0.156 0.239 0.551 0.053 0.117 0.182 0.5566 0.145 
71 0.155 0.231 0.562 0.053 0.114 0.173 0.5676 0.145 
72 0.145 0.220 0.583 0.051 0.106 0.163 0.5887 0.142 
73 0.143 0.205 0.602 0.050 0.102 0.151 0.6070 0.141 
74 0.144 0.198 0.616 0.043 0.097 0.143 0.6193 0.141 
75 0.137 0.184 0.639 0.040 0.090 0.130 0.6408 0.139 
76 0.132 0.172 0.663 0.033 0.082 0.119 0.6644 0.135 
77 0.122 0.165 0.683 0.030 0.071 0.112 0.6866 0.130 
78 0.117 0.151 0.707 0.025 0.065 0.100 0.7092 0.126 
79 0.105 0.144 0.730 0.021 0.054 0.090 0.7322 0.123 
80 0.097 0.130 0.753 0.020 0.048 0.076 0.7550 0.121 
81 0.091 0.121 0.771 0.017 0.044 0.065 0.7736 0.117 
82 0.083 0.114 0.792 0.010 0.037 0.057 0.7957 0.110 
83 0.082 0.110 0.799 0.009 0.034 0.051 0.8032 0.112 
84 0.075 0.102 0.818" 0.005 0.028 0.044 0.8211 0.106 
85 0.064 0.090 0.840 0.006 0.022 0.035 0.8421 0.100 
86 0.060 0.074 0.866 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.8686 0.089 
87 0.056 0.063 0.881 0.000 0.016 0.018 0.8825 0.083 
88 0.053 0.043 0.903 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.9060 0.071 
89 0.033 0.031 0.937 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.9365 0.052 
90 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.0000 0.000 
Correlation of Away Win Probabilities; 0.992 
Correlation of Home Win Probabilities; 0.996 
Correlation of No-Score Draw Probabilities; 1.00 
Correlation of Score Draw Probabilities; 0.892 
fBy equal strength we mean by 'form.' For example this could be a match between Chelsea 
and Manchester United where both teams have had a winning streak of 5 games, 
thereby giving each team a form of '3.' 
Table 6.8: Example of Outcome Probabilities Minute by Minute for a Match that 
Ended as a 0-0 Draw After 90 Minutes 
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Figure 6.3: Graphical Correlation of Premiership Frequency of No-Score Draw 
Probabilities and Probabilities Estimated by Logit Equation 
6.4.2 Stage 2 — Viewership Model 
We constructed three distinct measures of outcome uncertainty: 
1. 
2. Draws: f and 
3. + [PE; awin pj:^awin'\2 Jl^nsdraw 
These measures capture the different aspects of outcome uncertainty. The un-
certainty of outcome hypothesis states that the more uncertain the outcome of 
the game, the more 'exciting' it is, thus driving up demand. The first variable, 
SQOUJVt, relates to the relative strengths of the two teams. It incorporates not 
only team quality and form but also home team advantage. As the value of this 
variable decreases, the more uncertain the winner. The variables and 
PRjf'^'^ are the probabilities at minute t of a draw between home team j playing 
away team k. Unlike US sports, football has three outcomes. The third potential 
outcome (the draw) can be independent of the balance of the winning probabilities, 
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e.g., it may reflect different playing conditions or strategic conditions. For example 
some teams may be playing for a draw, e.g., a weak team playing away at a strong 
team may use this strategy to avoid losing. This variable might convey some of 
the dissatisfaction of viewers watching defensive-minded games. Secondly, draws 
may not be appealing to neutral spectators who want to see lots of goals and an 
eventual winner. The third variable measures uncertainty relative to the initial 
expectations. In addition to our uncertainty measure, we hypothesise that goals 
should increase the excitement of a game, though too many could make the game 
more certain and reduce viewer ship. It is also apparent there is some inertia in 
viewership so we include lagged variables to capture this effect. 
We construct a viewership model based on the 248 matches for which we have 
the minute-by-minute television ratings data. Dynamic panel data estimation ap-
pears to be the most appropriate model. Observation of viewing trends during a 
match suggest a strong inertia in viewership, therefore we will incorporate several 
lags of the dependent variable into the model. A common problem of panel data 
estimation with dynamic models is the potential for the lagged dependent variable 
to be correlated with the disturbance, which could encapsulate unvarying unob-
served effects^^. This correlation leads to inconsistent estimators and therefore 
an estimation method using instrumental variables is necessary. Anderson & Hsiao 
(1981) suggested flrst differencing to wipe out the unobserved fixed effects and using 
lagged levels of the dependent variable as instruments^^. Arellano & Bond (1991) 
developed a generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure to find a more ef-
ficient estimator using additional instruments. We apply the Arellano-Bond (AB) 
technique for our model of television demand since we believe a dynamic model 
most appropriately captures viewership inertia (i.e., once people tune in, they tend 
to remain tuned in and the data dictated that we should use three lags) and since 
it is likely that some effects are unobservable. Our model estimated using the AB 
estimator is the following; 
= Oijk H- /3l Arjfc^f_i -f P2^fjk,t-2 + + 
+ + A - H ^ A f 72^^-"+ (6-2) 
+ PgASQEXPECTjk,t + TimeDummies 
^^See Greene (2000); Baltagi (2005); Wooldridge (2002); or Hsiao (2003) for a summary. 
^^For example using as an instrument for Ayi^t-2-
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The general model is presented below in Table 6.9. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Regression Estimation 
The results from the Arellano-Bond one-step and two-step GMM dynamic esti-
mations are listed below in Table 6.9. The one-step and two-step estimations are 
presented for completion however one should use the one-step regression for in-
ference and the coefficients as two-step estimator is mainly used for the Sargan 
test. Standaxd errors from the two-step estimation are biased downwards. Further 
simulations performed in this Chapter will use the one-step coefficient estimates. 
Although Model (1) is our preferred model, we also estimated models with different 
versions of the outcome uncertainty variables. In Model (2) we do not distinguish 
between a no-score and a score draw, and in Model (3) we use a variation of 
the EXPECTjk^t variable where the individual terms are the absolute deviations 
instead of the squared terms. All the models pass the Sargan test and contain 
robust coefficients, but Model (1) is preferred as it differentiates between score and 
no-score draws which we believe is important for any policy implications. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Explanatory 
Variables One Step Two Step One Step Two Step One Step Two Step 
1 0.6633* 0.6608* 0.6629* 0.6595* 0.6546* 0.6497* (0.0206) (0.0049) (0.0206) (0.0043) (0.0202) (0.0034) 
Arjk,t-2 0.0881* 0.0913* 0.0882* 0.0906* 0.0864* 0.0898* 
(0.0106) (0.0034) (0.0106) (0.0037) (0.0106) (0.0030) 
0.0205^ 0.0226* 0.0206f 0.0236* 0.0193? 0.0235* 
(0.0091) (0.0026) (0.0091) (0.0033) (0.0092) (0.0034) 
^^9jk,t—l 0.0032 0.0032* 0.0056 0.0058* 0.0048 0.0067* 
(0.0046) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0011) (0.0042) (0.0011) 
^9jk,t 0.0089t 0.0097* 0.0089t 0.0094* 0.0089? 0.0090* 
(0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0012) 
-0.1558* -0.1600* 
(0.0433) (0.0153) 
-0.1171* -0.1154* 
(0.0441) (0.0139) 
A f % - -0.1437863* -0.1269* -0.1155* -0.0996* 
(0.0417092) (0.0112) (0.0413) (0.0150) 
AgQO[/_W,t,t -0.0843* -0.0838* -0.0930077* -0.0768* -0.0748? -0.0617* 
(0.0289) (0.0095) (0.0289193) (0.0078) (0.0303) (0.0108) 
0.0219 
(0.0143) 
0.0175* 
(0.0052) 
AgQEXfEC21,k,t 0.0496^ 0.0528* 0.0513136? 0.04626* 
(0.0215) (0.0076) 00.0218821) (0.0063) 
Minute 15 -0.0075^ -0.0067* -0.0074822? -0.0072* -0.0084? -0.0082* 
(0.0035) (0.0008) (0.0035887) (0.0009) (0.0037) (0.0010) 
Minute 17 0.0147* 0.0149* 0.0146918* 0.0141* 0.0138* 0.0128* 
(0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0034655) (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0008) 
0 
I 
i 
i 
I 
CO 
-^ 7 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Model 1 
One Step Two Step 
Model 2 
One Step Two Step 
Model 3 
One Step Two Step 
Minute 24 0.0161* 0.0155* 
(0.0031) (0.0006) 
0.0162* 0.0159* 
(0.0031) (0.0007) 
0.0149* 0.0157* 
(0.0032) (0.0007) 
Minute 31 -0 .0127* -0 .0124* 
(0.0029) (0.0008) 
-0 .0127* -0 .0133* 
(0.0030) (0.0007) 
- 0 . 0 1 4 0 * -0 .0136* 
(0.0029) (0.0009) 
Minute 36 0.0077* 0.0074* 
(0.0025) (0.0006) 
0.0077* 0.0070* 
(0.0026) (0.0007) 
O.OO6IT 0.0052* 
(0.0025) (0.0006) 
Minute 46 -0.1868* -0.1845* 
(0.0151) (0.0038) 
-0 .1869* -0 .1824* 
(0.0151) (0.0039) 
-0 .1879* -0 .1852* 
(0.0151) (0.0035) 
Minu te 47 0.1631* 0.1622* 
(0.0122) (0.0029) 
&1630* &1584* 
(0.0122) (0.0031) 
&1613* &1586* 
(0.0121) (0.0031) 
Minute 48 0.0245* 0.0241* 
(0.0054) (0.0016) 
0.0245* 0.0248* 
(0.0054) (0.0016) 
0.0245* 0.0260* 
(0X%)54) (0XM18) 
Minute 55 -0 .0196* -0 .0197* 
(0.0047) (0.0011) 
-0 .0197* -0 .0195* 
(0.0047) (0.0012) 
-0 .0196* -0 .0201* 
(0.0047) (0.0011) 
Minute 56 0.0135* 0.0146* 
(0.0046) (0.0013) 
0.0136* 0.0137* 
(0.0046) (0.0013) 
0.0127* 0.0133* 
(0.0046) (0.0012) 
Minute 70 -O.OllOT -0 .0126* 
(0.0051) (0.0016) 
-0.0107T -0 .0100* 
(0.0052) (0.0016) 
- 0 . 0 1 1 3 t -0 .0125* 
(0.0051) (0.0017) 
Minute 71 0.0063 0.0072* 
(0.0049) (0.0016) 
0.0065 0.0036^ 
(0.0049) (0.0015) 
0.0067 0.0069* 
(0.0049) (0.0016) 
Cons tan t 0.0020* 0.0019* 
(0.0003) (0.0001) 
0.0022* 0.0020* 
(0.0004) (0.0001) 
0.0022* 0.0020* 
(0.0004) (0.0001) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
z = - 1 3 . 8 2 z = -14.19 
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00 
z = 0.40 z = 0.00 
Pr > z = 0.69 Pr > z = 0.99 
z = - 1 3 . 8 1 z = - 1 4 . 2 2 
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00 
z = 0.43 z = 0.10 
Pr > z = 0.67 Pr > z = 0.92 
z = —13.86 z = —14.19 
Pr > z = 0.00 Pr > z = 0.00 
z = 0.36 z = 0.06 
Pr > z = 0.72 Pr > z = 0.95 
Sargan Test X''^ (429) = 228.81 
Pr > = 1.00 
% (^429) = 224.25 
Pr > = 1 0 0 
% (^429) = 225.87 
Pr > x^ = 1 0 0 
"Indicates Significance at 1% level 
flndicatcs Significance at 5% level 
ilndicates Significance at 10% level 
Table 6.9: Viewership Regression; Arellano-Bond One-Step and Two-Step GMM Estimation 
0 
i 
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Diagnostic checks for the GMM estimators include tests for serial correlation in 
the errors and a test that checks the instruments are not correlated with the errors. 
If the errors are correlated the GMM estimator will be inconsistent. Arellano and 
Bond state that there should be first order but no second order serial correlation. 
The results here indicate that this is the case for our sample. Additionally the 
Sargan statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not 
correlated with the errors^^. We also check for multicollinearity between the inde-
pendent variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF). Variables who have a 
VIF greater than 10 may need to be investigated further. None of the independent 
variables in our equation have a VIF greater than 10 as presented below in Table 
6.10. 
Variable VIF 
i9jk,t—i 2.32 
9jk,t 1.02 
&83 
4 24 
9.26 
SQEXPECTjh^t 3.06 
Table 6.10: Variance Inflation Factor Multicollinearity Test for Equation 6.2 
Most of the signs and significance of the outcome uncertainty variables conform 
to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. The SQOU.Wjk^t variable (which mea-
sures the difference in the probabilities for a home or away win) is negative^'^ and 
significant at the 1% level which means the greater the uncertainty about which 
side will win, the more viewers that will watch the game. If outcome uncertainty 
falls, then viewers may switch to other channels or turn off the television. However, 
if outcome uncertainty rises, channel hoppers may decide to stay with the game. 
It is also possible that potential viewers may receive updates about the state of 
the game from other sources such as the radio, internet or mobile phone texts and 
may decide to start watching based on the current level of outcome uncertainty. 
To the extent that the and variables are interpreted as mea-
Arellano & Bond (1991) suggest using the two-step results for the Sargan test. The Sarg;ui 
test has low power and the null is easily rejected if heteroskedasticity is present. Therefore, for 
the one-step estimation we use White's procedure for robust standard errors. 
^^The sign is negative because the more the value approaches zero (gets smaller) the more 
uncertain the winner. 
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sures of outcome uncertainty, the signs are perverse. However these variables may 
indicate other aspects of the quality of the game, e.g., "boring" characteristics such 
as non-attacking play, few goals, etc which could reduce viewer ship. A striking re-
sult of the estimation is that score draws were also negatively signed albeit with a 
smaller magnitude. In our estimation sample of 248 matches, 65 games were draws 
of which 30% (20 matches) were no-score draws. In fact, out of all Premiership 
games (from the 1992-1993 season to the close of the 2004-2005 season) approx-
imately 27.7% of the matches were draws^. One explanation for the negatively 
signed score-draw coefficient is that for most of the minutes, the score is level and 
no team is leading. For all of the score-draw matches in our sample, approximately 
60% of the minutes were where the score was level. Conversely, for games where 
there was a winner, 60% of the minutes were where one team was leading. The 
longer the minutes are level, viewers may anticipate that a draw is inevitable and 
attacking play will subside. Table 6.11 below lists the proportion of 'level score 
minutes' in the score draw matches in our sample. 
Even if the final result ended up as a win, viewership would have been lower 
on average if a goal was only scored in the dying minutes of the game. By looking 
matches that ended 1-0 (and 0-1), and comparing the viewership of those matches 
that had a 'last minute' goal versus those matches that had a goal scored earlier 
in the match, there are lower .viewership figures for these late scoring matches. 
Obviously one reason could be that viewers surmise that the match will end as a 
no-score draw. Similarly, these games may be defensively fought matches where 
both sides are 'playing for the draw', whereas in an early-scoring match, the 'losing' 
side is forced to play more attacking football in order to get the equaliser or to 
achieve victory. Table 6.13 lists the comparison of viewership for 1-0 results. 
The SQEXPECTjk^t variable is consistent with the outcome uncertainty hy-
pothesis and is positively signed and significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
unexpected outcomes attracts viewers. A goal having occurred in the past minute 
boosted viewership as did total goals though the latter did not at a statistically 
significant level. 
The time dummies corrected for peaks and troughs in the data. During the 
46th minute, fans are still 'away' from the half time break and take a couple of 
^®Out of all the draws that occurred in the Premiership from 1993-2005, 31.9% were no-score 
draws and only 17.6% were high-scoring draws (2-2 and higher). 
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Number of Within Proportion 
Minute Level Absolute First & Last Goal of Minutes 
Timeband Minutes Percent 30 Minutes Difference at Goal Diff 
1-5 203 90.2% 0 60.0% 
6-10 163 72.4% 1 37.8% 
11-15 150 66.7% 2 2.2% 
16-20 132 58.7% 
21-25 126 56.0% 
26-30 113 50.2% 65.7% 
31-35 106 47.1% 
36-40 94 4L8% 
41-45 98 43.6% 
4&50 102 45.3% 
51-55 113 50.2% 
56-60 118 5&4% 
61-65 122 54.2% 
66-70 128 56.9% 
71-75 137 60.9% 
76-80 152 67.6% 
81-85 173 76.9% 
86-90 200 88.9% 67.6% 
Games=45 
Table 6.11: Proportion of 'Level Minutes' in Score-Draws for Games Broadcast 
2002-2005 
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Number of Within Proportion 
Minute Level Absolute First & Last Goal of Minutes 
Timeband Minutes Percent 30 Minutes Difference at Score 
1-5 4605 94.3% 0 59.360% 
6-10 4079 83.5% 1 38.166% 
11-15 3648 74.7% 2 2.430% 
16-20 3231 66.1% 3 0.044% 
21-25 2933 60.0% 
26-30 2626 53.8% 72.1% 
31-35 2432 49.8% 
36-40 2291 46.9% 
41-45 2166 44.3% 
46-50 2118 43.4% 
51-55 2129 43.6% 
56-60 2153 44.1% 
61-65 2191 44.9% 
66-70 2384 48.8% 
71-75 2650 54.2% 
76-80 2961 60.6% 
81-85 3410 6&8% 
86-90 4188 8&7% 62.1% 
Ganies=977 
Table 6.12: Proportion of 'Level Minutes' in Score-Draws for Premiership 1993-
2005 
Goal Scored 
Before Minute 
Goal Scored 
After Minute 
All gP u 79 84 
Rating 2.36 2.91 2.94 3.00 2.29 2.28 2,20 
Means Test 
All 1-0 (0-1): 15.99* 18.88* 22.71* -2.13t -2.36t -4.26* 
Before Minute 21: 0.99 2.52t -16.93* -17.06* -18.50* 
Before Minute 26: 1.76* -19.48* -19.53* -20.94* 
Before Minute 29: -20.51* -20.02* -20.68* 
After Minute 7^: -0.36 -2.43t 
After Minute 79: -2.08t 
Games 56 8 10 13 11 9 7 
* Indicates Significance at 1% level 
tIndicates Significance at 5% level 
^Indicates Significance at 10% level 
Table 6.13: Comparison of Viewership for Matches Ending as 1-0 (0-1) 
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minutes to return to viewing as indicated by the large drop for minute 46 and large 
spike at minute 47. What may be peculiar at first are the significance minutes 15, 
17, 24, 31,36, 55 56, 70 and 71. Upon further investigation, there is a very simple 
explanation for these unusual increases and decreases. For specific kick-off times, 
these minutes correspond to a specific time in the 24 hour clock. Table 6.14 below 
should make it easier to see why these minutes are significant. 
Time after Match Minute: 
Kick-off 15 17 24 31 36 55 70 
hh:00 hh:15 hh:17 hh:24 hh:30 hh:36 hh:15 hh:30 
hh:15 hh:30 hh:32 hh:39 hh:45 hh:51 hh:25 hh:40 
hh:30 hh:45 hh:47 hh:54 hh:00 hh:06 hh:40 hh:55 
hh:45 hh:00 hh:02 hh:39 hh;15 hh:21 hh:55 hh:10 
hh:05 hh:20 hh:22 hh:29 hh:35 hh:41 hh:15 hh:30 
Table 6.14: Significance of Time Dummies 
The times in bold indicate times when viewers are likely to be switching chan-
nels to tune in or in the case of boring matches, turning off. By looking at the 
average change in rating minute by minute, the general trend is steadily increasing. 
However for minutes listed above there was a shift in this trend. For minutes 55, 
56, 70 and 71, it is expected that they might not fall exactly on the hour and half 
hour as half time most likely runs past the allotted 15 minutes. This is confirmed 
by the PA sport data which gives the second half kick-off times. By examining 
channel switching reports^® there is a strong indication that new viewers do in fact 
tune in near the hour and half hour and that almost equal portions of these viewers 
either tune in from other channels or are turning on their televisions to watch the 
game. For minute 24, more than two thirds of the new viewers are tuning in from 
other satellite channels, while in minute 55 most of the viewers that decide to turn 
off the match are switching to other channels. Viewers may decide to turn off if 
the match is boring and choose to do so as another program starts on a different 
channel. 
We also included the variables ^ (a dummy variable if a goal had been scored 
within the last 10 minutes) and ^ (similarly, a dummy variable if a goal had been 
scored within the last 15 minutes) to capture any lingering affect on viewership. 
These reports indicate the source of new viewers as well as where viewers go if they change 
channels or switch off. 
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These were not significant. We also estimated models which included red cards 
and interaction variables, none of these variables were significant. 
6.5.2 Explanatory Power of Viewership Model—Actual Matches 
Below we present three actual matches to illustrate the explanatory power of the 
viewership model: (1) Game A is between two equal-strength (in terms of form 
not odds of winning) teams that resulted in a no-score draw, (2) Game Bis a 1-0 
outcome between two evenly matched teams and (3) Game G is a 3-3 draw where 
the away team form is twice that of the home team. For each game we present the 
probability plots of match outcome based on the logit model in Equation 6.1 and 
the predicted viewership from Equation 6.2. We use the estimates from Model (1) 
to simulate viewership. 
g &6 
0 2 4 G 8 10 1 2 l 4 16 18 2 0 22 2 4 2 6 2 8 30 3 2 3 4 3 0 3 a 4 0 4 2 44 4 8 4 8 50 52 64 6 6 G 8 G O & 2 6 4 6 6 68 7 0 72 74 76 7 8 8G 82 84 8 6 8 8 Q0 
Minute 
——PR NSdraw ——PR Sdraw PR Awin — PR Hwin 
Figure 6.4: Game A — Estimated Logit Minute-by-Minute Outcome Probabilities 
for a No-Score Draw Between Two Equal-Strength Teams 
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1Q 18 2 0 2 2 2 4 2 6 2 8 3 0 32 3 4 36 3 8 4 0 4 2 4 4 4 8 4 8 50 5 2 54 5 6 58 6 0 6 2 G 4 6 6 6 8 7 0 7 2 74 7 6 7 8 8 0 8 2 8 4 8 8 8 8 Q 0 
Minute 
^—Predicted Viewerehip Actual Viewership 
Figure 6.5: Game A — Estimated and Actual Viewership 
F^_NSdraw PR_Sdf«w PR_Awfi PR Hwlfi 
Figure 6.6; Game B — Estimated Logit Minute-by-Minute Outcome Probabilities 
for a 1-0 Result Between Two Equal-Strength Teams 
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0 2 4 6 8 1 0 12 14 16 1B 2 0 2 2 24 2 8 2 8 3 0 32 34 36 3 8 4 0 4 2 4 4 4 8 4 8 G 0 5 2 S 4 6 B 5 8 6 0 82 64 68 6 8 7 0 7 2 74 7 6 78 8 0 82 B4 8 8 88 9 0 
Mlnuk 
Predicted Viewership Actual Viewership • - G o a l 
Figure 6.7: Game B — Estimated and Actual Viewership 
0 . 4 
0 2 4 8 8 10 12 14 18 18 2 0 2 2 24 2 6 2 8 3 0 32 34 3 6 38 4 0 4 2 44 4 0 4 8 6 0 6 2 54 5 8 5 6 6 0 62 04 8 6 6 8 7 0 72 74 7 6 78 80 82 84 88 88 8 0 
M i n u t e 
PR NSdraw PR Sdraw PR Awin PR Hwin 
Figure 6.8: Game C — Estimated Logit Minute-by-Minute Outcome Probabilities 
for a 3-3 Result Between Two Different Strength Teams 
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0 2 4 6 6 10 12 14 16 18 2 0 2 2 2 4 2 6 2 8 3 8 3 2 3 4 36 3 8 4 0 4 2 4 4 4 8 4 8 5 0 5 2 54 5 0 5 6 8 0 8 2 64 6 6 6 8 70 72 74 7 8 78 80 8 2 84 6 0 8 8 90 
Minute 
Predicted Viewership -Actual \^ewership — H o m e Goals —A—Away Goals 
Figure 6.9: Game C — Estimated and Actual Viewership 
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6.5.3 Size of the Impact of Outcome Uncertainty on Viewership 
Simulations 
Given that our outcome uncertainty measures are contingent on the state of the 
game (in terms of the score), there is no simple way to summarise the impact of 
outcome uncertainty on average. Using Model (1) estimates we illustrate the effect 
of outcome uncertainty on viewership by simulating a hypothetical game with five 
possible results: 
(a) A no-score draw. 
(b) An away win (0-1). 
(c) A home win (1-0). 
(d) A score-draw where the home team scores first (1-1). 
(e) A score-draw where the away team scores first (1-1). 
The teams are assumed to be near-equal strength, with a slight form advantage 
for the away team. The initial rating is assumed to be 2.37, the average for our 
dataset. The first goal occurs in the 25th minute with the second goal coming in 
the 80th minute in the case of the score-draw. Clearly the no-score draw (case 
(a)) does not attract as many viewers as would a 0-1 (case (b)) or 1-0 (case (c)) 
result. The 1-1 (case (e)) result hurts viewership relative to case (b) but the 1-
1 (case (d)) result increases viewership slightly relative to case (c). This can be 
attributed to the change in expectations of the away team scoring. Due to home 
advantage, home teams are twice as likely to win as the away team, thus an away 
goal occurring first generates an element of surprise. By looking at Figure 6.11, 
there is a larger jump in viewership when the away team scores first rather than 
if the home team leads initially; although either team scoring increases viewership 
over no score. However, in the case where the away team scores first and then the 
home team equalises, expectations of a home win (or at least a draw) are brought 
back into line. This is seen in the decreasing rate viewership after the goal in the 
80th minute. While it may appear that a 1-1 increases overall viewership over a 
no-score draw, it is not due to the draw but rather the viewership increase is driven 
by the away team leading. In the case where the home team scores first and the 
away team equalises, it will actually shift viewership up but then level off. The 
average television ratings for the five results are summarised below in Table 6.15. 
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(a) 0-0 
I 
(b) 0-1 
I 
(e) 1 -1 
(c) 1-0 
1 
(d) 1-1 
Figure 6.10: Path of Simulated Game 1 
Percent Percent Percent 
Average Increase Increase Increase 
Result Rating Over 0-0 Over 1-0 Over 0-1 
(a) 0-0 2.635 
(b) 0-1 2.750 4.39% 
(3.88*) 
(c) 1-0 2.700 2.50% 
(2.41)t 
(d) 1-1 (ha) 2.703 2.60% 
(2.47)t 
0.10% 
(0.08) 
(e) 1-1 (ah) 2.747 
(3.82)* 
4.26% 
(-0.10) 
-0.12% 
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses. 
* Indicates Significance at 1% level 
^Indicates Significance at 5% level 
Table 6.15; Simulation of Five Different Results and the Impact on Viewership 
Halitime 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2 0 22 24 26 2 8 30 32 34 3 8 3 8 4 0 42 44 4 6 4 8 50 52 64 58 5 8 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 7 8 80 82 84 86 8 8 90 
—#—0-0 — 0 - 1 - # - 1 - 0 — 1 ( h ) - 1 — 1 ( a M 
Figure 6.11: Simulation of Five Different Results and Impact on Viewership 
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In another example we assume a very strong team (with an average of 2.4 points 
per game over the last 5 games) plays away at a relatively weaker team (an average 
of 0.4 points per game). Given this scenario the away team is expected to win. 
In this case we plot the twenty different results including the 2-2 final score that 
could have been reached via six different scoring patterns; 
- Two home goals followed by two away goals (hhaa). 
- Alternating goals with the home team scoring first (haha). 
- Two away goals between two home goals (haah). 
- Two home goals sandwiched between two away goals (ahha). 
- Alternating goals with the away team scoring first (ahah). 
- Two away goals followed by two home goals (aahh). 
(a) 0-0 
, I , 
(b) 1-0 (c) 0-1 
I , I 
(d) 2-0 (e) 1-1 ( f ) l - l (g) 0-2 
I I 1 I 1 I 
(h) 2-1 (i) 2-1 0)1-2 (k)2-l (1)1-2 (m) 1-2 
I I I I I I 
0424 .0024 GD24 00^2 00&2 
Figure 6.12: Path of Simulated Game 2 
We assume a lower initial rating of 1.00 with goals coming in the 42nd, 60th, 
75th and 82nd minutes. Tables 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18 below compare the different 
results with the percentage change in rating if the match had ended differently. 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Average Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase 
(Case)Result Rating Over 0-0 Over 1-0 Over 0-1 Over l(h)-l Over l(a)-l Over 2-0 Over 0-2 
(a) 0-0 1.257 
(b) 1-0 1.350 7.36% 
(3.18*) 
(c) 0-1 1.325 
(2.48t) 
(d) 2-0 1.356 7.82% 
(3.30*) 
0.43% 
(0.16) 
(4 1-1 (ha) 1.352 7.53% 
(3.24*) 
0A6% 
(0.06) 
(f) l-l(ah) 1.340 6.61% 
(2.88*) 
1J7% 
(0.47) 
(g) 0-2 1.329 5.70% 
(2.57lj 
0.30% 
(0.12) 
(h) 2-1 (hha) 1.355 7.75% 
(3.28*) 
0.36% 
(0.14) 
-0.06% 
(-0.02) 
(i) 2-1 (hah) 1.358 7.99% 
(3.35*) 
0.59% 
0122) 
0.43% 
(0.16) 
(j) 1-2 (haa) 1.352 7.54% 
(3.24*) 
0^7% 
(0.06) 
0.01% 
(0.00) 
(k) 2-1 (ahh) 1.346 7.07% 
(3.00*) 
1.61% 
(0.63) 
0.43% 
(0.16) 
(1) 1-2 (aha) 1.340 6jG% 
(2.88*) 
1.18% 
(0.47) 
0.01% 
(0.00) 
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses. 
* Indicates Significance at 1% level 
tindicates Significance at 5% level 
i 
i 
i 
I 
i 
Table 6.16: Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact of Viewership (a) 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Average Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase 
Result Rating Over 0-0 Over 1-0 Over 0-1 Over l(h)-l Over l(a)-l Over 2-0 Over 0-2 
(m) 1-2 (aah) 1.329 5.73% 
(2.58t) 
0.33% 
(0.14) 
0.03% 
(0.01) 
W 2-2(hhaa) 1.352 7.56% 
(3.24*) 
Oj^% 
(0.07) 
-0.24% 
( - 0 . 0 9 ) 
(o) 2-2(haha) 1.355 7.80% 
(3.31*) 
0.41% 
(0.16) 
0.25% 
(0.10) 
(P) 2-2(haah) 1.352 
(3.25*) 
0.20% 
(0.08) 
0.04% 
(0.10) 
(q) 2-2(ahha) 1.344 6.89% 
(2.95*) 
1.43% 
(0.57) 
, 0.25% 
(0.10) 
• 
(r) 2-2(ahah) 1.341 6.65% 
(2.89*) 
1.21% 
(0.48) 
0.04% 
(0.01) 
(s) 2-2(aahh) 1.330 5.76% 
(2.59t) 
Oj#% 
(0.15) 
0.06% 
(0.02) 
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses. 
* Indicates Significance at 1% level 
findicates Significance at 5% level 
Table 6.17; Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact of Viewership (b) 
I % 
i 
i § 
1 
tsD 
I—' 
to 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Average Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase 
Result Rating Over 2-l(hha) Over 2-1 (hah) Over 2-1 (ahh) Over l-2(aha) Over l-2(haa) Over l-2(aah) 
(n) 2-2(hhaa) 1.352 -0.1748% 
( - 0 . 0 7 ) 
(o) 2-2(haha) 1.355 -0 .1744% 
( - 0 . 0 7 ) 
(P) 2-2(haah) 1.352 0.03% 
(0.01) 
(q) 2-2(ahha) 1.344 -0 .1759% 
( - 0 . 0 7 ) 
(r) 2-2(ahah) 1.341 0.03% 
(0.01) 
(s) 2-2(aahh) 1.330 0.03% 
(0.01) 
t-statistics for means test are in parentheses. 
* Indicates Significance at 1% level 
^Indicates Significance at 5% level 
i 
O) 
i 
1 § 
I 
Table 6.18; Simulation of a 2-2 Draw and the Impact on Viewership (c) 
to 
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W , 
Figure 6.13; Average Ratings of Games that Could End in a 2-2 Score Draw 
Again the element of surprise raises the average rating relative to what one 
would have expected. Given that the away team was expected to win, average 
ratings are higher when the home team scores first (cases b, d, e, h, i, j, n, o, p) 
and win relative to the other outcomes. The scoring pattern in case (n) generates 
the optimal ratings for a 2-2 result. Comparing cases (i) and (j), at the 75th minute 
the value for SQOUJWjk,t is lower for case (i) and SQEXPECTjk,t is higher which 
increases the average rating over that of case (j). 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
The competitive balance of popular sport is not just an important economic issue, 
it has become a matter of political significance. As far back as the 1950s the 
United States Congress held hearings to discuss the validity of imposing competitive 
restraints in the players' labour market in order to achieve a desirable level of 
competitive balance. In 2005 the European Commission instituted a review of the 
governance of football to investigate, inter alia, whether European soccer leagues 
were sufficiently balanced and, if not, to suggest what pohtical measures might 
be taken to increase that balance. Such interventions are to a significant degree 
motivated by the argument that a sporting contest must entail sufficient uncertainty 
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of outcome to maintain the interest of spectators. 
Empirical studies of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis have dealt almost 
exclusively with this question in terms of match attendance. In this paper we have 
looked at television viewing. Television is rapidly becoming the principal source 
of revenues for football leagues in Europe, and is already the dominant source for 
the American major leagues, most notably American football. To our knowledge 
Forrest et al (2005) provide the first empirical measures of the impact of uncertainty 
on TV viewers, comparing average viewership of games with different levels of ex 
ante uncertainty. Our study is the first to analyse the impact of uncertainty on the 
level of viewership within a game, minute by minute. 
Our findings suggest a complex picture. Uncertainty matters in the sense that 
viewership is decreasing in the gap in the probabilities of each side winning, but is 
also decreasing in the probability of a draw. This suggests that a significant pro-
portion of viewers want something more than statistical uncertainty. The fact that 
our measure of the unexpected (the difference between pre-match probabilities and 
within match probabilities) tends to be positively associated with viewership lends 
weight to the idea that fans demand excitement, which is likely to be associated 
with eventful games in which one side wins, rather than tame draws. 
Our findings show that audience fluctuations within matches are significantly 
affected by the progress of the game. Fans may switch channels away from the game 
if they find the probability of a draw is increasing, or they may switch to and stick 
with a game that has an exciting result in prospect. We found significant evidence 
of fan switching at times when programmes on other channels were likely to end. 
Games that produce a result are likely to have significantly higher audiences than 
games which end up as 0-0 draws. However, even games that involve goals being 
scored may have relatively low viewership if the game ends up as a draw. Using 
some simulation exercises we were able to show that in some cases a drawn match 
can attract a lower viewership than a match which end up with a win for one team, 
depending on the evolution of the game. 
These results suggest that there is need for a certain amount of caution about 
the proposed interventions to redistribute resources in order to create an appro-
priate level of competitive balance. Reforms that increased the probability of a 
win rather than a draw could increase viewership, if the probabilities were evenly 
balanced between the two teams. Given that there exists a natural home advan-
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tage, some of the most well balanced and exciting games axe likely to be between a 
strong team playing away against a relatively weak team. Given home advantage, 
a league of equally strong teams might even reduce viewer ship. 
Finally, it is worth commenting on the desirability of draws. In the North 
American major leagues, tied games have been abolished by requiring a result (with 
overtime in American football and extra innings in baseball). Would measures to 
ensure a result, such as the penalty shoot-out, be desirable in European football? 
Our results suggest caution on this front as well. While a penalty shoot-out may 
guarantee a result, what matters for viewership is the pattern of play over the whole 
game, not just the end result. Teams (especially weak ones) often prefer a penalty 
shoot-out to taking risks during regulation time and therefore forcing a result in this 
way may provoke even more conservative play attracting fewer viewers. However 
it appears that viewers like goals and prefer more goals to be scored in matches 
to make it entertaining and competitive. Policies to lessen the likelihood of 0-0 
stalemates could be helpful for the game, but there also exists means to improve 
the scoring potential in games by introducing features such as 'power plays' as in 
hockey where a penalised player is not sent off, but rather removed from the game 
for a period of minutes. An example is the sin bin in rugby. Fans prefer excitement 
and any policy imposed to improve scoring and entertainment would be welcomed. 
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6.7 Additional Tables for Chapter 6 
6.7.1 Definitions 
Variable Definition 
n 
pj^awin 
ppnsdraw 
p psdraw 
Qt-i 
Television rating. 
Probability of a home win at time t. 
Probability of an away win at time t. 
Probability of a non-score draw at time t. 
Probability of a score draw at time t. 
Probability of any draw at time t. 
Total number of goals (home and away) at time t. 
If a goal was scored in the last minute. 
fhwin D uhwin [ I p TDhwin p -nm + p rpawin r> TDawin 
Iprqit'" - -PflSj-l + \PR'itr - PRj'Tl 
PR'itaf + (PR'tT - PRit«f ( p rfhwin 
( p TDnsdraw PRTkT^Y + {PR" •sdraw p ipsdraw •ik,t ^^ik,0 
+ 
+ 
\ 2 
Table 6.19: Regression Variables 
6.7.2 Television Terminology 
The following television terms are according to the BARB website; 
• Television Rating — The TVR (Television Rating) measures the popular-
ity of a programme, daypart, commercial break or advertisement, by com-
paring its audience to the population as a whole. One TVR is numerically 
equivalent to one per cent of a target audience. 
• Reach — The net number or percentage of people who have seen a par-
ticular piece of broadcast output (e.g. a programme, daypart, channel, TV 
advertising campaign). The BARB definition is for this to be at least three 
consecutive minutes. 
• Share — The percentage of the total viewing audience watching over a given 
period of time. This can apply to channels, programmes, time periods etc. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 Summary and Contribution of Thesis 
The first two chapters of the thesis focused on economic objectives and behaviour 
and the potential impacts on the financial viability of clubs and the competitive 
balance of the league. The last two chapters examine directly competitive balance 
and its impact on demand. In the next Section we shall review these different areas 
and their individual contributions. 
7.1.1 Economic Objectives and Behaviour 
By examining clubs that changed ownership structure in the mid-1990s, we were 
able to discern if there was any notable change in economic behaviour and its po-
tential impact on competitive balance. Sixteen clubs floated on the London Stock 
Exchange which should have encouraged clubs to behave more like profit maximis-
ers in order to attract investors. By going public and dispersing ownership, clubs 
also increased the risk for agency problems. Over the period examined, operating 
profits fell substantially with quite a few clubs (both public and private) going 
into administration status. However, over the same period, wages and revenues 
increased which implies that revenues were not converted into profits and most 
likely funded player transfers, .wages and stadium enhancements. Using a panel 
data and an error correction model we tested for the impact of floatation on per-
formance both on and off the pitch. In the short-run team success weakened but 
remained unaffected in the long-run. This indicates that the increased commer-
cialisation of football did not come at the expense of club performance nor did 
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it give teams a competitive advantage. Team revenues did increase, but this too 
did not translate into better profit margins nor did it appear to hurt or improve 
competitive balance. Since position was unaffected it is difficult to determine any 
behavioural change, although if clubs were strict win-maximisers we should have 
seen significantly improved positions 
The only discernable change was the improvement in revenues which at the very 
least implies that floated clubs tried to become more efficient in extracting revenue 
out of a given position - a seemingly profit-minded motive. Although there is not 
very strong evidence, the results do provide more insight into owner objectives and 
how competitive balance might be affected. 
7.1.2 Financial Adjustment and Viability 
Extending the economic objective model in Chapter 4 allows for a representation 
of wage adjustments when clubs miss or achieve their objectives as well as when 
clubs fall into financial difficulties. Falling short of position and revenue goals 
can increase the likelihood of financial trouble, but because the transfer market 
exists and allows for clubs to recuperate part of their spending in obtaining those 
goals, they are able to adjust by buying and selling players. The implication is 
that any policy aimed at altering or restricting the transfer market could have 
adverse effects on the financial viability of the team and its ability to maintain 
its competitiveness. Not only would these effects harm the club itself but bring 
down the competitiveness of the league if clubs are unable to rebuild by using a 
well-functioning and efficient transfer market. 
Also, the wage adjustment mechanism demonstrates that clubs which achieve 
their revenue objectives, tend to spend less the following season relative to the 
league average. This suggests a means to improve profits by effectively reducing 
wage costs relative to the club's competitors. Overperforming with respect to po-
sition did not significantly affect wage spending during the following season, again 
suggesting that more win maximising motives would lead to increased spending. 
The implication of profit maximising football clubs is that some policies imposed 
to increase competitive balance may not have any affect. However, to what extent 
should competitive balance be pursued? 
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7.1.3 Optimal Win Distribution and Perfect Balance 
The results of Chapter 5 indicate that competitive balance under noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium is greater than if a social planner were to jointly maximise profits. 
The sensitivity of attendance to winning percentages indicate that less competi-
tive balance jointly maximises attendance across the leagues. More importantly 
the indication is that perfect competitive balance would not improve attendances 
relative to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. If a social planner were to jointly 
maximise league profits, the distribution of winning percentage would be much 
more skewed than at present. 
Thus, pursuing policies to increase competitive balance may not be desirable. 
The argument for more competitive balance is to increase the excitement of the 
competition and therefore attendance. However, if one considers the negative im-
pacts of such policies, increasing competitive balance may do more harm than 
good. 
7.1.4 Demand for Football on T V and Outcome Uncer-
tainty 
As TV becomes a dominant source of income for football clubs across Europe as 
well as a more accessible means for fans to watch the games, it becomes desirable to 
use television viewer ship in testing for outcome uncertainty on demand. Analysing 
the impact of outcome uncertainty on television viewership within a game minute 
by minute, revealed some interesting results. Uncertainty is important but so is 
winning. Our results indicate that draws, although usually associated with un-
certainty, actually have lower viewership than games with winners. Television 
audiences have a greater flexibility in showing their preferences as opposed to a fan 
sat in the middle of 40,000 other fans, since they can easily change the channel if 
the game is uneventful match. Thus by following the minute by minute viewership, 
demand was seen to fluctuate given the progress of the game and viewers prefer an 
exciting result as opposed to a draw. 
An implication of this result could be that instead of focusing policies on improv-
ing competitive balance, sporting bodies could focus on incentives for increasing 
attacking play. The introduction of the three-point rule in 1981 in England was 
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designed to promote attacking play. Similar strategies and tournament designs 
should be encouraged. 
7.2 Further Research 
The results here provide many opportunities for future work. The role of economic 
objectives and financial viability can most certainly be complemented with case 
studies and an expanded dataset. Through case studies, a more focused inspection 
of how clubs deal with financial difficulties could be explored. Likewise, one could 
follow the process through which clubs adjust to missed opportunities and over-
achievement. Expansion of the dataset and suvery period could also incorporate 
the testing of new policies such as club licensing and player quotas and how they 
might affect economic incentives. Another aspect to consider is what impact lu-
crative competitions such as the Champions League have on economic behaviour, 
especially with respect to wage spending and profit maximisation. 
Television viewership also provides a rich environment for research about com-
petitive balance and demand. An extension of 5 would be to try and estimate win 
sensitivities for viewership. Although only select games are broadcast currently, it 
is feasible that in the future more matches could be shown on different platforms 
(e.g., on mobile phones or the Internet) and various datasets could be compiled. 
Additionally and complementary to 6, would be a comparison between the impact 
of outcome uncertainty on viewership at the first minute (or first few minutes) of a 
game when anticipation about a match is still based on pre-match information with 
how outcome uncertainty might influence the average viewership over the whole 
game. Unexpected results (e.g., a 6-0 result when a closer match was anticipated) 
may alter the average viewership figures relative to the initial figures during the 
first moments of the match and this would make an interesting comparison. 
What is certain, is that the. increase in accessibility of football across different 
viewing platforms will definitely provide ample areas of research for the effect of 
competitive balance. 
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